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Mid-Term Assessment – Eye Kutoloka Project: Improved Resilience and Climate Governance in Angola’s Cuvelai Basin



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ACRONYMS

COP	Chief of Party
CP	Civil Protection
DCHA	Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
dTS	Development & Training Services, Inc.
DW	Development Workshop
DWA	Department of Water Affairs and Forestry Cuvelai-Etosha Basin
E3	Bureau for Economic Growth, Education and Environment
FEWSNET	Famine Early Warning System Network
FFEWS	Flood Forecasting and Early Warning System
GCC	Global Climate Change
GCCI	Global Climate Change Initiative
GEF	Global Environmental Facility
GIS	Geospatial Information System
GRA	Government of the Republic of Angola
GPS	Global Positioning System
HH	Household
INAMET	National Institute of Meteorology
MINADER	Ministry of Agriculture
MPR	Mid-Cycle Portfolio Review
NAPA	National Adaptation Programme of Action
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NIWR	National Institute of Water Resources
OFDA	U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
PPM	Office of Program, Policy and Management
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USFS	United States Forest Service
WL	World Learning

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACRONYMS 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS..... 2

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 3

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4

PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY 5

COUNTRY CONTEXT 6

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT 7

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 9

LESSONS LEARNED AND BEST PRACTICES..... 23

RECOMMENDATIONS 24

ANNEX 1: SCOPE OF WORK..... 26

ANNEX 2: TRIP AGENDA 30

ANNEX 3: PEOPLE INTERVIEWED 32

ANNEX 4: DOCUMENTS REVIEWED 33

ANNEX 5: MID-TERM ASSESSMENT TEAM MEMBERS..... 34

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The photo on the cover page is of a shallow water well (center of photo) in Ondjiva, the capital of Cunene province in Angola. The Angola-side of the Cuvelai Basin is situated almost entirely in the Cunene province. The photo was taken on January 27, 2015 by Rebecca Nicodemus.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

USAID/Angola applied for and received funding for a Global Climate Change Initiative (GCCI) Integration Pilot Project. The “Improved Resilience and Climate Governance in Angola’s Cuvelai Basin” is a two year initiative (Aug 2013 to Jul 2015) with a total budget of \$1,123,711 USD. As part of USAID’s learning objectives, pilot projects are routinely monitored and evaluated to derive knowledge and to provide opportunities to improve ongoing programming. To this end, USAID conducted a mid-term assessment of the project from January to February 2015. The review appraised current activities, while considering emerging issues, constraints, program assumptions, and other relevant events to foster creativity and encourage flexibility to redirect activities in exigent circumstances. The assessment consisted of interviews, document review, and observation of field-based activities.

The project strives to address the pressing disaster risk reduction (DRR) needs and to build climate resilience in the Cuvelai River Basin in Angola (largely in Cunene province). The original USAID proposal objectives were to support Angola NGOs to work with communities to develop disaster risk reduction (DRR) plans and response measures, to partner with government to develop a flood forecasting and early warning system and to improve the dissemination of short-term seasonal climate forecasts. The proposed pilot was integrated into an existing capacity building cooperative agreement with World Learning (WL). A sub-grant was awarded to Development Workshop (DW) to begin implementing activities in August 2013.

The project has been adjusted during implementation based on learning and has made different degrees of progress under the four key intervention areas (key intervention areas as stated at the time of the assessment): (1) development of a flood early warning system, (2) mapping of people, services and flooding, (3) implementation of a household survey, and (4) piloting key interventions that strengthen people’s resilience. The project has achieved several significant milestones. The project has produced a flood map for the province and service maps for each of the four project municipalities. It also completed a household survey in the four project municipalities, which was the first of its kind in the Angolan Cuvelai Basin. However, the results have yet to be publicly released. The project has made progress on the flood early warning system, but it is far behind the timeline originally envisioned, largely for reasons outside the project’s control. Progress has also been made on piloting key interventions, but since they were initiated late in the project, there are concerns regarding the successful completion of those interventions.

Other notable achievements include strengthening the capacity of Cunene Civil Protection and improving coordination between Government of the Republic of Angola (GRA) institutions and coordination between Angola and Namibia in areas relevant to the project. Concerns include delayed timelines for some interventions and, more generally, potentially misplaced expectations with regard to government stakeholder roles and responsibilities. Both concerns may impede the successful conclusion of the project and continued sustainability of results.

Lessons learned include the importance of having a strong government buy-in and support in Cunene province to make progress and the importance of recognizing, starting at project inception, the respective roles and responsibilities of government ministries. A best practice of the project was adaptively managing the project based on new evidence and information.

Recommendations for the project include immediately generating and distributing the findings from the vulnerability study and developing an outreach/advocacy plan to facilitate the demand and supply

response for the three demonstration pilots. USAID/Angola should consider using its convening power to facilitate a dialogue and hopefully an agreement between relevant government stakeholders to determine the roles and responsibilities for the maintenance of the flood early warning system as well as establishing a clear understanding on data sharing as analytical responsibilities. This is highly recommended due to the potential influence on the long-term sustainability of the project's interventions as well as potentially promoting the sustainability of a similar UNDP GEF program. The project should also consider drafting a sustainability plan, perhaps an informal document, that prioritizes aspects of the project that are intended to continue and documents how those activities will continue. Means of continuation could include that sufficient capacity has transferred (knowledge and resources) or other recently launched projects could continue efforts (e.g., similar UNDP GEF program). The final recommendation is to facilitate linkages (perhaps with assistance from USAID/Angola) with other current USAID project in the area (e.g., OFDA-funded projects) and with FEWSNET to share learning and perhaps garner support for the continuation of projects goals or goals in the region more broadly.

PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

USAID/Angola applied for and received funding for a Global Climate Change Initiative (GCCI) Integration Pilot Project. The "Improved Resilience and Climate Governance in Angola's Cuvelai Basin" is a two year initiative (Jul 2013 to Jun 2015) with a total budget of \$1,123,711 USD. As part of USAID's learning objectives, pilot projects are routinely monitored and evaluated to derive knowledge and to provide opportunities to improve ongoing programming. Due to a variety of reasons, USAID chose a peer-review assessment approach to replace the standard, external evaluation approach. This peer-review assessment approach is based on the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) Office of Program, Policy, and Management (PPM) Mid-Cycle Portfolio Review (MPR). This assessment approach aims to analyze projects in the context of the operational environment, while taking into consideration issues that may shape the future direction of these initiatives. Experience has demonstrated that a continuous analysis of a country's conditions better informs programming at three distinct but interconnected levels: (1) overall goal, (2) program objectives, and (3) activities funded.

To this end, USAID conducted a mid-term assessment of the project from January to February 2015. The review appraised current activities, while considering emerging issues, constraints, program assumptions, and other relevant events to foster creativity and encourage flexibility to redirect activities in exigent circumstances. This review was completed in accordance with a Statement of Work (Annex 1) developed in partnership with respective Bureaus, Mission, and implementing partner inputs. The principle process methodology was a "snap-shot" peer-review process that fostered a direct and constructive dialogue on the status of recent achievements, future challenges, and longer-term direction of project activities. These reviews are intended to provide the Mission with a third-party analysis, by a team experienced in GCCI integration activities, of the project at programmatic and strategic level. This process provides the country team with a timely perspective, feedback, and strategic recommendations for consideration to make possible mid-course adjustments to the project prior to its conclusion. The review also gave the GCCI the information necessary for making informed decisions regarding future resource allocations and for allowing personnel to advocate for the initiative to a variety of internal and external audiences, including the U.S. Congress and general public.

While in Washington, the assessment team reviewed documents and interviewed project stakeholders. The assessment team then travelled to Angola where it interviewed USAID/Angola staff, Government of the Republic of Angola (GRA) and Government of Namibia officials, implementing partners, grantees and

beneficiaries and reviewed field-based activities with key stakeholders with specific emphasis on the normative evaluation questions outlined later in this statement of work (Annex 1). See Annex 2 for the trip agenda, Annex 3 for the list of interviewees, Annex 4 for the documents reviewed, and Annex 5 for the list of mid-term assessment team members. At the conclusion of this process, the assessment team produced this report that includes a presentation of the assessment findings together with the team's conclusions and recommendations.

COUNTRY CONTEXT

Given a 27 year civil war and a war of independence prior to that, today's Angola has known just over a decade of peace. The Government Institutions of Angola and in particular of Cunene province lack the technical capacity, management capacity, physical and financial resources to address the anticipated impacts of climate change. The rural population, though they have the perception of the impact of climate change, as it was expressed during National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) activities, they lack the capacity, resources and financial assistance to adapt to and overcome worsening climatic conditions¹.

The NAPA and other assessments identify Cunene province as among the most vulnerable provinces to extreme climate events in the country. Cunene province is also among the poorest in the country. The large majority of livelihoods are subsistence-oriented and dependent on rain-fed agriculture. The majority of homesteads are built entirely as traditional structures of wood and thatch. A survey undertaken as part of the project across the four project municipalities (753 households) found that more than half of the people are less than 15 years old and there is an average of 10.0 and 6.2 people per rural and urban home, respectively. Most households (HHs) have more than one source of water but the great majority (92%) of sources supply water that would normally not be safe for human consumption. Approximately 29% of HHs treat their water. Considering these facts and statistics, there is, surprisingly, virtually no donor presence in the Angolan portion of the Cuvelai Basin.

The Angolan government institution responsible for all disaster risk reduction (DRR) activities is the Civil Protection Service, housed within the Ministry of Interior. On paper, in significant disaster cases the Civil Protection Service convenes a United Country Team that includes UNICEF, the Governments of the United States, Japan, the Netherlands and others but in reality this does not occur. The Government of the Republic of Angola (GRA) has never made an official disaster declaration appealing for USG assistance in the disaster-prone Cuvelai Basin, even though the Basin has in recent years seen both devastating floods (2008, 2009, and 2011) and drought (2012-2013).

Angola's economy is overwhelmingly driven by its oil sector. Oil production and its supporting activities contribute about 50% of GDP, more than 70% of government revenue, and more than 90% of the country's exports². Diamonds contribute an additional 5% to exports. Depressed global oil prices in 2014 have reduced GDP growth and put significant pressure on the budget. Additionally, corruption, especially in the extractive sector, remains a major challenge. If the drop in oil prices is prolonged, it might have an impact on the sustainability of certain aspects of the project (that rely on government resources).

¹ Angola National Adaptation Programme of Action (2007)

² *The World Factbook* 2013-14. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2013, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>

President Jose Eduardo Do Santos has been in power since 1979. He is both the chief of state and head of government. Under the 2010 constitution, the president is indirectly elected by National Assembly for a five-year term (eligible for a second term). Ballots are cast for parties rather than candidates, and the majority leader is appointed president. Following the elections of 2012, Dos Santos became president (eligible for a second term). Currently, government officials (at all levels) are appointed by the president. The constitution calls for local elections, but it is not clear when these will occur. Local elections increase accountability of government officials, which would be a positive with respect to the project goals.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT

In 2011, USAID/Angola applied for and received funding as one of the GCCI Integration Pilot Projects. The purpose of the integration pilot projects is to emphasize and support the need for integration of climate change into other top Agency priorities. The overarching goal of funding and learning from the integration pilot projects is to build climate resilience and promote lower-emission approaches to development across USAID's development portfolio. This particular project received climate change adaptation funding from the Bureau for Economic Growth, Education and Environment (E3) and DCHA.

By investing in these pilots, the Agency hopes to learn about the most effective ways to support low emissions, climate resilient growth, and in the case of this project, strong governance approaches to climate change. USAID will use the results and lessons learned from these pilots as Agency-wide teaching tools. USAID will then be in an even stronger position to program the next generation of climate change funds according to best practices identified in the pilots, and prioritize sectors in which USAID works.

Initial Project Proposal

The initial project proposal submitted by USAID/Angola to USAID/Washington strove to address the pressing disaster risk reduction (DRR) needs identified by Angola's National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) and in other vulnerability assessments. The pilot proposed to focus primarily on the Angolan portion of the Cuvelai River Basin, situated almost entirely in the province of Cunene in southern Angola. The proposed activities would also have relevance to the entire province of Cunene and broader Cuvelai River Basin (which crosses into Namibia).

Through this pilot project, the Mission sought to establish an innovative approach for linking DRR activities with climate change adaptation by training non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to work with communities to design and implement DRR plans that take into account climate change impacts and building their capacity to advocate for essential climate services at various level of government. While the most immediate result of the proposed pilot would be DRR plans, it more profoundly had the potential to establish an approach to NGO strengthening for enhanced DRR and adaptation that could serve simultaneously as a model for the Angolan government and produce teaching tools for USAID and the broader development community. Toward this end, USAID/Angola proposed to integrate the pilot into an existing cooperative agreement between USAID/Angola and World Learning, "Eye Kutoloka: NGO Strengthening through Health Service Delivery and Technical Activities", which works to build the capacity of NGOs and government agencies working largely in the health sector.

The initial proposal had three main components:

1. Support Angolan NGOs to work with communities in the Cuvelai River Basin to develop DRR plans and response measures.
2. Support Angolan NGOs to partner with the provincial and national government to develop the infrastructure needed for an effective flood forecasting and early warning system (FFEWS).
3. Support Angolan NGOs to partner with the provincial government to improve the dissemination of short-term seasonal climate forecasts.

Development Workshop (DW) Proposal

All projects are translated from initial proposal and change due to unknown or evolving circumstances on the ground, the type of mechanism chosen, and who ultimately implements the project. To realize the pilot, World Learning awarded a grant to Development Workshop (DW), a well-established and capable Angolan NGO.

The DW proposal emphasized four components:

1. Production of detailed flood risk map of the Angolan Cuvelai Basin.
2. Development of participatory flood prevention plans in four of the most vulnerable communities and raised general awareness of DRR against floods, droughts and pests.
3. Establishment of a flood early warning system in collaboration with Cunene provincial authorities and Namibian counterparts.
4. Raised public awareness about DRR and better information for policy-making.

Current Activity (at the time of the assessment)

Development Workshop started implementation of the pilot on August 1, 2013 and it is scheduled to end on July 31, 2015. Once implementation of the pilot began, the activity made a number of changes to its implementation approach such that some aspects of the pilot, as implemented, diverged from what was originally proposed. The changes made from the DW proposal are detailed in the following section.

At the time of the mid-term assessment, the expected results of the activity were³:

1. Strengthened community capacity for preparedness for climate response
2. Strengthened capacity of local hydro-meteorological services and local civil protection authorities to monitor extreme weather and climate change in the Cuvelai Basin
3. Improved local government services and response to climate disaster

Associated with these results are the following four key intervention areas⁴:

1. Development of a flood early warning system based on hydrometric stations, installed in strategic localities across the basin
2. Mapping of people, services and flooding to analyze and understand the spatial dimensions of vulnerability

³ Weber, Beat; Presentation for USAID Evaluation Team; Ondjiva, Angola; January 26, 2015

⁴ Weber, Beat; Presentation for USAID Evaluation Team; Ondjiva, Angola; January 26, 2015

3. Implementation of a household survey to document and understand social, economic and livelihood aspects of vulnerability and to identify key interventions that would increase resilience
4. To pilot key interventions that strengthen people's resilience, promoting the best ones through advocacy at provincial and municipal government level by targeting policy, program design and budgeting processes

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Question 1: Analyze the process of implementation (e.g., describe any lessons learned and/or best practices identified since activity start-up with regard to the initial analysis, assumptions and design)

The DW proposal emphasized Geospatial Information System (GIS) capacity development, including the production of flood maps for the Angolan Cuvelai Basin, the creation of participatory flood prevention plans and related outreach and the creation of a flood early warning system. In addition the original proposal emphasized climate change awareness raising activities with communities. Many of the original elements of the proposal did stay the same as the project moved to implementation, although the timeline has changed. These included the household survey and the development of an early warning system.

The primary shifts in implementation begin with an evolving understanding of the nature of climatic risks of the region. This pilot proposal from USAID/Angola was initiated in response to the floods of 2008, which by all accounts were devastating, particularly among the smallholder farmer and hunter/gatherer populations in the Basin. Although the floods were extreme, officials from Civil Protection (CP) in Cunene, as well as local informants, noted that the impact of droughts is actually more severe and adversely affects a larger percentage of the population in the Cuvelai Basin. Cunene CP noted that the 2008 floods adversely affected 308,000 people in Cunene province out of a total provincial population of 800,000. After the floods, thousands of people lost the capacity to sustain themselves. But while the floods brought much suffering, the ongoing drought, which began in 2012, has adversely affected over 540,000 people, according to Cunene CP officials. Additionally, over 1 million cattle were affected. (Cattle represent the most significant asset that most families possess.) The project's household survey corroborated that people living in the Basin generally perceive droughts as a more significant problem than floods.

Another shift in the project's implementation approach stemmed from the project's close working relationship with the Civil Protection Unit of Cunene province. The 2nd in command of Cunene CP quickly emerged as an enthusiastic and dynamic champion of the project seeing it as a means to improve the CP's ability to prepare for and mitigate the adverse effects of floods and other climate-related events. Thus whereas the project may have initially intended to work across government levels and agencies within Cunene, it increasingly began to shift its work to focus on collaboration with the Cunene CP so that by the time of the mid-term assessment, it was working almost exclusively with or through the Cunene CP, regardless if the action is outside CP's current mandate. So far, this approach has paid off, as CP has been instrumental in increasing the project's profile among key national, provincial, and municipal stakeholders, while much of what the project has been able to accomplish to date related to the flood early warning system and the mapping/GIS activities is due in large part to CP's support and

advocacy. However, this approach, which may be viewed as placing undue expectations on CP given their mandate, could potentially hinder the sustainability of project results.

Another shift in the project's implementation approach was the dropping of awareness raising activities as they were originally envisioned. In interviews with the DW team members, they emphasized that people living in the Basin are well aware of issues related to floods, drought and climate variations, such that there was little value-added to conducting awareness raising activities. At the same time, however, the same people have very limited options to take preventive or preparatory measures. This suggests that expanding their options in these areas is potentially a significant value-add (the options explored through the project, also called demonstration pilots, are described below). Although climate variability and climate change are not equivalent, many actions taken to adapt to climate change also address issues related to climate variability, which seems to be the primary tenor of the changes undertaken by the project.

Given that droughts adversely impact significantly more people than floods, the project is implementing three demonstration pilots of interventions aimed at strengthening people's resilience to drought (but in the case of plastic bins also improving protection of seeds during heavy rain events). The pilots include the introduction of the drought-resistant Oshakana #1 millet seed and plastic storage containers in 23 makundas and the construction of wells using concentric concrete ring technology in two makundas (yet to be selected). The makundas are linked to the household survey conducted by the project (described below). Each of the three demonstration pilots is fully funded by the project, although implemented only after a process of engagement between the project team, Sobas (village leaders), and other makunda residents. A brief description of each these three pilot interventions is provided below.

Seed Pilot: One particular effect of droughts is that either (a) there is insufficient rain to produce a healthy crop of millet using traditional millet seeds or (b) the rains begin too late, which means that the growing season is not long enough to grow a healthy crop of millet using traditional millet seeds. (Millet is the most important staple crop for rural households living in the Angolan Cuvelai Basin.) Thus during November-December 2014, the project distributed Oshakana #1 millet seeds to 23 makundas to plant on communal plots where they will be collectively tended. Oshakana #1 is both drought resistant (needs less water) and requires a short growing period (about 120 days), which means that it is likely to produce a better crop than the current millet seed during drought periods or when the rains begin late meaning a shorter growing season. Oshakana #1 has been adopted successfully by smallholder farmers in the Namibian side of the Cuvelai Basin. Planting the Oshakana #1 seeds on communal plots will allow the makundas to provide collective labor, create more seed stock for distribution throughout the community, as well as publicly demonstrate the seed's efficacy. Once the millet is harvested, the seeds will be distributed to makunda residents for use in the next cropping season. At the time of the mid-term assessment, Oshakana #1 seeds had been distributed to 23 makundas.

Storage Container Pilot: Currently, the farmers in the Angolan Cuvelai Basin store crops in raised, wooden bins with thatch roofs. These bins are not airtight and allow moisture to enter increasing the risk and occurrence of spoilage. Farmers in the Namibian side of the Cuvelai Basin have successfully adopted plastic storage containers demonstrated their usefulness in reducing spoilage. To demonstrate practicality and usefulness of the plastic storage containers, the project is distributing (but had yet to distribute at the time of the mid-term assessment) containers to each of the 23 makundas participating in the seed pilot, which will be kept at the Soba's household.

Concrete Reinforced Wells Pilot: Households living in the Angolan Cuvelai Basin suffer from limited access to water during the dry season, which has been greatly exacerbated during the ongoing drought. A particular challenge is digging the wells to a depth below the water table so that they continue to produce water during the dry season. The sandy soil in the Cuvelai Basin makes it very difficult to hand dig wells, the primary digging method, below the water table, because the well walls are prone to collapsing. The best method for digging wells in the Basin's sandy soil below the water table is to use professional drilling equipment. This method, however, is expensive as well as technically changing due to the presents of brackish layers in many sites that have the potential to contaminate the water that may be accessed if best practices are not followed. Makunda residents cannot afford it, and there is not enough money available in the provincial or municipal budgets to drill a sufficient number of wells to meet local water demand.

In light of the above, the project is planning a pilot to hand dig wells in two mukundas using pre-fabricated concrete rings, a technology that keeps the sandy soil from collapsing, thus allowing the well to reach down below the water table. These concrete wells have been successfully installed in other parts of Angola, and the project believes that this technology has significant potential in the Cuvelai Basin as well. Due to the cost of this pilot, it is being limited to two makundas. The project plans to commence constructing the wells in June or July 2015 once the groundwater has receded sufficiently.

As the project was implemented it shifted away from developing first of its kind community-level DRR plans. Many USAID projects work on local and regional planning. Often found, however, is that new planning processes and outputs outside the current system of planning are not implemented in a meaningful way. DW staff thought this was a likely outcome of the community-based DRR plans and they therefore chose to drop this portion of the project as originally envisioned. On the other hand, the project increased the emphasis on GIS skills development for government officials, particularly CP, and the creation of service maps for each of the four project municipalities. The purpose of this activity is to encourage municipal administrators to use the maps to inform their plans/budgets, while at the same time helping Cunene CP improve its response efforts during floods, droughts and other disasters. The project team also created a database for CP to record locations and details of their service calls. With the ability to better characterize their current services, which are largely reactive, they can more proactively plan how to deploy future resources.

The project has achieved several significant milestones. First, the project has developed a solid relationship with Cunene CP. The project has produced a flood map for the province and service maps for each of the four project municipalities. Furthermore, the project has helped continue and strengthen the cooperative relationship between CP, the Angolan Water Institute, and the Namibian Department of Water Affairs. Officials from these four organizations met in April 2014 to discuss the placement of flood monitoring stations, the harmonization of flood monitoring equipment, the sharing of water data and improved cross-border coordination, although in the latter two cases, further work needs to be done. Finally, the project purchased equipment for four flood monitoring stations and selected the sites where they will be installed.

The project completed a household survey in the four project municipalities, which was the first of its kind in the Angolan Cuvelai Basin. It consisted of a set of case studies along with a survey administered to a sample of 750 households located in 26 research blocks consisting of approximately 30 houses each spread throughout the four municipalities. To date, the project has produced a summary of the study's findings. During December 2014, the project (DW with CP) shared the primary study findings with officials from the four project municipalities, and it will do a more extensive analysis of the survey

results with the findings to be published in a booklet and presented at a conference during February 2015 attended by key stakeholders and decision makers within the Cunene province. During the December 2014 meetings, the project also shared the service maps developed for each of the municipalities and information on the demonstration pilots they are undertaking across the four municipalities.

Conclusion:

The project has been adjusted during implementation based on learning and has made different degrees of progress under the four key intervention areas (key intervention areas as stated at the time of the mid-term assessment). The project has contributed to strengthening the capacity of Cunene Civil Protection, improved coordination between GRA institutions and coordination between Angola and Namibia in areas relevant to the project. These contributions are described below (SOW Questions⁵ 2a, 2b, and 2c). The project has faced and addressed challenges and constraints during implementation. There is concern, however, that delayed timelines and potentially misplaced expectations may impede the successful conclusion of the project and continued sustainability of results (SOW Questions 2d and 3). Recommendations for a successful conclusion of the project and sustained results as well as identified best practices are described below (SOW Questions 3a, 3b and 4).

Question 2: What changes have occurred within local government?

*(*This question is answered via the sub-questions.)*

Question 2a. What has been the project's contribution to the strengthening of civil protection?

The Cunene Civil Protection's (CP) interest in this project began when Development & Training Services (dTS) consultant Gary Woller and Gastao Lukangu from USAID/Angola visited Cunene in December 2012 to undertake an initial scoping trip for a possible project evaluation. During this visit, Gastao contacted the provincial government, which put him in touch with Civil Protection, including Paulo Calunga, 2nd in Command of the Civil Protection Unit of Cunene province, who has since been the driving force behind Cunene Civil Protection's involvement with the project. During the approximately six-month gap between this initial scoping visit and the beginning of on-the-ground activities, Calunga repeatedly asked Eye Kutoloka Chief of Party (COP) Fern Teodoro when the project was going to begin. From the beginning, Calunga saw the potential the project offered for CP's work.

Cunene CP (and in particular Calunga) wanted to improve CP's capacity to implement preventive measures and undertake pre-emptive actions to floods and other disasters as opposed to always reacting after the they have occurred. For instance, as stated in a quarterly report⁶, "An important lesson learned for the project was related to the openness and willingness for collaboration by the provincial headquarters of Cunene's Civil Protection services. From the first meeting onwards, the provincial Commander and his staff have assisted and encouraged the project, repeatedly emphasizing on the important contribution that the project will make for emergency prevention and planning. Given this interest and enthusiasm of this local government institution, the project will fully integrate its staff into project activities to maximize sustainability of all activities undertaken and processes initiated by the project."

⁵ The mid-term assessment SOW can be found in Annex 1

⁶ Project quarterly report, July to September 2013

The Cunene CP's enthusiastic participation the project offered a fortuitous opportunity for the project to gain traction and move the project activities forward quicker than would have been the case if the project team itself had tried to involve provincial and municipal government administrators from various administrative departments, as might typically be the case. From the beginning, the project was pessimistic about their chances of accomplishing much working through the existing provincial and municipal administrative structures, and so they welcomed the opportunity to embed within Cunene CP. Finding a champion in such cases is difficult enough, so when an enthusiastic, dynamic and influential champion (Calunga) essentially falls into one's lap, it makes good strategic sense to embrace that person, which is what the project did. As a result of this collaboration, Calunga and his staff now have both the skill and technical capacity to create their own maps, in the former case as a result of the project's capacity building activities, and in the latter case, because the project has donated the necessary Global Positioning System (GPS) equipment, printer and software to CP (will transfer at the end of the project).

As mentioned above, the project's work with CP, particularly with regard to its GIS/mapping activities, have caught the attention of GRA officials. In October 2014, Cunene CP gave a presentation about its work under the project to the Vice-Governors and Civil Protection staff representing all provinces in the country. (DW provided support in drafting the presentation but it was not appropriate for them to attend.) Not only did all other provinces express an interest in acquiring GIS/mapping capability, but the Secretary of the State for the Ministry of the Interior was so impressed that he gave the Cunene CP a vehicle to support its work related to the project. He also suggested that representatives from other provinces visit Civil Protection in Cunene to learn about what they are doing. (The same Secretary of State had previously visited the project in Cunene.) The overwhelmingly positive response at this meeting demonstrates that Calunga has sufficient understanding to present and sway other parties about the importance of using maps for decision-making.

Quoting from the project's quarterly report,⁷ "Shortly after civil protection had the opportunity to show the work to their national headquarters . . . Civil Protection Cunene was appointed as the training focal point for civil protection offices in the southern provinces of Angola. The staff will continue to improve their data collection and GIS work continuously and have in the meantime provided assistance to civil protection in Huila province. Given this surprisingly positive result, the Project will continue its GIS assistance through on-the-job training."

As mentioned before, the project's office is housed in the Cunene Civil Protection building and Calunga or other Civil Protection staff accompany DW on all meetings, this includes meetings with government officials, community members, and Namibian counterparts. For example, CP staff accompanied DW staff in the household survey (across 750 households) and they accompany them in the implementation of the pilot activities (seeds, plastic storage bins, and wells). As such, their capacity has been strengthened not only through specific on-the-job training but also through participation in the project activities, in particular their capacity to assess and address vulnerability to climate variability and change. As described in the next section, they have also increased their knowledge on flood early warning systems.

In December 2014, Calunga gave a presentation to the Cunene Governor on the project's GIS/mapping activity and pilot activities. The Governor, who approves the final provincial budget, was, according to Calunga, receptive to his presentation. On an earlier occasion, the Governor took a helicopter to a

⁷ Project quarterly report, April to June 2013

distant locality and promised to build a school there. Calunga subsequently showed the Governor a map for that municipality, which showed that there was a river nearby that the children would need to cross to reach the school, demonstrating again the value of maps for government service planning and provision.

According to Calunga and other CP staff, the maps and GIS capabilities have taken Cunene CP to a “different dimension”; they were not previously aware that maps could contribute so significantly to their work. Calunga initially requested the project to create service maps for the other two municipalities in the province not covered by the project, but this is no longer necessary as CP staff have the capacity to generate the maps themselves. (As a side note, DW similarly trained provincial and municipal administrators in Huambo province in GIS mapping, and they are still using it. This result raises optimism that a similar result can be achieved in Cunene.)

Conclusion:

The project has strengthened the capacity of Cunene Civil Protection, in particular their GIS/mapping capabilities, knowledge of flood early warning systems, and ability to assess and address vulnerability to climate variability and change. They have been recognized throughout Angola for their GIS/mapping capabilities and, as a result, were provided a vehicle to continue their efforts and additional responsibility as the training focal point for civil protection offices in the southern provinces of Angola.

Question 2b. How has coordination improved between Angola and Namibia?

Namibia has a vested interest in flood monitoring in Angola since water flows from Angola to Namibia. Flood early warning in the Cuvelai Basin is challenging because there is more than one stream. The Cuvelai River is not a river per se. Local rains provide water to shallow channels—called iishanas—that mesh, network, and divide on their way downstream. For much of the year, most iishanas hold no water, filling only after summer rains. This makes predicting water flow particularly challenging.

Namibia currently has a flood early warning system on the Namibian side of the Cuvelai Basin consisting of a number of hydrometric stations some of which also collect rainfall, wind, and temperature data. Information about water depth and flows is disseminated by radio. The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry Cuvelai-Etosha Basin (DWA) also produces a daily flood bulletin during the rainy season. The Namibian stations each have one or two back-up systems, including a “stick” gauge at each station that someone reads each day (DWA provides the gauge readers cell phone minutes), while some locations also have additional gauge that does not automatically transmit data (as do all of the stations) but which must be manually downloaded.

The floods of 2008/2009 galvanized the DWA to create a flood early warning system. In addition to the hydrometric stations, they have bi-weekly meetings during the rainy season. This system proved its worth during the 2011 floods. Alerted to the oncoming floods, the DWA alerted the local population by radio thereby significantly reducing the cost to property and human lives. (During the 2008 floods, DWA was only able to observe the flooding from a helicopter.) The DWA also used the high waters of 2011 to improve their ability to interpret what water different levels and flows at different locations means in terms for the purpose of flood forecasting downstream. In comparison, The National Institute of Water Resources (NIWR) in Angola also installed flood monitoring stations after the 2008 floods, but all but one of these stations are now inoperable.

On September 25, 2013, the project team and Cunene CP traveled to Oshakati in Namibia to meet with DWA. This meeting provided the participants an opportunity to discuss past collaborations between Angola and Namibia in flood monitoring; the water flow monitoring and early warning system in Namibia; the type of equipment installed in this system, how it works, how much it cost and where it can be purchased; and how the Namibian and Angolan flood monitoring systems might be integrated. The Namibian counterparts at this meeting offered to travel to Angola to advise the project and Angolan authorities on identifying locations for the flood monitoring stations and to help them install the system.

The NIWR and DWA by necessity have a long-standing relationship given that much of the water (drinking, irrigation, etc.) Namibia receives is from the Cunene River and canal originating on the Angolan side of the border (the river would otherwise remain in Angola and drain in the ocean). The nature of this relationship has varied over the years, although cooperation has been strengthened under the project, for example, through a Coordination Workshop organized by the project in April 2014. The Workshop was held in Cunene CP's office in Ondjiva and it was attended by Cunene CP, NIWR, the project team (DW and WL), Cunene provincial government and DWA. During the workshop participants reached agreement on the need to share information across the border, the locations where to install the flood monitoring stations in Angola and on installing the same type of the flood monitoring equipment at each of the stations in both countries (which would facilitate the sharing of information across the border).

Conclusion:

The NIWR and DWA have a long-standing relationship that pre-dates the project. That said, the project has been instrumental in facilitating an increased level of discussion and cooperation between the Angolan and Namibian water authorities along with a commitment from both that the two will (in theory at least) share information on water levels and flows. The installation of the flood monitoring stations in Angola by the project is absolutely instrumental in making this type of cooperation possible. For its part, the Namibian water authorities have assisted the project and their Angolan counterparts in planning and, eventually, installing the flood monitoring stations in Cunene province. The project, moreover, facilitated a productive linkage between the Angolan Civil Protection and Namibian DWA, which has, according to CP, accelerated its movement up the learning curve with regards to flooding and, more generally, water issues.

Question 2c: How has coordination improved between GRA institutions responsible for climate change adaptation?

Representatives from GRA ministries (e.g., Ministry of Agriculture - Ministério da Agricultura-MINADER, NIWR) sit within the provincial and municipal governments, thus working with provincial and municipal governments inevitably involves working with these GRA ministries as well.

Cunene Civil Protection and NIWR began to work together after the 2008 floods. The project, and in particular discussions around the creation of a flood early warning system, has helped to reinvigorate this relationship. During an interview, Cunene CP said there is legislation that they [CP and the NIWR] must work together, and they feel the implementation of that legislation started in Cunene given that they both have vested interest in understanding and predicting water flows and flooding. Notwithstanding the above, CP has expressed frustration that the NIWR has yet to install its flood

monitoring stations. During the coordination meeting in April 2014 mentioned above, NIWR and the project decided where to install their respective hydrometric stations. The stations NIWR agreed to install lie to the north of the stations the project will be installing. CP realizes that this information will be valuable in predicting floods (given that over large stretches the water flows north to south, otherwise flowing horizontally).

The project, with CP's participation, produced a provincial flood map in addition to the following four "service maps" for each of the four project municipalities reflecting CP priorities: (1) a household map showing the location of households within the municipality, (2) a water map showing water sources and their proximity to households, (3) a health service map showing the location of health clinics/medical services and their proximity to households, and (4) a composite map combining the previous three maps with a flood map showing where each of the preceding is located relative to flood zones. In December 2014, the project (DW and CP) met with each of the four project municipalities to present them the maps and discuss other aspects of the project (e.g., seed pilot and household survey). It was reported that during one of those meetings a representative from the Cuvelai municipality requested a flood map at the municipality level (since the original map was at the provincial level). This shows understanding and value of this information. The project complied with the request.

During the mid-term assessment, the assessment team met with officials in Namacunde and Kwanhama municipalities. In both municipalities the officials stated that the project is important to them in that they presume it means it will be less adversely affected by floods in the future. They likewise acknowledged that the flood and service maps will be useful in helping them make investment decisions and plan service delivery in addition to informing them where they should not locate further development or service delivery due to the risk of flooding. At the same time, however, they noted that the service maps prepared by the project have errors that they would like to see corrected. For example, officials in Kwanhama observed that some of the earth dams shown in the map are actually dams created for construction, not for drinking water. They would like to use the maps to determine where to put water sources for communities that currently have poor access to water. The project intends to make the corrections to the service maps.

Other comments made by officials in both municipalities demonstrated a good understanding of the potential benefits of flood and service maps. One official, for example, suggested that the municipality should group together services (water, health services, etc.) to encourage residents to aggregate around those services. Another commented that education is very important to the population, and the municipality would like to sit down with the project to identify "Zones of Pedagogical Influence" to plan education services. Yet another official noted that the maps will help with spatial planning; the municipality needs information to discourage residents from settling on flood plains.

Interestingly, the Namacunde municipal government has two mapmakers on staff, but that they have not been able to fulfill their jobs since the municipalities lacks the proper mapmaking equipment. Meanwhile, the Kwanhama municipal government hired someone with GIS capability a few months ago, and thus expressed its interest in working with Cunene CP to develop additional maps for the municipality.

Unfortunately, persons representing the Ministry of Agriculture were not present at these meetings. Consequently, the assessment team was not able to discuss the project's seed or storage container

pilots with someone responsible for advocating for inclusion of these items in the municipal plan/budget.

Another GRA agency that could potentially play a role in the project, but which the project has not so far engaged is the National Institute of Meteorology (Instituto Nacional de Meteorologia, INAMET), which is responsible for monitoring and reporting on weather conditions (e.g., temperature, precipitation, wind, etc.) throughout the country. (During the initial scoping visit for a potential project evaluation in December 2012, INAMET was one of the GRA agencies that the scoping team interviewed.) With that said, what role INAMET might play in the project is not evident, plus it has not always been responsive to the Mission's requests for information in the past, and it appears to suffer from a significant lack of capacity at the provincial level. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Global Environmental Facility (GEF) proposal, for example, "At provincial level [in Cunene], the INAMET service runs with only one on-duty meteorologist technician who has to carry out all observation duties and advise the air traffic control on current weather. There is no system in place for the forecasting and warnings to be received in real time or to be able to adjust the forecast to local topographic and environmental conditions." (In addition to the eight stations to be installed by the NIWR, the UNDP GEF project will also be installing flood monitoring stations in the Angolan Cuvelai Basin.) In the end, and for better or worse, the project has elected not to involve INAMET in the project, preferring to focus instead on flood monitoring, which is consistent with their approach to the project as largely a DRR project.

In Angola, the point person for the Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWSNET) is within the central Ministry of Agriculture. At the time of the assessment, it did not appear as though the project has worked with central MINADER or the FEWSNET point of contact. Given that FEWSNET could compliment the goals of the project, this connection could be explored by the project with facilitation through USAID/Angola.

Conclusion:

The project has established a close and highly productive working relationship with the Cunene Civil Protection. This relationship has been the primary mechanism through which the project has been able to accomplish most of what it has accomplished to date. It is through this relationship, moreover, that the project has reached out to engage other GRA agencies at the municipal, provincial and national levels. Notwithstanding the level of interest shown by these other GRA agencies in the project's work and accomplishments, however, the project has been slow to follow-up to engage these agencies in its work, particularly in the context of generating sustainable support for project activities and the integration of these activities into the municipal and provincial planning and budgeting process. Key GRA agencies in this context include the MINADER, which would be responsible for purchasing/producing the seeds and plastic containers and distributing them to the makundas, GRA agencies that would potentially use maps/GIS for planning and funding public services, and the GRA agency responsible for well construction.

The project (and therefore Cunene CP) has also coordinated its activities with the NIWR, particularly in terms of working with their DWA counterparts in Namibia and in the selection of flood monitoring station sites and equipment. What remains to be resolved between the project and NIWR is who precisely will be responsible for the maintenance and operation of the four flood monitoring stations to be installed by the project and the process for sharing information not only from these four monitoring

stations but also for the flood monitoring stations installed by the NIWR. (For that matter, the communication framework between the CP, NIWR and DW has yet to be established as well.)

Question 3: What challenges and constraints have been encountered by the project? How has the project team addressed these issues?

The project has experienced a number of challenges/constraints in implementing its work plan, which have caused a number of implementation delays. These are described below.

According to the project's year one work plan, the household survey was to be completed and the assessment report submitted by February 2014. DW's original project proposal foresaw a baseline study on the people's *perceptions* on flooding, drought, and pests. Based on initial discussions with local stakeholders and implementation of GIS mapping activities, however, the project decided to implement a more in-depth baseline study on people's *vulnerability* to floods, drought and pests. The positive is that the assessment would now provide more depth than originally anticipated, the negative is that it require more time and resources to implement. The rationale to switch from a study of perceptions to a study of vulnerability was explained in the first quarterly report for the project. With the results of the vulnerability survey, the project would (presumably) be in a position to make very pointed and well-founded arguments and recommendations on how to improve people's resilience to climate variation and change. Similarly, Cunene CP also sought to use the results of the vulnerability study to advocate to provincial authorities that much more needed to be done to prevent climate-related disasters as opposed to just responding to them.

On entering the field for the household survey, the research team encountered a number of challenges that further slowed implementation. For instance, from a quarterly report⁸: "While access to some of the localities has proved difficult due to increased water levels in the Basin, the research is proceeding well." Reflecting the challenges encountered by the field research team, the study and final report was projected to be complete by August 2014⁹. This date was extended yet again to January 2015¹⁰. At the time of the mid-term assessment, the project had completed a preliminary analysis of the survey data and written-up its findings in an unpublished summary document. DW further stated its intent to undertake a more thorough analysis of the survey results and present its findings, along with a published pamphlet, at the February 2015 workshop described above.

Following with the previous topic, the project also incurred delays implementing its planned awareness raising campaign, stemming directly from changes described above related to the household survey. According to the year one work plan, the project was to have developed training and awareness materials during August-October 2014 and then conduct an awareness raising campaign during January-February 2014. But by the third quarterly report¹¹, the project had pushed back its awareness raising activities and changed their focus in light of the household survey findings, stating that "the project will shift its focus from awareness-raising at the community level towards finding and testing approaches that can increase the resilience of the people in the Basin." Together with its partner Civil Protection, it will make sure that survey results are widely disseminated with the objective to influence public

⁸ Project quarterly report, January to March, 2014

⁹ Project quarterly report, April to June, 2014

¹⁰ Project second year workplan

¹¹ Project quarterly report, January to March, 2014

spending towards more effective and efficient measures to improve resilience of the local population.” Based on the assessment team’s conversations with the project team, these awareness raising activities were now to have been launched at the February 2015 workshop.

According to the year one work plan, the project was to have selected a locally appropriate millet seed for the seed pilot test by December 2013, then the date was changed to February 2014 to allow more time to gather information about the improved and drought resistant Oshakana #1 seed. At the time of the mid-term assessment, the seeds had been distributed to the 23 pilot makundas (distribution was not originally envisioned in the year one work plan). One Makunda (of 24) was not interested in the seeds and chose not to participate in the seed pilot. According to the three Sobas visited as part of the mid-term assessment (two in Kwanhama, one in Namacunde), the pilot Oshakana #1 seeds have yet to be planted owing to the late onset of the rains. In all cases, the makundas intended to plant the seeds within the next two weeks, given that the rains appear to have begun, and we presume (but have not confirmed) that this has taken place as planned.

The project also experienced a number of delays in procuring and installing the flood monitoring stations. According to the year one work plan, the monitoring stations were initially to have been procured and installed by December 2013. This would have given the project ample time to facilitate the set-up and deployment of the flood early warning system. Early on, however, the project learned that NIWR had independently decided to procure and install eight monitoring stations in the Cuvelai Basin. Given this, the project considered having NIWR procure and install the project’s four gauging stations. However, given delays, the project reverted to procuring and installing four stations independently of NIWR. The project did facilitate coordination efforts with NIWR and DWA in Namibia culminating in the April 2014 Coordination Workshop in Ondjiva (described above). The installation date of the gauging stations changed to November 2014 (the last month before the iishanas began to accumulate water) and then, due to delays, was moved to June-July 2015 (after the water has sufficiently subsided).

In addition to installing the flood monitoring stations, the year one work plan also envisioned a set of activities to develop communication channels (e.g., radio, newspapers, mobile phones, television) for the dissemination of warnings from the monitoring stations. This was to occur in Nov-Dec 2013. According to the Oct-Dec 2013 quarterly report, the project indicated that it was still too early to undertake this activity, presumably in part because of the delays in installing the monitoring stations. At the time of the mid-term assessment it did not appear that progress has been made on this activity. It appears that it would be worthwhile for the project team to pursue this activity before project end.

Conclusion:

Judging from the year one work plan, the largest implementation delays incurred so far were for household survey and installation of the flood monitoring stations and related activities involving setting up a process for disseminating monitoring data. The delays incurred in the household survey were primarily driven by the need to accommodate an increase in the study’s scope and then by delays caused by difficulties encountered during the related fieldwork.

The delays involved in producing and disseminating the assessment findings, however, appear not to have been driven by any factor in particular other than perhaps internal project inertia. In the assessment team’s opinion, a full report on the findings should probably have been produced and disseminated before now. The delay in producing and disseminating the study findings is particularly

critical given that the project had hopes of using the findings to engage the relevant municipal and provincial GRA so as to influence the planning and budgeting process at the municipal and provincial levels, which start in March of each year. The project's delay, and lack of a clear strategy for engaging GRA officials for this purpose, is a significant weakness that could imperil the utility of this report in influencing government funding decisions and ultimately negatively impact the sustainability of project efforts.

In terms of the flood monitoring stations, it appears that the long delays primarily resulted from the nature of the project's engagement with the NIWR and to a lesser extent manufacturing and delivery delays. The assessment team feels project (or USAID/Angola) likely should have engaged the NIWR sooner to learn of their intentions. While the degree of the project's engagement and cooperation with the NIWR (as well as the DWA in Namibia) is encouraging, that the project still has not worked out who will be responsible for maintaining and operating the monitoring stations and how this will be funded, particularly given the NIWR's stated intention to take on this role despite its lack of internal staff capacity, is discouraging. The long-term sustainability of the project activities depends critically on making this decision and getting it right.

Question 2d: Which emerging issues exist that might affect the projects implementation from now to project conclusion?

Emerging issues that might affect the project implementation over the remaining life of the project are of far less concern than issue that may affect project's sustainability after its conclusion. Of particular concern are issues that are likely determine the sustainability (or long-term effectiveness) of the flood early warning system, the three demonstration pilots (seeds, plastic containers and concrete reinforced wells), advocacy efforts related to the household study and the GIS/mapping activities. These are described below.

Flood Early Warning System: The primary concern with regards to the flood early warning system is that there continues to persist significant uncertainty as to who will be responsible for their operation and maintenance, and the process to be used for interpreting the data and disseminating the findings. DW feels strongly that Cunene Civil Protection should be responsible for the monitoring stations, although it is less clear whether DW also feels CP should also be responsible for collecting, interpreting/analyzing, and disseminating the water information to other ministries and Namibia. DW sees the NIWR as a weak institution, and it doubts its commitment and capacity to maintain and operate the monitoring stations, while it sees Calunga and the CP as strong and dynamic. At the same time, however, were Cunene CP to take on this role, its staff would require a significant amount of training to interpret the water data, while it would need to secure funding at the national level from the Ministry of the Interior to support it in this role. On top of all this, DW plans (or hopes) to compliment the water data from the monitoring stations with rainfall data and satellite information on precipitation, which if it occurs, will significantly ramp up the technical requirements for whoever is made responsible for operating the monitoring stations. (Calunga expressed his own concern about CP's capacity to interpret and analyze the water data.)

It is not evident to the assessment team that CP has the capacity to assume this role, nor is there any guarantee of funding from the Ministry of Interior. (As a counterpoint, there is also no guarantee that NIWR will receive the necessary funding.) Another possible impediment to any plan to turn this responsibility over to the CP is if the NIWR decides that it wants this role and a turf battle ensues. Yet

another factor to consider here is the possible (and perhaps inevitable) turnover of the CP staff in Cunene. If for whatever reason Calunga were to leave the CP, there appears to be a reasonable chance that the entire impetus for making CP the steward of the monitoring stations would collapse.

DW and World Learning have expressed a different perspective regarding the future stewardship of the monitoring stations. Project COP Fern Teodoro has repeatedly emphasized that, according to the law, the monitoring stations would be under the mandate of the NIWR. Under this scenario, the NIWR would be responsible for maintaining and operating the monitoring stations and for collecting, interpreting/analyzing the water data. If it concludes that there is a danger of flooding, it would pass this information along to Civil Protection for it to disseminate through its established channels.

Another concern related to the maintenance of the monitoring stations is ensuring the technical capacity and funding to repair the stations in the very likely event that they are vandalized or malfunction. By way of context, the flood monitoring stations in Namibia suffered from repeated vandalism requiring the DWA to go to great lengths to devise methods to protect the stations from further vandalism. (Vandalism appears to be motivated either by the desire to cannibalize parts from the stations or for sport.)

For its part, the NIWR sees the maintenance and operation of all flood gauges as falling under its responsibility given its traditional role in this area and its relative experience and expertise. It also believes that it is better to centralize the collection, interpretation, and dissemination of flood-related data within a single organization that has the capacity to perform this role. At the same time, however, the NIWR appears to lack the manpower to maintain, monitor/interpret and disseminate information from all the flood monitoring stations to be installed by the project, by the UNDP GEF program or that it installs itself. According to the National Director of the NIWR, the institute has only nine staff members compared to the 123 staff members it requires to fulfill its responsibilities. (They recently hired 10-12 additional staff but they have not begun yet and concern was expressed on if they would be able to begin given budget issues.) The national director also does not anticipate the need to undertake maintenance of the flood monitoring each year, apparently unaware of the persistent problems with vandalism of the hydrometric stations of its counterpart just over the border in Namibia.¹²

There is precedent for assigning Civil Protection responsibility for maintaining and operating the flood gauges. In Benguela province, the Ministry of Interior (the parent ministry of Civil Protection) is responsible for maintaining and operating a number of flood gauges on the local river system (a perennial river). The system, however, is an unsophisticated one, which uses color-coded warnings (red, yellow, and green) but does no analysis of the water levels and flows beyond this. The Ministry of Interior, moreover, does not share this information with the NIWR.

In summary, it is probably the case that the success and sustainability of the project's flood early warning system depends on how this issue is resolved and on whether, regardless of how it is resolved, funding for the maintenance of the flood monitoring stations and interpretation/use of their data is secured. To date, the project does not have a formal plan in place to address this issue.

¹² The water monitoring stations are at risk for both mechanical malfunction and vandalism. In Namibia, for example, nearly all of the flood monitoring just over the border from Angola have experienced repeated vandalism. The four CP monitoring enclosures chosen are particularly robust and were informed by the Namibian experience with station vandalism. It is unclear how sturdy and vandalism resistant the enclosures chosen by NIWR will be.

Demonstration Pilots: The three demonstration pilots have been, or will be, initiated at such a time in the project that the learning from the pilots will be coming dangerously close to the scheduled end of project. Unless there is a no-cost or other extension for the project, it will be difficult to collect and disseminate learning. In addition, it could be an atypical harvest year, the seeds may not be planted (or the soil in which they're planted may be relatively poor) or the bins may not be used after all. In the ideal case, these would be piloted over multiple planting seasons (or through multiple wet-dry period for the wells) while the project is still active. Even if the project receives a no-cost extension, it may still be a challenge to wrap up the pilots and produce and disseminate learning from them before the project ends. This is particularly true for the concrete reinforced wells since, at the time of the mid-term assessment, the makundas had yet to be selected and work on the wells cannot begin until after the rainy season. For this reason, if the project must drop an activity due to limited time or resources, the concrete wells may be the option.

The project's strategy for scaling-up the demonstration pilots is to use their results to stimulate demand for the Oshakana #1 seeds, plastic storage containers, and concrete reinforced wells within the project municipalities. The increased demand for these items, combined with advocacy efforts by the makundas, Sobas, and the project, are in turn expected to facilitate supply by relevant municipal and provincial governments via public purchase/production and provision. The project does not currently foresee private sector provision of the Oshakana #1 seeds or the plastic storage containers. Smallholder farmers in the Angolan Cuvelai Basin largely lack the cash to purchase production and post-harvest inputs due to the non-commercial nature of cropping systems in the Basin, thus making private provision of the Oshakana #1 seeds and plastic storage containers a largely infeasible objective for the time being.

Unfortunately, because the local government budgeting process starts in March and ends around July-August, the three demonstration pilots will not finish until after the budgeting process for 2015 is either well underway or has concluded. It will thus be necessary to wait until the 2016 budgeting process in 2016 to determine whether the pilots have stimulated a sufficiently large demand response within the project municipalities and a corresponding supply response by municipal and provincial governments. Evidence of a demand and supply response would be the inclusion of funds in the municipal and provincial budgets to provide the seeds, containers, or concrete reinforced well. At the time of the mid-term assessment, the project had yet to develop an outreach/advocacy plan to facilitate the demand and supply response that it hopes to occur from the three demonstration pilots.

Household Survey: The project has (presumably) just embarked on its plan to disseminate the household survey findings and use them to advocacy purposes. The timing is not too late given that the 2015 municipal and provincial planning and budgeting process is in its early stages. In addition to the February 2015 workshop (see above), the project has already supplied services maps to each of the municipalities and conducted in-person meetings with GRA officials to discuss the study findings. If the project follows-up on these activities to pursue aggressive and effective dissemination and advocacy efforts related to the household survey over the next several months, it may do much to contribute to the project's long-term sustainability. If, however, it does not, a prime opportunity will squandered, and the next window to influence this process will not occur until 2016, after the project has ended.

GIS/Mapping: The project's GIS/mapping activities demonstrated both the proof of concept and the demand for this type of information among GRA officials at the municipal and provincial levels. That said, is not clear who will fulfill the GRA demand for these maps. The current intention appears to be for

the Cunene CP to fulfill this demand. There exists reasonable concern, however, about whether Cunene CP has either the capacity or bandwidth to meet this demand, should it arise. There also exist questions as to what administrative procedures it would install to manage this process, for example what criteria will they use to filter requests and how much of their time can they realistically devote to this task. Finally, this task appears to largely lie outside of Civil Protection's traditional duties and thus there exists the risk that the Cunene CP will not receive support from its hierarchical superiors to undertake it.

The ideal solution would be to establish the capacity to create maps at each municipality or at the very least house it in a responsible agency at the provincial government. This solution, however, lies outside the scope of this project. Regardless, whether the Cunene CP has the capacity and bandwidth to undertake the task of producing maps for the municipal and provincial governments in Cunene remains an open question.

Conclusion:

In the end, the benefits of working so closely with the Cunene CP likely outweigh the negatives. It is highly doubtful that the project could have accomplished near as much as it did had it tried to work through the GRA agencies traditionally responsible for the activities undertaken by the project. The downside of this approach, however, is that the project's engagement to date with the GRA agencies whose support will be critical for ensuring the long-term sustainability of these activities has been lacking. In addition to this, the project has yet to resolve who will be responsible for the operation and maintenance of the flood monitoring stations, while each of the options present a clear set of tradeoffs that must be weighed in each a decision. Finally, the mismatch between the timing of the demonstration pilots and the timing of the planning and budgeting process adds an additional challenge that the project needs to address if it is to secure the long-term viability of its demonstration pilots.

A window exists for the project to address all of these issues, particularly if it receives the anticipated no-cost extension, particularly in connection with the 2015 planning and budgeting process. As of the mid-term assessment, however, the project had yet to articulate a strategic plan for addressing these issues.

LESSONS LEARNED AND BEST PRACTICES

Question 4: Describe any lessons learned and/or best practices identified since program start-up with regard to initial analysis, assumptions, and program design (target areas, actors, and issues)

Having buy-in from the local government is critical for success in Cunene province. It is reportedly very difficult to work in Cunene province. Even more so than working in other areas of Angola, achieving success in Cunene requires buy-in from the provincial and municipal government authorities. The project's close relationship with the Cunene CP was instrumental in lending the project the level of credibility and buy-in it needed from local authorities to function as it did. In contrast, World Learning had previously tried to implement a health project in Cunene, but was unsuccessful because it was never able to get the level of local buy-in it needed.

It would have been beneficial for USAID and the project to both establish a relationship and sustain engagement with ministries whose mandates align to project objectives to ensure buy-in and knowledge

transfer (in both directions) and to avoid misplaced expectations. It was not until the project had invested substantial time in the flood monitoring stations that it learned that the NIWR also intended to install flood monitoring stations in Cunene province. As the NIWR is the primary GRA agency tasked with managing the country's water resources, it would have made sense for the project to engage with the NIWR from the early stages, as ultimately it would have had to do in any case, and (as we are now learning), coordination with the NIWR may be important for the project's long-term sustainability depending on NIWR's long term capacity to both maintain the stations and provide human resources for interpretation and coordination.

In a similar manner, notwithstanding the project's close and successful relationship with the Cunene CP, working with the CP and engaging with other local GRA agencies are not mutually exclusive strategies. Regardless of how dynamic Calunga and CP are, it is difficult to imagine, even from the beginning of the project, that Cunene CP could undertake all the key activities on its own over time without eventually involving the local GRA agencies, particularly when the latter play the key role in the planning and budgeting process and given the project's ultimate dependence of local government support to fund these activities over the long-term. Although the project appears poised now to begin this engagement process in greater earnest, just a few short months before the project is scheduled to end, it still has no formal strategy to do so. In the end, the project waited too long to begin thinking seriously about its sustainability plans, particularly in light of different ministries' mandates, such that the sustainability of portions of the project, specifically the pilot activities that are outside of CP's manageable interest are in doubt. Though the sustainability of the gauging stations due to lack of clarity on what entity in the GRA will manage their upkeep and who actually has the capacity to do so is also in question, it is unclear if the project could have much influence on this situation.

A best practice that emerged was that the project was willing at times to adapt its approach based on learning from its previous experience and in the course of project implementation. For example, the project had learned that the awareness-raising approach initially envisioned for the project would not be worthwhile contributing to its decision to implement the demonstration pilots. That said, given that learning from the demonstration pilots will come only at the end of the project (if that), it is unclear if another alternative action that could have been completed within the project lifetime would have been a more suitable alternative. The information it gathered during the early phases of the project also led it to expand the scope of the vulnerability study, which it concluded would not only provide a better picture of the conditions among the rural agro-pastoralists in the Cuvelai Basin but would also provide the project a more effective tool to advocate for policy change among local GRA authorities. Finally, the project quickly perceived the potential value of GIS mapping as both useful planning tool for municipal and provincial governments but also as a useful advocacy tool, although it perhaps has not to this point pressed this advantage as much as it might have.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Question 3a: What additional actions could be undertaken during the remainder of the project to address these issues and improve project implementation?

Question 3b: What human, financial and time resources are required (and why) to maximize project performance in the remaining life of the project?

The project should consider immediately generating and distributing the findings and conclusions from

the vulnerability study in both English and Portuguese. This will involve determining the implications of the vulnerability study as relevant to the target stakeholders and deciding upon an advocacy strategy with the different local GRA agencies during the planning and budgeting process. In a similar vein, the project should consider determining what type of documentation of the demonstration pilots is necessary (such as documenting the experience of the various Sobas and members of the makunda with the improved seeds, plastic containers, and concrete reinforced wells) as an advocacy tool for future budgeting. The project should consider producing this documentation and then using it to engage the relevant local GRA authorities, again preferably in conjunction with the planning and budgeting process as feasible.

With regard to the flood early warning system, the project should consider mapping out all necessary steps between the current state and when the flood early warning system is fully functional. While some steps will be one time (install gauging stations), others will be recurring (operations and maintenance). Based on this mapping, timelines can be determined as well as roles and responsibilities of relevant GRA stakeholders and others (including the project), as appropriate, can be assigned. For instance, the project may decide to take responsibility for initiating a communication channel for dissemination of warnings. It is likely beyond the ability of the project to solve issues of turf, budget, data sharing and maintenance of the flood monitoring stations due to these questions being inherently GRA in nature. For this reason we suggest that USAID/Angola should use its convening authority to create a dialogue between GRA actors particularly NIWR/Ministry of Water, CP (including CP Cunene)/Ministry of Interior, and Ministry of Environment (due to being the lead Ministry on the upcoming UNDP GEF project that is also investing in flood monitoring). The nature of the problem are entrenched questions of turf and authority over water monitoring, who has interpretive skills, issues of data sharing and budget authority etc. A facilitated process might be the best way to allow GRA actors to develop consensus regarding these issues and may likely add to not only the sustainability of this project's investment but might also have implications on the upcoming GEF project as well. It is critically important before the end of the project to reach agreement on who will be responsible for what with regards to the monitoring stations maintenance.

The project should consider creating a sustainability plan (perhaps only an informal document) that (1) prioritizes aspects of the project that are intended to continue after the project ends and (2) documents how those activities will continue. The plan could include each of the project's primary implementation activities: flood early warning system, vulnerability study dissemination, demonstration pilots, and GIS/mapping. Means of continuation could include that sufficient capacity has been transferred to relevant GRA ministries and sufficient resources have been secured. Another potential means of continuation is the upcoming or recently launched projects in the area, which can potentially pick up where the current project leaves off. Upcoming projects include the (very similar) UNDP GEF project and a recently awarded grant to DW from USAID/Angola. Other bilateral and regional USAID efforts could also be explored, as well as potential efforts of other donors.

In a similar vein, USAID/Angola should consider facilitating linkages between the current project and the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) funded projects in Cunene province. The OFDA projects can take-on learning from the current project and leverage linkage thereby contributing to the sustainability of certain project activities. The project and USAID/Angola, as appropriate, should consider continuing to remain abreast of the UNDP GEF project (for the same reason as above). Finally, USAID and the project should consider exploring how the Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWSNET) might be able to support the project goals or the goals in the region more broadly.

ANNEX 1: SCOPE OF WORK

World Learning

The Eye Kutoloka Project: NGO Strengthening through Health Service Delivery and Technical Activities

Title of Activity: Improved Resilience and Climate Governance in Angola's Cuvelai Basin

Purpose of the Assessment

1. PROJECT IN ANGOLA

The *'Improved Resilience and Climate Governance in Angola's Cuvelai Basin'* is a two year initiative with a total budget of US\$1,123,711 implemented by World Learning. In FY13, World Learning started financing Development Workshop to implement the activity in Cunene province, notably, in Kwanhama, Ombajda, Namacunde and Cuvelai municipalities. Development Workshop started implementation on August 1, 2013, and is scheduled to end on July 31, 2015. The activity aims to support local adaption strategies by helping communities to: 1) Identify their needs; 2) Increase resilience resistance to climate change; 3) Campaign for and influence government funding; and 4) Help families, communities and the government to take concrete decisions and action on climate change.

2. PROJECT OBJECTIVE, RESULTS AND INDICATORS

Project Objective, Results and Indicator:

Elements	Indicators
Specific Objective: Increase communities' climate change resilience in Cuvelai Basin (Cunene province) through capacity strengthening activities in four target municipalities (Cuanhama, Ombajda, Namacunde, and Cuvelai) from August 1, 2013 to July 31, 2015.	Number of stakeholders (communities and government) with increased capacity to adapt to the impacts of the climate changes as a result of USG assistance; (USAID mandatory indicator)
Result 1: Strengthened community capacity for preparedness for climate resilience response.	Number of communities implementing risk reducing practices/actions to improve resilience to climate change as result of USG assistance.
Result 2: Strengthened capacity of local hydro-meteorological services and local civil protection authorities to monitor extreme weather and climate change in the Cuvelai Basin.	Number of stakeholders (government institutions) with improved capacity to provide early warning information on potential flooding as a result of USG assistance. (USAID mandatory).
	Number of local media, internet service providers or mobile phone institutions facilitating access to early warning systems and disaster response information. (USAID mandatory).
Result 3: Improve participation and advocacy	Number of measures adopted by the provincial

for community preparedness and disaster response services.	government to reduce vulnerability to potential impacts of climate change as a result of USG assistance.
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Underlying Project Assumptions:

- The project requires a high degree of buy-in, at municipal and provincial levels, which could impede project implementation.
- Unavailability of requisite human resources and data.
- Insufficient institutional support and political commitments
- Work progresses in a compartmentalized fashion and there is little integration e.g. government refuse to share data and information

3. PURPOSE

The main purpose of the assessment should focus on the process of implementation rather than on its impact, since this will be minimal after such a short time of activity implementation (little over 1 year of project implementation), assessing in particular whether the intervention being implemented will have the intended results and meet specific objective. Specifically:

1. Analyze the process of implementation (e.g., describe any lessons learned and/or best practices identified since activity start-up with regard to the initial analysis, assumptions and design)
2. Analyze the changes that have occurred within local government:
 - What has been the project’s contribution to strengthening the capacity of Civil Protection?
 - Has coordination improved between Cunene and Namibia?
 - Has coordination improved between the GRA institutions responsible for climate change adaptation?
 - Are there any emerging issues that might affect the project’s implementation strategy in Year 2?
3. Identify challenges and constraints that have been encountered
 - How has the project team addressed these issues? What additional actions could be undertaken in Year 2 to address these issues and improve project implementation?
 - What human, financial, and time resources are required (and why) in order to maximize program performance in the remaining months
4. Describe any lessons learned and/or best practices identified since program start-up with regard to initial analysis, assumptions, and program design (target areas, actors, and issues)

The assessment should provide information to the team so that the intervention can be modified and improved, if necessary.

4. ASSESSMENT METHODS

The assessment should include but is not necessarily limited to the following methods:

- **Desk Review** of relevant documents (quarterly project reports, work plans and other relevant project documents, etc.)
- **Key Informant Interviews:**

No.	Position	Institution
1.	- Country Director - Consultant	World Learning

2.	- Project Manager - Project Coordinator - Community Office	Implementing partner DW
1.	Civil Protection officers - Commander - 2 nd in Command - Officers who received training	Cunene Civil Protection
2.	National Director	National Water Institute
3.	Secretary of State	Ministry of Interior
4.	Vice-Governor for social affairs	Provincial Government
5.	4 Municipal Administrators	4 Municipalities Kwanhama, Ombajda, Namacunde and Cuvelai
6.	4 Municipal Social Affairs Delegates	4 Municipalities Kwanhama, Ombajda, Namacunde and Cuvelai
	Community leaders – this will consist of going to the communities	Four municipalities
7.	Provincial Water Director	Provincial Water Institute
8.	Provincial Agricultural Director	Provincial Agriculture Department
9.	Namibian water institute officers (2-4)	Namibian Water Institute
	Total number of people to be interviewed 27 people	

5. DELIVERABLES

The team's principal deliverable will be a written report (approximately ten to fifteen pages in length) that analyzes the process of implementation, including challenges, constraints and opportunities, and provides findings and recommendations to help guide the remainder of the project. Prior to field mission conclusion, the team will meet with USAID/Angola and World Learning (WL) to review the intended content of the written report.

6. TEAM COMPOSITION

Rebecca Nicodemus, USAID/W/E3/GCC
 Kyle Rearick, USAID/W/DCHA PPM & DRG
 Ranca Tuba, USAID/Angola
 Gary Woller, dTS

7. ANTICIPATED REPORT OUTLINE

- a. Executive Summary
- b. Purpose, Scope, and Methodology
- c. Political Background and Country Context
- d. Brief Description of the Project
- e. Findings
- f. Conclusion
- g. Lessons Learned & Best Practices

- h. Recommendations
- i. Annexes

8. SCHEDULE OF MID-TERM ASSESSMENT

SOW Finalized: January 23, 2015

Field Interviews and Consultations, Debrief with USAID/Angola: January 26 – February 6, 2015

DC Interviews (as applicable): February 9 – 13, 2015

Submit Draft Report for Comment: March 9, 2015

Submit Final Report: March 31, 2015

Final Debrief: (as warranted)

ANNEX 2: TRIP AGENDA

Below is the draft trip agenda as of January 19, 2015. The actual trip agenda was close to the draft.

World Learning
“Improved Resilience and Climate Governance in Angola’s Cuvelai Basin”
Draft Agenda for USAID Mid-Term Assessment Team
26 January to 6 February 2015

Week: Monday, January 26 to Sunday, February 1

Date	Day	Time	Activities
Jan .25	Sunday		Arrival of team in Luanda
Jan. 26	Monday	Morning 9:30 or 10:00 13:30 17:00 17:30	Briefing at USAID Depart USAID Depart to Cunene Arrival in Cunene Hotel check-in
Jan. 27	Tuesday	9:00-11:00 11:00-12:00 12:00-13:00 13:00-14:00 14:30-15:30 15:45-17:00	Project Power Point Presentation and Question and Answer Session Meet with the Vice Governor Nascimento Meet with Civil Protection Lunch Provincial Director for Water Affair Visit Ondjiva flood protection dams
Jan. 28	Wed.	8:00-18:00	Visit to communities/households that have been involved in the project.
Jan. 29	Thursday	8:00 9:00-10:00 10:00-12:00 12:00 13:00-14:00 15:30-16:30 17:00	Departure to Namacunde Municipality Meeting with the Namacunde Municipality Administrator and Team Visit Ohaitamba community (households that have been involved in the project) Return to Onijav Lunch at Onijav Meeting with Kwanhama Administrator and Team Return to hotel
Jan. 30	Friday	8:00 11:00-13:00 13:00-14:00 14:00 17:00	Travel to Oshakati Meet Namibian counterparts (Water Affairs to discuss project coordination) Lunch Visit Namibian gauge stations on the way to Ruacana Arrival at Ruacana Town Lodoge Overnight at Ruacana
Jan. 31	Saturday	8:00 9:00 13:00 13:00	Depart Ruacana Arrival Omahenene border crossing, direction Xangongo Arrival Xangongo Lunch at Xangongo Visiting two gauging stations sites

		14:00-16:00 17:00	Arrival and Overnight in Ondjiva
Feb. 1	Sunday		Personal Day

Week: Monday, February 3 to Friday, February 6

Date	Day	Time	Activities
Feb. 2	Monday		Debriefing with Civil Protection Lunch Depart to airport Fly back to Luanda
Feb. 3	Tuesday		Meetings in Luanda Ministry of Interior (Secretary of State) Manuel Quintino (Director of National Institute for Hydrology)
Feb. 4	Wed.		National Holiday
Feb. 5	Thursday		Debrief at USAID
Feb. 6	Friday		

ANNEX 3: PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

Persons that the assessment team met with and interviewed during the mid-term assessment are listed below. Where the name, organization and title of the interviewee are known, this information is provided.

1. Ranca Tuba, Democracy Specialist, USAID/Angola
2. Dr. Gastao Lukangu, Private Sector Engagement Specialist, USAID/Angola
3. Fern Teodoro, Chief of Party, Eye Kutoloka Project
4. John Mendelsohn, Consultant to Development Workshop
5. Beat Weber, Development Workshop
6. Nasso Soares, Project Coordinator, Development Workshop
7. Paulo Calunga, Commander, 2nd in Command of the Civil Protection Unit of Cunene province
8. João Mbala, Department of Civil Protection, Cunene province
9. Victor Junior, Department of Civil Protection, Cunene province
10. Aurelio David, Department of Civil Protection, Cunene province
11. Convangelisto Cameiti Vetcky, Engineer, Provincial Department of Water and Energy
12. Soba, Ondova Makunda, Cuanhama Municipality
13. Soba, Nehome Makunda, Cuanhama Municipality
14. Administrator Namacunde Municipality
15. Administrative staff Namacunde Municipality
16. Soba, Ohiohaitamba Makunda, Namacunde Municipality
17. Vice Administrator, Cuanhama Municipality
18. Administrative staff, Cuanhama Municipality
19. Ronny Hango , Senior Hydrologist & Basin support Officer, Department of Water Affairs and Forestry Cuvelai-Etosha Basin, Oshakati
20. Manuel Quintino, Director National Institute of Hydrological Resources, Ministry of Water and Energy
21. Peter Cloutier, Office Chief, Technical Programs, USAID/Angola
22. Paige Miller, Program Officer, USAID/Angola
23. Analdina Nouemou, DG Civil Society Advisor, USAID/Angola
24. Tuwilika Haludilua, Development Workshop

ANNEX 4: DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Below is the list of documents reviewed as part of the mid-term assessment.

1. Project proposal related documents (6):
 - a. USAID/Washington Request for Missions Proposals for GCC Integration Pilot Projects
 - b. USAID/Angola Proposal Documents (3)
 - c. World Learning Request for Application
 - d. Development Workshop Proposal to World Learning
2. Project generated documents (10):
 - a. Program Description (Oct 4 2012)
 - b. Workshop Report (May 10 2013)
 - c. Year One Work Plan (Jul 2013 to Jun 2014)
 - d. Year One Quarter One Quarterly Report (Jul to Sept 2013)
 - e. Year One Quarter Two Quarterly Report (Oct to Dec 2013)
 - f. Year One Quarter Three Quarterly Report (Jan to Mar 2014)
 - g. Year One Quarter Four Quarterly Report (Apr to Jun 2014)
 - h. Year Two Work Plan (Jul 2014 to Jun 2015)
 - i. Year Two Quarter One Quarterly Report (Jul to Sept 2014)
 - j. Draft report on the 2014 Cuvelai Household Survey
3. Trip reports related to the project (2):
 - a. Development and Training Services (dTS) Evaluation Scoping Trip Report
 - b. United States Forest Services (USFS) Land Use and Climate Change Workshop Mission Report
4. Other documents (2):
 - a. GEF UNDP Project Description: “Angola: Promoting Climate-resilient Development and Enhanced Adaptive Capacity to Withstand Disaster Risks in Angola’s Cuvelai River Basin”
 - b. Angola USAID/OFDA Trip Report, December 1-12 2014

ANNEX 5: MID-TERM ASSESSMENT TEAM MEMBERS

The mid-term assessment team consisted of the following members:

- Rebecca Nicodemus, Bureau for Economic Growth, Education and Environment, Office of Global Climate Change, USAID
- Kyle Rearick, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, Humanitarian Assistance, Office of Program, Policy and Management, USAID
- Gary Woller, Evaluation Specialist Consultant, Development and Training Services, Inc.
- Fern Teodoro, Chief of Party, Eye Kutoloka Project
- John Mendelsohn, Consultant to Development Workshop
- Beat Weber, Development Workshop

Also accompanying the assessment team were the commander and four staff members from the Civil Protection Unit of Cunene province, as follows:

- Paulo Calunga, Commander, 2nd in Command of the Civil Protection Unit of Cunene province
- João Mbala
- Victor Junior
- Aurelio David