PATHWAYS TO PEACE SERIES: ADDRESSING CONFLICT AND STRENGTHENING STABILITY IN A CHANGING CLIMATE

LESSONS LEARNED FROM PEACE III: A MID-CYCLE PORTFOLIO REVIEW

Updated June 2019
Pastoralists guide their livestock through the Karamoja region of Uganda. During times of dry spells or droughts, Turkana pastoralists frequently cross the Kenyan border into Uganda in search of water points and better grazing areas for their livestock. These seasonal migratory movements are one of the main sources of potential cross-border conflict between Turkana pastoralists and pastoralists in Karamoja.
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A MID-CYCLE PORTFOLIO REVIEW

Updated June 2019

Prepared for:

United States Agency for International Development
Adaptation Thought Leadership and Assessments (ATLAS)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The arid and semiarid lands (ASAL) along the borders between Kenya and its neighbors have for many years been areas of conflict among pastoralists and agropastoralists from diverse ethnicities and clans. PEACE III is a cooperative agreement funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) that responds to these challenges by strengthening the management of conflict along the Kenya/Somalia, Kenya/Ethiopia, Kenya/South Sudan and Kenya/Uganda borders. PEACE III promotes stability in the region by strengthening the relationship between communities and local governments in cross-border areas and improving the ability of regional and national institutions to respond rapidly and effectively to conflict.

This Mid-Cycle Portfolio Review (MPR) reports on PEACE III’s conflict work and its integration of interventions responding to the impacts that climate change and poor natural resource management (NRM) have on conflict among target communities. The report:

1) describes PEACE III’s interventions related to conflict, climate change and NRM and considers how well current programming meets the project’s objectives; and
2) documents lessons learned and provides recommendations for implementation and additional ways the program can integrate climate change and NRM.

PEACE III project interventions are divided into two “clusters”—the Somali Cluster (Kenya, Somalia and southern Ethiopia) and the Karamoja Cluster (Kenya, Uganda, southwestern Ethiopia and southeastern South Sudan). The scope of this MPR was defined by its focus (conflict–climate–NRM) and the geographic areas that the field team had time and resources to visit. The three-person field team spent 10 days in March 2018 visiting the main project areas of operation in the Karamoja cluster, including Turkana County in Kenya and Moroto and Kaabong Districts in Uganda. Field visits with local officials, stakeholders and project beneficiaries were preceded by consultations with USAID staff, Pact and Mercy Corps implementing partners and regional and national government officials and research experts in Nairobi and Kampala, respectively.

KEY RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1) How did perceptions, attitudes and behaviors toward conflict change among local stakeholders and target communities during PEACE III project activities?

2) How did PEACE III activities and advocacy affect the evolving cross-border conflict management relationships among local, national and regional institutions in the project areas? What have been the effects of those changes on conflict dynamics?
3) Did conflict reduction contribute to improved climate change adaptation measures, and did climate knowledge/adaptation contribute to conflict reduction?

4) How did the PEACE III project experiences affect the roles and expectations of chiefs/traditional leaders, women and youth?

5) What are the most important next steps (and institutional changes) needed to further promote improved conflict management and build resilience across the PEACE III project areas?

**PEACEBUILDING CHALLENGES FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN KENYA AND UGANDA**

The recent political watershed in Kenya was the 2010 constitution, which created independent institutions, new checks and balances and a far-reaching devolution of power and resources to the county level. Turkana County has established a peace directorate that intends to use its devolved resources to work with other levels of government and civil society partners on peacebuilding. Nevertheless, county officials said that the continuing proliferation of arms from weakly governed South Sudan and the squeeze on Ethiopian pastoralists from large-scale plantations, pushing them increasingly southward, make the achievement of peace a difficult and ongoing challenge.

One of the most consequential contributions of PEACE III to local conflict prevention in Turkana County is the program’s cooperation with county authorities in the preparation and validation of the Turkana County Community Safety Policy, which for the first time lays out the full context, drivers and planned institutional responses to issues of peace and conflict.

Over the past three decades, Uganda’s democracy has passed from promising innovation to an increasingly autocratic patronage-based style of governance. A five-tier set of decentralized institutional structures was created—village, parish, subcounty, county and district—with the goal of increasing participation in local governance. But the implementation of decentralization has been weak and inefficient. Because security issues are considered to be under the competence of national authorities, budget resources for local government to address challenges of cross-border peace and conflict have been lacking. This has prevented local governments in Karamoja from playing a more constructive role in conflict resolution and peacebuilding and has led to continuing reliance on PEACE III and other donor organizations to fill the gaps.

Under PEACE III, Mercy Corps is actively working with the National Platform for Peacebuilding on the drafting of a National Peace Policy for Uganda. One of the main goals of that collaboration is to create budget mechanisms that would allow funds for conflict prevention and peacebuilding to be made available to local government units.
PEACE AND NATURAL RESOURCE SHARING AGREEMENTS

A principal challenge for peacebuilding is the development of norms and institutions—i.e., formal and informal rules and their enforcement mechanisms—that can help to sustain effective conflict management and peaceful behaviors over time. In the Karamoja Cluster, PEACE III has organized, facilitated or supported a number of important cross-border peace agreements and natural resource agreements involving communities and government representatives from Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan and Ethiopia.

Cumulatively, the agreements reflect an evolving conflict management network that government officials and community leaders consistently described as having helped to reduce conflict—especially large-scale raids—and saved lives in these countries. Nevertheless, there are many forces at play that make the gains in peacemaking in the Karamoja Cluster still fragile. The areas along the border with South Sudan remain unstable and prone to conflict. National and local political dynamics, the continued presence of small arms and interclan suspicions and misunderstandings have destabilized some areas. Notably, many of the peace and natural resource sharing agreements also encompassed issues and provisions that went well beyond the immediate agenda of peace and natural resource management, including such issues as water pans (natural or excavated areas to store surface runoff) and dams, the establishment of markets and trading, women's rights, wildlife protection, education, human and animal health and the sharing of cross-border schools and hospitals. This trend is indicative of community needs that are part of a larger agenda for resilience.

KEY FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNED

AN EFFECTIVE MODEL FOR CONFLICT REDUCTION AND COLLABORATION

PEACE III's model of encouraging and strengthening horizontal and vertical linkages among local, national and regional institutions, partner organizations and communities has been largely effective in helping to reduce and mitigate conflict, especially large-scale or escalatory violence in the Karamoja Cluster. Where PEACE III's relationships are dense and have continuity, conflict is at very low levels.

PEACE III's efforts have provided important support for an emerging and growing network of peace committees, women's groups, youth groups and traditional leaders across pastoralist and agropastoralist communities in the borderlands of Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and South Sudan. Conflict dynamics in the region remain unstable and unpredictable, and peace agreements remain vulnerable to political events, the circulation of illicit arms, unequal access to natural resources and climate shocks. But the broader pattern is one of increasing collaboration and the gradual transformation of these conflict-prone areas.

The issue remains of the gap between the prerogatives of national governments in relation to issues of security and conflict and the resources available to government officials at the local level to constructively address outbreaks of conflict as they occur. The instruments to address local and cross-border conflict are primarily the various security forces. While peace committees
have been growing in strength and number in Kenya and Uganda, both national and local governments have leaned heavily on PEACE III and other external donors for guidance and resources to address conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

Nevertheless, PEACE III is making steady progress in nudging national and local governments toward recognizing the need for new institutional arrangements to respond quickly to conflict and provide mechanisms for conflict resolution. The network of peace committees, peace agreements and natural resource sharing agreements to which PEACE III has contributed, directly or indirectly, has helped to increase pro-peace public attitudes and institutionalize new forms of dispute resolution. But those efforts require ongoing support through the continuing work of PEACE III over the near-to-medium term, as well as new policy frameworks, increased resources from host-country governments and dedicated local government budget lines.

CLIMATE KNOWLEDGE AND ADAPTIVE RESPONSES
Government officials and community leaders in the Karamoja Cluster described a wide array of climate adaptation measures that are underway, including small-scale irrigation, new boreholes, soil and water conservation, bans on tree-cutting for charcoal, hay growing, cereal banking, energy-efficient stoves and tree-planting. But more remains to be done to disseminate climate knowledge, including explicit assessment of community level climate risks and vulnerability, and adaptive measures at the local level. Still needed is a broader and deeper understanding of the overall climate change challenge that leads to a vision of the medium- to long-term climate future for Turkana and Karamoja—as well as an appreciation of the need for peace to address that challenge. This would help make climate change a more powerful “forcing issue” for the cooperation required to respond to climate change threats.

BUILDING ON COLLABORATIVE CAPACITY: ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT AND RESILIENCE
Beyond their direct contributions to conflict prevention and peacebuilding, the institutional relationships, networks, peace committees and human and social capital created or strengthened by PEACE III represent extremely valuable assets that can be leveraged for further program activities. These new collaborative relationships have been partially institutionalized in the recent series of peace agreements and natural resource agreements. More generally, through their constituent groups in civil society and government, especially through the work of the peace committees, these cooperative linkages have circulated new norms and practices for the management of natural resources and conflict.

There are two noteworthy characteristics of these new collaborative arrangements. First, because of the nature of the problems that they address—cross-border conflict, natural resource scarcity and climate change—the scale of the relationships is both spatially larger and more complex than those that preceded them. Second, peace committees, local government, women’s groups and communities are actively interested in expanding their joint sphere of activities. This is reflected in the many “non-peace-and-conflict” issues that appear in nearly every peace agreement and natural resource sharing agreement. In essence, this constitutes a set of structures for collaborative learning and decision-making that can help build an agenda
for resilience that is arrived at inductively, rather than prescriptively. PEACE III’s still-evolving institutional platforms represent an opportunity for program integration with other USAID activities related to livelihoods, environment, climate change, natural resource management and other aspects of a broader resilience agenda.

RECOMMENDATIONS

During the remainder of the PEACE III cooperative agreement through 2019:

1) USAID should support PEACE III activities, with an emphasis on institutionalizing the peace architecture of peace committees, peace agreements and natural resource agreements. PEACE III should review and provide a concise status report and recommended next steps by the relevant peace actors for each of these agreements before the end of the current award cycle.

2) PEACE III should support institutionalization of the Women’s Forum and Chiefs’ Forum in order to fully embed them as established local institutions. The program should also facilitate opportunities for increased intercommunity exchanges for members of the Women’s Forum.

3) PEACE III should enhance climate knowledge in its target communities through workshops and curricula that incorporate discussion of both traditional knowledge and current climate science, with a focus on medium- to long-term climate trends and their implications for the future of project areas. The Women’s Forum and youth councils should be considered primary outreach mechanisms to prioritize accessibility and assimilation of climate knowledge while reinforcing the message that responding to climate challenges requires peace and cooperation. Clarifying the climate change threat will help to catalyze peacebuilding and cooperative responses, such as community-based climate risk and vulnerability analysis, which in turn strengthen the foundation for climate change adaptation.

4) USAID should actively encourage the Kenyan and Ugandan governments to provide budget lines and dedicated resources for local governments to address conflict prevention and peacebuilding. This will help to close the gap currently being filled by PEACE III, promote self-reliance and make PEACE III’s achievements more likely to be sustainable over the longer term.

5) USAID should support PEACE III and Mercy Corps in actively advocating for the finalization and adoption of Turkana County’s “Community Safety Policy” and Uganda’s “National Peace Policy” as formulated by the Office of the Prime Minister.

6) PEACE III should continue to work closely with the Peace Directorate of Turkana County and encourage government counterparts to make Turkana County a model and example in realizing the peacebuilding commitments—including water pans and dams—contained within its peace and natural resource sharing agreements.
7) USAID should encourage the governments of Kenya and Uganda to fulfill their publicly expressed intentions and officially join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). With oil production beginning in Turkana County and mining conflicts already plaguing some areas of Karamoja, both governments need to monitor activities in the extractives sector to prevent additional conflict in border areas.

To ensure that PEACE III’s achievements are sustained and extended:

8) USAID should support PEACE III program activities for an additional award cycle after 2019 in recognition of its achievements and its critical role going forward in extending and deepening relationships to reduce conflict and advance peacebuilding in the border areas of Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. Bilateral programs do not address cross-border, community-level issues.

9) USAID should recognize and take advantage of the unique “accumulated assets” produced by PEACE III in the form of new institutional relationships and cross-border peace and conflict networks to explore opportunities for further program integration.

10) USAID should identify opportunities for program integration, beginning with the Partnership for Resilience and Economic Growth (PREG) and other regional efforts, such as Food for Peace, Feed the Future and recent USAID activities like Growth Health Governance (GHG) in Uganda. The “non-peace-and-conflict” issues enumerated in the PEACE III-supported peace and natural resource sharing agreements provide a demand-driven list of possible intervention areas, especially with respect to livelihoods/markets, natural resource management and opportunities for women and youth.

11) USAID should consider leveraging the consensus-based institutional platforms of PEACE III and pivot to a follow-on activity that explicitly uses the peace architecture as a collaborative governance platform to support livelihoods and resilience work. Instead of jointly developing conflict and resilience programming side by side, as has been done in other resilience-related activities, view the peace architecture developed by PEACE III and local governments as an existing governance framework by which to develop resilience-related programming. By “thickening” the relationships between actors, giving the relationships value beyond peacebuilding alone, and fostering adaptive and participatory governance, peace is likely to be more sustainable and more development gains are likely. The new activity should focus on:

- Strengthening the peace architecture as a consensus-based governance platform
- Hosting a series of visioning activities among various stakeholders to develop a common vision of what is possible for resilience and livelihood work
- Facilitating mixed group study tours to increase participants’ knowledge of what is possible
- Coordinating with other parts of the Mission and empowering participants to take ownership of livelihood interventions
- Providing seed resources/pilots either directly though the new program or through collaboration with other Mission activities or development partners (ideally both) to show host governments how these mechanisms can be used for feedback and decision-making on development investments
- Continuing to encourage host government ownership and support for the peace committees and related parts of the peace architecture
- Developing a collaborating, learning and adapting (CLA) approach for the follow-on agreement and work plans, to be able to adapt to changing circumstances and opportunities
- Exploring management options within the Mission related to the new mechanisms to encourage greater cross-office buy-in and promote deeper integration
I. BACKGROUND

The arid and semiarid lands (ASAL) along the borders between Kenya and its neighbors have experienced for many years conflict among pastoralists and agropastoralists from diverse ethnicities and clans. Recurrent drought, authoritarian governance, political marginalization, resource scarcity and, in some places, violent extremism, have combined to destabilize communities and impede economic development. PEACE III is a US$20 million United States Agency for International Development (USAID) cooperative agreement that responds to these challenges by strengthening the management of conflict along the Kenya-Somalia, Kenya-Ethiopia, Kenya-South Sudan and Kenya-Uganda borders. Implemented by Pact in partnership with Mercy Corps from 2014 through 2019, PEACE III promotes stability in the region by strengthening the relationship between communities and local governments in cross-border areas and improving the ability of regional and national institutions to respond rapidly and effectively to conflict.

This report is the second of three studies taking a broader comparative look at lessons learned from project interventions in the Horn of Africa and East Africa that address linkages among conflict and climate risks and their implications for building resilience. The first study focused on findings from the pilot project for Peace Centers for Climate and Social Resilience (PCCSR) in Borana Zone in southern Ethiopia. That case study found positive linkages between interethnic collaboration on climate change adaptation activities and improved conflict prevention and mitigation. The third study, examining the “Toward Enduring Peace in Sudan (TEPS)” program in North Darfur, will be conducted in mid-2018.

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This report reviews PEACE III’s conflict work and its integration of climate change and natural resource management (NRM). The review is based on the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) Office of Program, Policy and Management (PPM) Mid-Cycle Portfolio Review (MPR). The MPR is used by the Complex Crisis Fund (CCF) and Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) to analyze projects in the context of their current operational environment, while taking into consideration issues that may shape the future direction of project interventions. The report: 1) reviews PEACE III’s interventions related to conflict, climate change and natural resource management and considers the contribution of current programming to the project's objectives; and 2) documents lessons learned and provides recommendations for implementation and additional program integration moving forward.

The scope of this MPR was delimited by its topical focus (conflict–climate–NRM) and the geographic areas that the field team had time and resources to visit. PEACE III project interventions are divided into two “clusters”—the Somali Cluster (Kenya, Somalia and southern Ethiopia) and the Karamoja Cluster (Kenya, Uganda, southwestern Ethiopia and southeastern South Sudan). The three-person field team, which had previous experience in these and similar pastoralist areas, spent 10 days visiting the main project areas in the Karamoja Cluster, including Turkana County in Kenya and Moroto and Kaabong Districts in the Karamoja region of
Uganda (see Figure 1). Field visits with local officials, stakeholders and project beneficiaries were preceded by consultations with USAID staff, Pact and Mercy Corps implementing partners and regional and national government officials and research experts in Nairobi and Kampala, respectively.

Figure 1. Turkana County, Kenya, and Karamoja Region, Uganda

![Map of Turkana County, Kenya and Karamoja Region, Uganda](image)

Source: Esri, USGS, NOAA.

The site visits, meetings and interviews focused on five areas:

1) How did perceptions, attitudes and behaviors toward conflict change among local stakeholders and target communities during PEACE III project activities?
2) How did PEACE III activities and advocacy affect the evolving cross-border conflict management relationships among local, national and regional institutions in the project areas? What have been the effects of those changes on conflict dynamics?

3) Did conflict reduction contribute to improved climate change adaptation measures, and did climate knowledge/adaptation contribute to conflict reduction?

4) How did the PEACE III project experiences affect the roles and expectations of chiefs/traditional leaders, women and youth?

5) What are the most important next steps (and institutional changes) needed to further promote improved conflict management and build resilience across the PEACE III project areas?
II. METHODOLOGY

While the powerful effects of rising temperatures, droughts, floods, seasonal shifts and erratic weather associated with climate change are clearly evident in the Horn of Africa and East Africa, recent research on the effects of climate change on conflict points toward a complex and contingent relationship mediated by an array of nonclimate factors. The quality or failings of formal and traditional institutions of governance, relations between the state and its citizens, patterns of interaction among contending identity groups, trends in socioeconomic conditions and the allocation and management of natural resources all interact in ways that may provoke or deter conflict.

There is a broad consensus among analysts, however, that adverse climate trends are stressors that increase the likelihood of conflict when they occur in combination with nonclimate factors associated with conflict. The difficulty of establishing “a robust direct association” between climate change and conflict does not reduce its importance for rural ASAL communities heavily dependent on natural resources. Rather, it calls for attention to how climate impacts interact with underlying conflict dynamics in specific settings and how interventions can be designed to prevent and mitigate conflict in those particular circumstances (Buhaug 2015).

With this in mind, this MPR used the nonclimate categories of USAID’s Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF 2.0) as a conceptual basis and considered how these categories interacted with climate risks in the PEACE III project areas that were visited. The CAF 2.0 is an analytic framework that synthesizes empirical material (e.g., geography, demographics, political trends, economic data, climate vulnerability, food security) and qualitative data and information (e.g., interviews and focus groups). The latter includes gathering information on the subjective understandings and perceptions that often drive conflict. The CAF 2.0 draws upon diverse perspectives from government, nongovernmental organizations, communities and civil society. It includes a sampling of viewpoints from a spectrum of groups who occupy diverse positions within political, economic, social and cultural institutions and hierarchies. Five concepts of conflict dynamics are central to the CAF 2.0:

**Identities** are markers of similarity or distinction among individuals and groups. Identities can be multiple—for example, gender, religion, ethnicity, age cohort, indigene/migrant, etc. In many communities, livelihoods are not just economic activities but also are carriers of identity.

**Grievances** are feelings of dissatisfaction among a community’s members with how society is organized and how it impacts their lives, based on perceptions of whether their basic needs are being met. These perceptions may be accurate or inaccurate. In areas where a large percentage of the population is still engaged in traditional livelihoods such as pastoralism, agropastoralism, and fishing, threats to livelihoods and access to resources are pivotal sources of grievances.
**Societal patterns** are systematic and repetitive forms of interaction among individuals, groups and institutions in the community (e.g., elitism, exclusion, corruption, impunity).

**Institutional performance** is the extent to which formal and informal institutions are perceived to be legitimate (fair, transparent, accountable) and effective (providing order and basic public goods and services).

**Key actors** are influential individuals and organizations that have the capacity to mobilize collective actions around grievances or resiliencies.

Other points of reference for the analysis include “triggers and trends” (catalyzing events and current trajectories) and “bright spots” (unconventional practices and innovations with promise).

The analysis of conflict, climate and NRM linkages and their implications for affected communities also leads to the broader question of resilience, which is defined by USAID as “the ability of people, households, communities, countries, and systems to prepare, recover, and thrive in the face of shocks and stresses in a way that reduces chronic vulnerability and facilitates inclusive growth.” Climate adaptations that are based upon and strengthen effective institutions are more likely to build resilience than technical solutions alone. This report considers whether and how PEACE III’s core activities on conflict management could facilitate further program integration to address climate risks and increase the resilience of communities in these cross-border regions.

Most people in the Karamoja Cluster are engaged in pastoralism or agropastoralism, or a combination of both herding and farming. Pastoralists rely on the movement between dry and wet season grazing areas to ensure the efficient use of water and pasture. The migration of people and livestock between host and receiving communities—each coping with the challenges of natural resource scarcity—is further complicated by national borders, differing political and administrative settings and divergent expectations about rights and responsibilities. PEACE III activities were reviewed in their national contexts and compared and contrasted to draw out lessons learned and recommendations for enhancing and sustaining the program’s accomplishments.

**A NOTE ON CONFLICT DATA AND CONSTRAINTS TO STUDY SCOPE**
Conflict event data for the border areas covered by this study is limited and subject to large definitional and methodological differences among the few available sources. The Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has used a limited number of monitors and community contacts to collect event data and issue periodic (but not systematic) reports on these areas for the past 15 years. That event data, however, is not publicly available and is not shared with donors and researchers. CEWARN states that it needs additional resources to be able to process the data and render it in a form suitable for public release.
The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) Project is widely used to study conflict in Africa, based on published reports from verified local news sources. While ACLED data is collected systematically, it is limited to “political violence and protest events.” This excludes most of the conflict that takes place between pastoralist groups. Other sources, such as the monthly conflict assessment reports on Uganda produced by USAID’s Supporting Access to Justice, Fostering Equity & Peace (SAFE) Program, give characterizations of monthly trends but do not provide specific or systematic data.

The field team found the conflict data compiled by PEACE III from local partners, trained monitors and UN sources to be the most complete and relevant, although it is subject to the constraints of PEACE III’s limited resources. In addition to these empirical limitations, it is important to note that, unlike physical data, the nature and meaning of conflict events vary widely and require qualitative analysis to be understood in context.
III. NATIONAL AND SUBNATIONAL CONTEXTS

KENYA AND TURKANA COUNTY

NATIONAL POLITICAL CONTEXT

In 2017, Kenya again experienced a difficult and conflictive electoral season—as it had in 1992, 1997 and 2007. After incumbent President Uhuru Kenyatta was declared the winner in August 2017, the opposition candidate, Raila Odinga, rejected the results and the Supreme Court annulled the election outcome. Odinga declined to participate in the rescheduled election in October, which Kenyatta won overwhelmingly. In the heated aftermath, violence broke out, and dozens lost their lives (McConnell 2018). The uneasy political atmosphere continued until early March 2018, when Kenyatta and Odinga met and agreed to end the crisis and jointly address the antagonisms arising from Kenya’s zero-sum politics.

Despite recurrent electoral conflict, Kenya’s democracy has consolidated since the return of multiparty politics in 1991, and Kenyan political culture is marked by open debate and a vigorous civil society. The space for groups to engage has, at times, been constrained, however, particularly for those working on sensitive issues. Episodes of political turmoil generally revolve around the “ethnification of politics,” in which the distribution of political and economic benefits (especially land) are mapped onto and reinforce the country’s ethnic divisions (Wambua 2017). Real GDP has grown steadily over the past five years (between 5 and 6 percent annually), but there are sharp income and wealth divides among social groups and among the 47 counties in Kenya.

The most important recent political watershed in Kenya was the 2010 constitution, which created independent institutions, new checks and balances and a far-reaching devolution of power and resources to the county level. While institutional structures have been devolved to the county level, the accompanying components of civic engagement are still a work-in-progress. For the poorer and historically marginalized counties of Kenya, devolution offers new opportunities for autonomous decision-making and participatory planning for local development. The constitution also mandates the allocation of equalization funds to provide basic services, such as water, roads, health facilities and electricity, to compensate historically marginalized counties. Concerns persist, however, that devolution has merely brought rent-seeking and ethnic patronage to the local level (D’Arcy and Cornell 2016).

OVERVIEW OF TURKANA COUNTY

Turkana County is the second largest, poorest and fastest growing county in Kenya. Closely related to the Jie and Karamojong of Uganda, the Turkana people are the main inhabitants. The county’s population of approximately 1.4 million is growing extremely rapidly (6.4 percent annually), poverty levels are very high (85 percent) and almost half the population is under 14
years of age (Cohen et al. 2015). Malnutrition and malaria are crucial concerns for much of the population.

Most of Turkana is a low-lying plain interspersed with mountains following along the eastern Rift Valley. The county is bordered by Uganda to the west, South Sudan and Ethiopia to the north and Lake Turkana to the east. With hot and arid conditions throughout most of the year, pastoralism is the main economic activity. The presence of Lake Turkana, however, makes fishing a principal livelihood for some people, and fishing is a supplementary or alternative food source for pastoralists.

CONFLICT AND GOVERNANCE IN TURKANA COUNTY

Historically, cross-border disputes over water and grazing lands have occurred between the Turkana and the Toposa to the north in South Sudan, the Dassenech and Nyangatom to the northeast in Ethiopia and the Matheniko and Dodoth to the west in Uganda. Most of these groups (with the exception of the Dassenech) have linguistic and cultural ties with the Turkana. Within Kenya, the Turkana have had conflicts with other groups, including the Pokot, Samburu and Rendile. The proliferation of small arms, especially from South Sudan, and poor relations between the Turkana population and the police authorities, add to the potential for conflict.

The marginalization of the Turkana dates back to tensions and conflict during British colonial rule, which was imposed by force in the early twentieth century. Unhappy with the Turkana’s unwillingness to engage in manual labor, the British imposed taxes in 1928 on male cattle owners. The Turkana resented these taxes, both because of their punitive nature and because the collected proceeds were sent to Nairobi rather than used for local needs. Along with the absence of investment in infrastructure and social services, Turkana was declared a restricted area, and a pass was required from the authorities to exit or enter, a stipulation that lasted until 1968 (Chemelil 2015). Provincial boundaries, grazing zones, game parks and quarantine restrictions further constrained the movement of pastoralists.

Today, however, new opportunities are emerging in governance, resource discoveries and economic development. The devolution of power to the county level has brought financial resources as well as added governance opportunities and responsibilities. Kenya’s National Steering Committee for Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (NSC), while predating devolution in its origins, provides peace committee structures at the local level that may be strengthened as devolution gains a firmer footing. The Turkana County Integrated Development Plan 2013–2017 recognizes the urgent need to address the effects of climate change on marginalized populations, and it has committed the county to increasing education and addressing water and food insecurity.

In recent years, oil deposits estimated at 600 million barrels have been discovered in Turkana County. In May 2018, the national government announced the commencement of oil production and a formula for the distribution of its revenues. The national government will receive 75 percent, Turkana County government will receive 20 percent and the remaining 5 percent will go to local communities. Large underground water aquifers also have been found, although their
utility may be limited by high levels of salinity. The potential development of these natural resources coexists with continuing insecurity in the pastoralist sector and threats of violence along Turkana’s borders (Turkana County Government 2013; Turkana County Government and Mercy Corps 2018). These resources also add to the number of interest groups in competition over ownership and access to land in Turkana.

CLIMATE VULNERABILITY IN TURKANA

Climate Trends and Projections
Turkana has an arid environment marked by two rainy seasons—long akiporo rains (March–May) and short akecheres rains (October–November). Together, these average 300–400 mm of rainfall annually. Long rains are important for livestock as they affect pasture and browse regeneration as well as the recharge rate of water sources for cattle (Mutua and Owade 2017). Rain falls in brief, violent storms and sometimes results in floods, particularly between September and February. The surface runoff and potential evaporation rates are high. Temperatures range between 24°C and 38°C, with an annual average of 30°C. Temperatures peak in March and October (USAID 2011).

According to Kenya’s Meteorological Department (KMD), average temperatures have increased across Kenya since the early 1960s, especially in the northern parts of the country. KMD has noted an increase in rainfall events between September and February—including the formerly dry months of January and February—and a decrease in precipitation during the traditional March–May rainfall season (Government of Kenya 2010). Climate trends and projections for Lodwar, the capital of Turkana County, are summarized in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARAMETER</th>
<th>OBSERVED TRENDS</th>
<th>PROJECTED CHANGES BY 2050s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Temperature</strong></td>
<td>• Temperatures peak in March and October. • Station data from Lodwar show increased (minimum and maximum) temperatures of 2–3°C (3.6–5.4°F) between 1967 and 2012, with the most marked increases in maximum temperature.</td>
<td>• Rising temperatures with maximum temperatures expected to rise between 0.7°C and 2.6°C and minimum temperatures rising between 0.8°C and 2.6°C by the 2050s, with most marked increases occurring during December–January.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rainfall</strong></td>
<td>• Rainfall peaks in April. • Period of “short rains” extends into previously dry months, with increase in rainfall events between September and February. • Decreasing rainfall during the main rainy season (March–May).</td>
<td>• Projections of rainfall are highly uncertain, although the preponderance of models suggests a slight increase in rainfall between June and August.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Livelihoods and Climate Shocks
Livelihood insecurity in Turkana is increasing as a result of rising temperatures, recurrent droughts and unpredictable and unreliable rainfall patterns. With limited water sources in Turkana, pastoralists seek dry season grazing areas in Uganda and South Sudan. Better-off pastoral households get most of their meat and milk from their animals, while mid-range households receive less than half their food needs from their livestock. Livestock production
provides a small fraction of the food needs of very poor households. Poorly integrated and inefficient markets and high food prices further add to household insecurity. Wild foods are important seasonally (USAID 2011). Figure 2 identifies the livelihood zones of Turkana and shows the strong predominance of pastoralism.

**Figure 2. Livelihood Zones in Turkana County, Kenya**

In southern Turkana, where agropastoralism is practiced, food crops and cash crop production contribute up to 40 percent of total household income. Crops are cultivated under rainfed and irrigated conditions during both the long and short rainy seasons. Sorghum and maize are the most important crops, with additional cultivation of tomatoes and mung beans. Table 2 summarizes the climate sensitivities of the main crops, and Table 3 summarizes the main climate sensitivities of livestock. Other income-generating activities for pastoralist and
agropastoralist households include firewood collection, charcoal production, agricultural labor, petty trade and land leasing.

**Table 2. Climate sensitivities of key crops grown in Turkana County, Kenya**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CROP</th>
<th>CLIMATE SENSITIVITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum</td>
<td>• Optimum temperature range of 21°C to 35°C for seed germination, 26°C to 34°C for vegetative growth and development, 25°C to 28°C for reproductive growth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Very sensitive to moisture stress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>• Susceptible to rain failure, high temperatures depress yields, especially at flowering and silking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cowpeas</td>
<td>• Sensitive to waterlogging from intense rainfall.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Table 3. Climate sensitivities of common livestock in Turkana County, Kenya**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIVESTOCK</th>
<th>CLIMATE SENSITIVITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small ruminants (goats, sheep)</td>
<td>• Higher temperatures can induce heat stress and lower livestock immunity to pathogens and disease vectors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>• Changes in rainfall and temperature regimes may affect both the distribution and the abundance of disease vectors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donkeys</td>
<td>• Flooding creates conditions for many waterborne pathogens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: USAID 2011.

Fishing is a principal or supplementary source of income for many people in the Lake Turkana area. Most fish are sold dry rather than fresh. Fish catches vary seasonally, dropping to around half in the dry season. Better-off households with boats have access to deeper waters, bigger fish and access even during the dry season. Government officials believe, however, that the full potential of fish production from Lake Turkana has not yet been realized. The Dassenech and Turkana have come into frequent conflict over thefts of fishing gear and boats in the lake. Cash for work is the primary income source for the poorer households engaged in fishing.

There is concern about the drying up and shrinking of Lake Turkana. Within the past decade, the lake has receded by about 400 meters. In addition to climate effects, the lake water levels are affected by reduced inflows from the Omo River in Ethiopia, which provides about 90 percent of the lake’s annual inflows (Avery 2013). The extensive use of irrigation canals for sugar and cotton plantations has lowered riverine water levels. There is additional concern about the effects of Ethiopia’s Gigel Gibe III dam 600 km upstream of the lake. The reduction in water availability and pasture land in Ethiopia also causes the Nyangatom and Dassenech to cross the border to seek water and pasture in northern Turkana.

**UGANDA AND KARAMOJA**

**NATIONAL POLITICAL CONTEXT**

Uganda has had its own difficulties with controversial presidential elections, though without the levels of violence seen in Kenya. President Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Movement have held power since 1986, following several years of civil war. In 2016, Museveni was elected to his fifth term of office, after harassment of his political opponents by police and
security services and allegations of voting irregularities by U.S. and European observers. In January 2018, President Museveni signed legislation for a constitutional amendment removing the age limit of 75, presumably to allow him to run for president again in 2021 when he will be 77 years old.

During the course of Museveni’s three decades in office, Uganda’s democracy has passed from promising innovation to an increasingly autocratic patronage-based style of governance. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a five-tier set of decentralized institutional structures was created—village, parish, subcounty, county and district—with the goal of increasing participation in local governance. But the implementation of decentralization has fallen short of its intended design.

Critics of decentralization point out a lack of sufficient funding for operations and services at the district level and note that line ministries of the national government often set conditions on the use of funds that limit autonomy. Shortfalls in local-level funding and administrative capacity have been worsened by the creation of new districts, a process that has extended networks of political patronage for the ruling party. The use of the discretionary powers of the national government—both legal and extralegal—are regularly used to award land and mineral concessions. Village and parish council elections have not been held since 2002.

After very rapid real GDP growth in the first decade of the 2000s, ranging from 6 percent to 10 percent annually, real GDP has slowed to a range of 4–5 percent during the past five years. Around 84 percent of Ugandans live in rural areas, but the agricultural sector has suffered from low commodity prices, environmental degradation, erratic weather patterns and farm fragmentation, as successive generations subdivide land holdings. Youth unemployment and underemployment is high, and the population is steadily increasing at around 3.2 percent annually (International Crisis Group 2017).

OVERVIEW OF KARAMOJA
The inhabitants of the region known as Karamoja are made up of a number of main ethnicities or clans, including the Dodoth, Jie, Matheniko, Tepeth, Bokora and Pian. Along the border with Kenya to the east are found the Turkana and Pokot tribes, while to the north in Sudan are the Toposa and Didinga. The people living in Karamoja’s eastern border regions are mostly engaged in pastoralism, while in adjacent areas to the west, agropastoralism is common. An agricultural zone or “green belt” with rainfall nearly double that of pastoralist areas runs along the western border of Karamoja. Livelihoods in Karamoja are based primarily on livestock-rearing, along with cultivation of sorghum, maize, beans, millet and cowpeas.

CONFLICT IN KARAMOJA
Cattle in Karamoja are highly valued for daily sustenance, bridewealth, social status and religious ceremonies. With the combination of highly valued livestock, climate variability and scarce water and pasture, the clans of Karamoja have longstanding patterns of cattle raiding among the various groups. Traditionally, these are not only acts to replenish herds, but also a key means of obtaining livestock to pay high bride prices and a demonstration of prowess and heroism by the community’s young “warriors.” Settlement patterns in Karamoja reflect the need
for protection against cattle raiding by rival groups in the form of manyattas (a hamlet or collection of households) and kraals (a mobile camp of mostly men for herding cattle, sheep, goats and donkeys). Both are constructed with thorn bushes and other sturdy materials to defend against enemies.

While conflict associated with cattle raiding has been endemic to Karamoja, the level of violence increased significantly after the mid-1970s. When the Idi Amin government fell in 1979, Ugandan Army soldiers abandoned their barracks in Moroto, leaving behind a huge stockpile of weapons. The Matheniko came into possession of some 60,000 weapons, which then began circulating to allies, while leaving other groups unarmed and vulnerable to predation (Bevan 2008). Unarmed tribes and clans scrambled to find arms by any means possible in order to defend themselves and to conduct their own raids. Civil war to the north in Sudan helped make this possible. Through trade and alliances, thousands of weapons found their way from Sudan into Uganda, either directly or via the Turkana in Kenya. As armed raiding and the arms trade grew in Karamoja, the Uganda Peoples Defence Force (UPDF) initiated a series of disarmament campaigns over three decades. These campaigns ranged from voluntary to forcible, and eventually entailed strict limits on the movement of pastoralists. The process of forcible disarmament was further aggravated by UPDF human rights abuses and retaliatory attacks on UPDF personnel. These tensions bred deep resentment among the people of Karamoja toward the Uganda national government. Around 3,000 people were killed in the first decade of the 2000s amid this cycle of violence (CEWARN 2010).

The security situation improved significantly, however, by 2015, through the combined effects of forced disarmament and new community agreements and peace committees. Large-scale cattle raids began to decline in number and the freedom of movement increased. Threats to physical security persisted in the form of frequent thefts by young “thugs” (lonetia) and high levels of sexual and gender-based violence (Howe et al. 2015). Cross-border raiding still remains a concern and peace in the region is fragile.

CLIMATE VULNERABILITY IN KARAMOJA
Climate Trends and Projections

While the rest of Uganda mostly has a bimodal rainfall pattern, Karamoja has a unimodal pattern, with a rainfall season of planting and weeding that runs from March to October, followed by a long dry season the rest of the year. The region is historically known for periodic droughts and marked climate variability. Droughts are the main climate shock experienced by the local population.

For pastoralists and farmers, the main climate challenge is not total annual rainfall but increasingly erratic and irregular seasonal (and intra-month) rainfall patterns that have disrupted traditional planting, grazing and harvesting patterns. While the rains have failed during March to May with increasing frequency, the rains from September to November have stretched later in the year and brought greater-than-average precipitation (Chaplin et al. 2017). Table 4 summarizes observed climate trends over the past four decades and projected temperature changes and rainfall changes by the middle of the twenty-first century.
### Table 4. Climate trends and projections for Karamoja, Uganda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARAMETER</th>
<th>OBSERVED TRENDS</th>
<th>PROJECTED CHANGES (2040-2069)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Temperature</strong></td>
<td>• Increase in average temperature of 1.3°C, with increases in both minimum (0.9°C) and maximum (1.6°C) temperatures (1975–2009).&lt;br&gt;• Increase in average number of days with extreme heat of 20–28 percent between 1960 and 2003, with marked increases June–August.</td>
<td>• Increases in minimum temperatures regionwide by 1.8–2.1°C, maximum temperatures by 0.3–1.7°C, and average temperatures by 1.2–1.5°C.&lt;br&gt;• Increase in the number of days with extreme heat by 15–43 percent.&lt;br&gt;• Districts with the highest projected increases include Moroto and Kaabong (minimum temperatures +2.3–2.8°C and maximum temperatures +2.0–2.5°C).&lt;br&gt;• Higher temperatures are projected for the periods corresponding to projected reductions on rainfall.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rainfall</strong></td>
<td>• Decreased reliability of rainy season, with early cessation in Kotido and Kaabong.&lt;br&gt;• No definitive annual pattern. Reduction in total annual rainfall of 15–20 percent (1947–1985), but increased annual rainfall in recent decades.&lt;br&gt;• Increase in variability making the timing of planting increasingly difficult.&lt;br&gt;• Increases in rainfall September–November.</td>
<td>• Rainfall projections are less certain.&lt;br&gt;• Some projections suggest reduced rainfall (50–150 mm), with pronounced variability from year to year as well as within the year.&lt;br&gt;• Other models suggest that rainfall is projected to increase in total amount but with pronounced year-to-year variability.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Livelihoods and Climate Shocks

Rainfall in Karamoja is characteristically episodic, alternating with prolonged dry seasons and considerable year-to-year variation. Cyclic severe droughts have occurred every two to three years recently. The frequency of these events means that much of the region’s population is typically affected by a sequence of shocks that pose serial challenges to livelihoods and food security. The main climate-related shocks result in:

- Droughts (generally April–June)
- Severe dry spells and erratic rains (particularly May–July)
- Floods (particularly July–September)
- Poor soil fertility and soil moisture deficits
- Outbreaks of livestock disease or changing crop pest dynamics (August–September)
- High food prices

Livestock rearing of sheep, goats and cattle has a long history in the Karamoja region, and most households obtain a significant proportion of their annual income from livestock. Land use and land-cover change have reduced available forage resources, particularly in the grasslands. Along with overgrazing, which worsened during the government-imposed restrictions on pastoralist mobility, these issues have combined to reduce the quality of herds, render livestock more sensitive to heat and water stress and threaten the ability of families to cope with climate shocks.
Crop production in Karamoja is rainfed and reliant on two principal crops: sorghum and maize. Other crops include beans, millet, cowpeas, groundnuts, cassava and sweet potatoes. The majority of farming is of a subsistence nature, although the western region also grows vegetables for markets. Soil fertility in most of Karamoja is poor. South Karamoja’s soil types have poor plant-available moisture dynamics, cracking during the dry season and becoming waterlogged during the wet season. Soils are highly compacted in general, often forming a dense mass called hardpan.

With the exception of less-compacted and more nutrient-rich soils along dry riverbeds, most of the soils in the region are of low fertility. These poor-quality soils make agricultural production especially vulnerable to temperature increases and drought. Figure 3 shows the location of the main livelihood zones in Karamoja, which are more diverse than in Turkana County.

Figure 3. Livelihood Zones in Karamoja Region, Uganda

![Map of Karamoja Region, Uganda](image-url)

Source: USAID FEWS NET Livelihood Zones 2013.
As soil continues to erode, farmers have fewer options and must seek out increasingly marginal areas for production. Other constraints to the sector include lack of draft animals (oxen), lack of improved seeds and tools, transportation challenges to reach markets and inefficient crop drying and storage practices. Table 5 provides a brief summary of key climate sensitivities for the principal crops and Table 6 summarizes the main climate stressors and climate risks for livestock. Figure 4 and Box 1 (page 25) shows the average annual rainfall in Karamoja and Turkana, and its impact on pastoralist migration between the two countries.

### Table 5. Climate sensitivities of key crops in Karamoja, Uganda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CROP</th>
<th>CLIMATE SENSITIVITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Maize  | • Very susceptible to rain failure.  
        | • Each “degree day” that the crop spends above 30°C depresses yield by 1 percent if the plants are receiving sufficient water. If not receiving enough water, yield reductions are higher (e.g., yield decreases by 1.7 percent for each degree day spent over 30°C). |
| Sorghum| • Very sensitive to moisture stress—especially a long break in the rains during the growing season that can lead to honeydew disease. |
|        | • Highly susceptible to water stress during the early development stages.                                                                               |
| Beans  | • Sensitive to waterlogging from intense rainfall.                                                                                                     |


### Table 6. Climate stressor and climate risks for livestock in Karamoja, Uganda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLIMATE STRESSORS</th>
<th>CLIMATE RISKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher temperatures</td>
<td>• Increased evaporation of water points, leading to water shortages and competition between people and livestock for limited resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Changing water systems, increasing the difficulty of maintaining healthy animals in a sanitary environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased unreliability of rainfall (more variability)</td>
<td>• Increased incidence of disease outbreaks as disease vectors change and expand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased length or intensity of dry periods</td>
<td>• Reduced forage availability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased intensity of extreme events</td>
<td>• Increased milk spoilage due to higher average temperatures.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turkana receives much less average annual rainfall than Karamoja, which not only has better natural pasture and water resources but also benefits from water collected at a large dam at Kobebe. As a consequence, during times of dry spells or droughts, Turkana pastoralists frequently cross the border into Uganda in search of water points and better grazing areas for their livestock. These seasonal migratory movements are one of the main sources of potential cross-border conflict between Turkana pastoralists and pastoralists in Karamoja.
IV. PEACE III OBJECTIVES AND THEORY OF CHANGE

PEACE III has two main objectives:

1) To strengthen local cross-border conflict management systems
2) To improve the responsiveness of regional and national institutions to cross-border conflict

Figure 5 sets out PEACE III’s model of change based on fostering horizontal and vertical linkages between local, national and regional conflict management actors.

The model holds that horizontal networks across communities are required to create an effective, diverse and inclusive collaborative peace system. The creation of stronger vertical networks with national and regional peace actors improves high-level support for grassroots peace efforts and facilitates macro-level analysis. Both horizontal and vertical networks, working together, are integral to PEACE III’s multilevel approach to peacebuilding.

PEACE III develops and enhances community-based approaches to cross-border security and peacebuilding through subgrants to local organizations. Peacebuilding activities that connect communities previously in conflict through the construction of a shared resource, such as water pans and markets, help to promote more secure livelihoods, health and well-being, as well as build communities’ resilience to drought. PEACE III addresses the diverse drivers of conflict in the Horn of Africa in two primary geographic areas: the Karamoja Cluster along the borders of
Kenya, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Uganda, where violence is often related to the impacts of climate change and access to natural resources such as water or land for grazing animals; and the Somali Cluster along the borders of Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia, where violence is often linked to the rise of extremist groups, local politics and land.

By improving the knowledge and skills of individuals and local government authorities, PEACE III seeks to contribute to efforts to build trust between communities and break cycles of cross-border violence. Working through “peace actors” (women, youth, tribal chiefs, elders, security officials and local political leaders), the project helps communities to prevent or recover from violent acts and support individuals who have been affected by violence. Conflict prevention, reconciliation and peacebuilding activities are delivered through women’s forums, chiefs’ networks, youth activities, cultural events, trauma-healing sessions and the development of natural-resource–sharing agreements and formal peace treaties, among other mechanisms.

Corollary to the model of change is the following theory of change in relation to the linkage between climate change and conflict:

“IF communities and local government are aware of the links between conflict and climate change, and engage in processes that strengthen the peaceful management of communal resources, THEN capacities to cope with climate change will be strengthened.”

This formulation is based on the idea that climate change and conflict influence each other in a kind of negative synergy: Climate change contributes to the potential for conflict, and conflict impedes or hampers the ability of communities to cope with the effects of climate change. Conversely, the peaceful use of shared natural resources is posited to facilitate more effective climate change adaptation and strengthen resilience.

1 USAID/Kenya and East Africa has a regional Not Withstanding Authority (NWA) in place that enables Peace III to engage with security personnel and law enforcement officials through their participation in conflict mitigation activity structures.
V. FINDINGS

HORIZONTAL LINKAGES

In the areas visited in Turkana and Karamoja, discussions with community members, traditional leaders, women’s groups, youth representatives and local government officials gave strong evidence that PEACE III has been successful in achieving its main objectives of expanding and deepening horizontal linkages to strengthen cross-border conflict management. PEACE III has facilitated or helped establish increasingly effective relationships among communities, identity groups, demographic cohorts and local government institutions throughout its areas of operation. Many of these lines of communication, dialogue and negotiation were previously weak, suboptimal or did not exist.

In Turkana, PEACE III partner organizations, the Agency for Pastoralist Development (APaD) and St. Peter’s Community Network (SAPCONE), provided a number of examples of these kinds of linkages and activities. Interventions have included cross-border dialogues, intergovernmental meetings, youth councils, women’s groups, chiefs’ forum, capacity building for traders and negotiations for sharing grazing land and water resources between the Turkana of Kenya and the Matheniko and Dodoth in Uganda. Horizontal linkages have focused frequently on strengthening intergovernmental relationships between cross-border administrations. They have also sometimes included the private sector—for example, dialogue with mining companies in Karamoja on their mining practices and their interactions with local communities.

Several activities have enhanced cross-border and interclan cooperative structures in politically sensitive border areas affected by recurrent drought. Relations between the Turkana and Dassenech have been recovering after more than 40 people (mostly Turkana, including women and children) were killed in a sudden outburst of revenge killings in 2011. PEACE III’s facilitation of jointly chaired fisherfolk committees of the Turkana and the Dassenech from Ethiopia has enabled these groups to monitor conflict, provide conflict early warning and reduce conflict over the theft of the Turkanas’ fishing gear and nets, which has sometimes been followed by Turkana retaliation against the Dassenech. SAPCONE has linked fisherfolk to markets and helped to train the Dassenech to improve their own fishing skills. With commercial development in South Omo in Ethiopia pushing the Dassenech pastoralists more frequently into Turkana, SAPCONE, in partnership with the Peace and Development Center in Ethiopia, has promoted resource-sharing strategies. SAPCONE is also trying to ensure shared access for pastoralists in disputed areas of the Ilemi Triangle, which Kenya holds to be part of its national territory.

In addition to consistent expressions of appreciation for PEACE III’s activities and support, group discussions and interviews provided opportunities for participants to identify some of the main problems and issues that they believe need ongoing attention.
The District Chairman (Local Council V) of Moroto District in Karamoja cited PEACE III’s role in opening up communications, supporting conflict reduction, encouraging climate adaptation and “filling the gaps” between government, civil society organizations and communities on both sides of the border between Karamoja and Turkana. He noted that, despite the persistent presence of small arms and occasional livestock theft, lower levels of violence have helped to increase the number of livestock and spurred trade and business activities in the district. Women have taken on a much larger role in both government and community discussions, and a district initiative for tree planting is underway.

The Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) in Moroto, however, emphasized that peace is still fragile. While it is good that young men are no longer using guns for raiding, he said, the question remains how to keep them occupied in productive livelihoods. Similarly, while the district has a ban on charcoal production, the underlying problem is the poverty and lack of livelihood alternatives that drive people to selling charcoal. With the persistence of drought and the reliance on rainfed agriculture, water is the biggest problem for the district, according to the CAO. He noted the increased competition for water resources at the Kobebe dam, the need to develop irrigation in Karamoja and the importance of “a dam on the other side” (meaning Kenya).

The Kobebe dam is an important dry season source of water for pastoralists from both Uganda and Kenya, at times providing water for several thousand people and their animals, and since its opening in 2011 it has helped to reduce conflict. As one government official said, Kobebe “proves the importance of joining together software (dialogue and peacebuilding) and hardware (tangible infrastructure).” But in recent years it has been subject to erosion, siltation and drying up from severe drought. Community members in Moroto complained about overcrowding and poor road access, as well as the need for health services and a school closer to the dam. PEACE III intends to implement a “peace dividend” project that will plant trees around the dam to prevent further erosion and siltation.
In its role as an implementing partner under PEACE III, Mercy Corps has developed a close and effective working relationship with the Turkana County government. The Deputy Governor and county officials responsible for peace and public service and disaster management noted Mercy Corps’ contributions to strengthening and rebuilding peace committees and “graduating peace actors” through its activities. Turkana County officials emphasized the county’s geographic vulnerability to cross-border conflict along pastoralist corridors with Uganda (Matheniko, Bokora, Dodoth), South Sudan (Toposa, Dodos) and Ethiopia (Nyangatom, Dassenech) and the long dry spells that often follow within two to three months of the limited rainfall that Turkana receives. Turkana’s goal is to institutionalize peace along these corridors and strengthen its early warning systems. The county has established a peace directorate led by a security advisor, who asserted that “peace is a flagship” for the county and that the county must use its devolved resources to work with other levels of government and civil society partners on peacebuilding. Nevertheless, county officials said that the continuing proliferation of arms from weakly governed South Sudan and the squeeze on Ethiopian pastoralists from large-scale plantations, pushing them increasingly southward, make the achievement of peace a difficult and ongoing challenge.

Perhaps the most consequential contribution of PEACE III to local conflict prevention in Turkana County is the program’s cooperation with county authorities in the preparation and validation of the Turkana County Community Safety Policy, which describes the context, drivers and planned institutional responses to issues of peace and conflict. The document is candid in describing

2 “Safety” is defined in the Turkana County Community Safety Policy as being “without insecurity challenges, which includes both hard and soft aspects of security.”
some of the gaps in community safety. It notes, “First and foremost, is the proliferation of small arms and light weapons,” which it attributes to past and current conflicts in neighboring countries. It acknowledges “the dispersal or deployment of police officers, which is thin and usually far away from communities” and adds “the relationships between the communities…versus the security agencies are always at jeopardy.” The Safety Policy also is forthright in noting the problem of “ politicization,” saying that “the role of politics and the players make it difficult to handle some of the issues that seem to perpetuate the conflicts in the county” (Turkana County Government and Mercy Corps 2018). Despite these challenges, PEACE III activities are laying the groundwork for mechanisms for early warning and early response to conflict and delineating a stronger institutional framework for Turkana County.

CHIEFS’ FORUM

PEACE III has initiated an effective Chiefs’ Forum in the Karamoja Cluster. After a first meeting of chiefs with high-ranking government officials resulted in a lack of open dialogue, it was decided to revise the format to include only the chiefs themselves. The first meeting under this arrangement took place in Moroto in December 2015, bringing together chiefs from the Pokot, Turkana, Matheniko and Tepeth. According to the chairman of the Chiefs’ Forum, after years of “rampant killings,” there was great hostility among the chiefs at the outset, but with the facilitation of APaD and Mercy Corps, their dialogue gained traction and they agreed to work collaboratively on ending livestock theft and promoting conflict prevention.

Chiefs are in charge of security in their communities, and they identify the “wrongdoers” guilty of violence and theft. Through collaborative efforts, raiding and theft have now been greatly reduced, and the chairman asserted that “since we have been together, we have not lost any lives,” a claim in accordance with PEACE III conflict data. These changes have freed up previously inaccessible grazing areas and created new market linkages. For pastoralists in Loima, for example, it is now easier to take livestock to Moroto than to markets in Lodwar. The chiefs in the forum have held public meetings to sensitize their communities to the norm (and legal reality) that killings and thefts are crimes, regardless of the clans against which they are committed. Cattle theft is punished under the provisions of the Nabilatuk Resolution, an interclan agreement developed in Karamoja that holds that the guilty party must return cattle at a proportion of two-times-plus-one (e.g., 20 stolen cows must be compensated by a payment of 41 cows). During the 2017 elections in Kenya, which increased the potential for division and conflict among clans, the Chiefs’ Forum worked with their communities to ensure stability and peace.

In principle, the Chiefs’ Forum meets quarterly, and the chiefs have formed a WhatsApp group for rapid communication and early warning and response on conflict issues. Meetings are contingent on the availability of transportation and funds, however, and due to the combined effects of the Kenyan elections and interruptions in funding, the chiefs had not been able to travel to meet for nine months. As a consequence, they had not been able to discuss livestock thefts with Jie counterparts. This left the chairman of the Chiefs’ Forum with questions about the sustainability of the group’s efforts. Although he had confidence in the current effectiveness of the forum and its collaboration with local government, the chairman said there was a need for a
clearer vision for the future and a framework for implementation. He asked, “What will this look like in ten years?” PEACE III intends to work with the Chiefs’ Forum to address sustainability by discussing options for continued support with local governments.

WOMEN’S FORUM

PEACE III has also supported the creation of a Women’s Forum in the Karamoja Cluster. The review team met with Women’s Forum representatives in Turkana, Moroto and Kaabong. Until recently, women were almost completely excluded from participation in formal discussions and decisions on peace and conflict in their communities. At best they were relegated to the sidelines of meetings held by traditional leaders and elders to plan raids against other clans. Yet, as one interviewee said, “we were the ones most affected by climate change and the loss of loved ones in conflict.” PEACE III coordinated a cross-border and multiclanc gathering of women leaders from all four Karamoja Cluster countries in Kitale, Kenya, in November 2016 to discuss the role of women in conflict management and peacebuilding. They identified two central issues: 1) conflict over water and pasture and 2) the low representation of women in peace initiatives, which they committed to working on in the Kitale Resolutions, signed by all women present.

As had been the case with the Chiefs’ Forum, the initial stages of the Women’s Forum were marked by suspicion and hostility. Participants recounted, however, that with the facilitation of PEACE III partners such as Mercy Corps and the Matheniko Development Forum (MADEFO), the process of discussing common experiences (including their own role in contributing to conflict) broke down barriers and led to a desire for collaboration to build peace among their communities. PEACE III partners and local government officials helped to structure meetings of peace committees and other local gatherings to ensure that women had opportunities to voice their concerns and opinions. The Chiefs’ Forum helped in this process and invited women to speak at barazas to spread messages of peace, especially to youth. Women were able to lobby government on natural resource management and the sharing of water and pasture. Several women were elected to higher positions in local government. One women leader said, “This process was about empowerment.”

The Women’s Forum has a two-tier structure of higher-level and lower-level groups that engage in discussions across all levels of government down to the kraals at the community level. With training they have received in advocacy and communications, women take leadership roles in local peace events such as the celebration of peace accords, cultural festivals and International Peace Day. Women have helped open cross-border markets, for example, in Nadapal on the border between Turkana and South Sudan. In their communities, they are the eyes and ears to provide conflict early warning and dissuade aggressive actions, and they withhold the prayers and blessings that formerly were bestowed upon young warriors before going out on raids. In Uganda, they also have helped to maintain the disarmament campaign.

In the communities where it is most active, the Women’s Forum has resulted in an impressive cultural shift and increased women’s participation in a short time. Although the group’s main focus is on conflict and natural resource management, it also discusses other community
problems, such as income-generation for women, gender-based violence, alcoholism and the need for children’s education. On a limited basis, members of the forum from Uganda have made cross-border visits to Kenya for learning experiences and more extended dialogue. In all of the meetings held with Women’s Forum interviewees, however, women expressed concerns about continuing support from PEACE III to sustain or expand the forum’s early successes, which have been substantial and indicate its potential for further growth.

PRIVATE SECTOR
On a more ad hoc basis, PEACE III has engaged with the private sector. The Community Safety Policy of Turkana County notes the problem of “the commercialization of livestock theft, away from the traditional ritual to theft for the market,” which is conducted by large raiding parties who are rarely apprehended by local security agencies (Turkana County Government and Mercy Corps 2018). Mercy Corps, along with other NGOs, has engaged with groups such as the Kenya Livestock Marketing Council to advocate for steps to ensure that trading is done in ways that deter conflict and support peace.

The mining sector presents more serious challenges for maintaining peace in the PEACE III project areas, as was reflected in interviews in Rupa subcounty in Moroto. Limestone, marble and gold are mined in the area, predominantly by artisanal and small-scale miners estimated at over 1,000 people, including many women and girls. Local officials said that conflict occurs when mining companies begin operations on communal lands and overlook the rights of diggers, whose ranks expand at times of drought. These officials also said that investors have frequently bypassed local authorities and engaged in land grabbing based on permits obtained through connections at the national level. Local miners are poorly paid (e.g., US$20 for a truckload of granite mined by hand), and communities do not receive royalties, although they have received promises of assistance such as health clinics and schools in years past. When local resentments have peaked, there have been occasional attacks on company equipment and personnel.

Much of the mining-related conflict in Moroto falls outside the purview of PEACE III’s mandate on cross-border conflict, but some incidents, such as conflict between Turkana and Matheniko over gold-mining sites at Naput along the border, have caused MADEFO to intervene to help resolve the conflict. More generally, mining conflicts in Moroto and elsewhere add to the background instability that affects communities in the program’s project areas.
In its program activities on trauma healing, PEACE III has tried to address the deep intercommunal and psychological scars in Karamoja’s population after years of extreme violence. These activities have included both those who inflicted and those who suffered from violence. The reformed warriors of Kaabong (now known as the “Kaabong Peace Ambassadors”), who fled to South Sudan to avoid disarmament, provide the most dramatic case. This group of young warriors, originally around 100 in number, used South Sudan as a base from which to raid cattle and launch assaults on both the Turkana and the clans of Karamoja. Over nearly seven years, they committed dozens of killings and rapes, while their own casualties in conflicts with communities and the UPDF reduced their number to around 60. At an impasse, some of the warriors indicated a wish to end the violence, surrender and return home. Mercy Corps and DADO collaborated with local authorities to facilitate the process.

Pact provided support to Mercy Corps and DADO to put together a multiweek program of intensive trauma-healing sessions to advance a process of social reconciliation and community healing that would allow the reformed warriors to regain acceptance in the community and take on a new role as messengers for peace and disarmament. The Kaabong Peace Ambassadors work with peace committees, women’s groups and youth to recount their experiences and personal transformations. They also report crimes, track stolen animals and confiscate illicit guns. PEACE III has involved them in income-generating activities to sustain these efforts and to support the individual transformation that these former warriors have experienced.

While the Kaabong Peace Ambassadors have a dramatic and important story, the trauma-healing activities of PEACE III in the Karamoja Cluster are much broader, training 40 facilitators and bringing together 20 participants (women and men, both perpetrators and victims) in 20 individual groups for intensive four-week sessions. Trauma healing exercises create horizontal linkages at the lowest level, rebuilding relationships from the interpersonal level to family relations to community reconciliation.

**VERTICAL LINKAGES**

PEACE III works collaboratively under a memorandum of understanding with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which is the Regional Economic Community (REC) covering the Greater Horn of Africa, including all of the countries in which PEACE III operates. In the 1990s, IGAD was primarily focused on drought, which continues to be a central concern, but issues of conflict and development are now incorporated into IGAD’s agenda. After the severe drought in the Horn of Africa of 2010–2011, the member states agreed to the creation of the IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI) to move beyond humanitarian emergency responses and work toward more comprehensive strategies for economic growth and resilience.

PEACE III’s main institutional nexus with IGAD is through its regionwide Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and the national-level Conflict Early Warning and Response Units (CEWERUs). Their purpose is to identify emergent conflicts and prevent their escalation, especially those involving cross-border conflicts along pastoralist corridors. PEACE III has an explicit commitment to working with and strengthening CEWARN in relation to its cross-border conflict and peacebuilding activities.
With respect to conflict data, IGAD has experienced the limitations common to other international organizations—it is constrained by member states’ willingness to make available publicly what they consider to be sensitive information. Early warning reports, analyses and alerts from the CEWARN website, for example, date from 2016 at the latest, and are generally older. The review team requested CEWARN conflict data on the Karamoja Cluster, but a CEWARN representative said that CEWARN lacks funding for the necessary processing of conflict data, which it obtains from selected civil society organizations.

PEACE III has strengthened linkages among the CEWERUs in Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda and used these relationships to make tangible advances on issues of law, justice and reconciliation among cross-border communities. This has included conflict prevention and compensation schemes (the Nabilatuk Resolution) and clearer articulation of the interaction of formal and traditional justice systems.

With the help of PEACE III, the CEWERUs of Uganda and Kenya have developed conflict assessments (e.g., Kaabong-Turkana). The Kenya CEWERU has worked with PEACE III in its efforts to strengthen women’s participation in peacebuilding. With the assistance of PEACE III, the Uganda CEWERU prepared an in-depth review of the performance and impact of the Nabilatuk Declaration.

Additionally, PEACE III coordinates in Uganda with IDDRSI, which established a cross-border unit in Moroto in February 2017. Besides addressing drought resilience, the IDDRSI office will also promote peacebuilding and research and capacity building on the use of natural resources. IDDRSI envisions the establishment of joint cross-border markets, schools and health clinics, as well as the development of a cross-border trade policy. In an October 2017 “Resilience Progress Report,” IDDRSI observed that, “Security has improved and conflict declined significantly in Karamoja over recent years. Large-scale cattle raids no longer occur and violent and unpredictable attacks have reduced considerably.” While not singling out PEACE III specifically, the report said the improved conflict environment was attributable to Uganda’s disarmament program and “investments in peacebuilding and conflict resolution mechanisms such as peace committees” (IGAD 2017).

In Kampala, the review team met with the chairperson for the National Platform for Peacebuilding in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM). Mercy Corps is working with the National Platform for Peacebuilding on the drafting of a National Peace Policy for Uganda. One of the main goals of that collaboration is to create budget mechanisms that would allow funds for conflict prevention and peacebuilding to be made available to local government units. Because security issues are considered to be under the competence of national authorities, such budget resources for local government have been lacking. This has prevented local governments from playing a more constructive role on conflict issues and has led to continuing reliance on PEACE III and other donor organizations to fill the gaps.

Mercy Corps noted some initial reluctance from USAID in relation to its engagement with the National Platform for Peacebuilding and its strong advocacy and support for the development of
the National Peace Policy. This was due to concern that Mercy Corps might be straying from its mandate on cross-border peace issues. The review team’s interviews found officials in the Office of the Prime Minister cautiously optimistic that the National Peace Policy will eventually be adopted, with provisions that will fill the funding gap at the local level. If this occurs, it could be one of the most significant and lasting contributions of PEACE III over the life of the project.

In Kenya, the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (NSC) serves as the national CEWERU. The NSC has a well-developed institutional profile grounded in an expanding network of 15-person peace committees that reach from the county level to subcounties and villages. Peace committees bring together representation from a diverse group of government officials, civil society organizations and local communities, including a mandated minimum one-third membership of women. Despite the uniformity of design, there are gaps in the peace committees and “many are not well-facilitated,” as one Kenyan government official put it. Pact works very closely with the NSC to strengthen its peacebuilding architecture and international relationships in cross-border areas.

Pact and the NSC also collaborate with Kenya’s National Drought Management Authority (NDMA), which provides county-level early warning bulletins for pastoralist areas that include not only weather forecasting but also reports of pastoralist migration, socioeconomic conditions and the status of vegetation and pasture. The connection between drought and conflict was recognized in the common program framework for peace and security on “Ending Drought Emergencies” coordinated under the NSC (Government of Kenya 2015). This framework, funded primarily by the Government of Kenya and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), with a minor contribution from IGAD-CEWARN, addresses many of the same issues that are the focus of PEACE III and contributes to reaching shared goals on peacebuilding and conflict.

**PEACE AND NATURAL RESOURCE SHARING AGREEMENTS**

One of the principal challenges for peacebuilding programs is the development of norms and institutions—i.e., formal and informal rules and their enforcement mechanisms—that can help to sustain effective conflict management and peaceful behaviors over time. In the Karamoja Cluster, PEACE III has organized, facilitated or supported a number of important cross-border peace agreements and natural resource agreements involving communities and government representatives from Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan and Ethiopia. Table 7 summarizes the kinds of agreements that have been reached, the identity groups or clans that have agreed to these accords, the main issues they address and the government institutions that are signatories to these agreements. These agreements reflect the nexus of the horizontal and vertical relationships that PEACE III has fostered and strengthened.
### Table 7. Formal agreements organized, facilitated or supported by PEACE III and partners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Affected Groups</th>
<th>Governmental Institutions</th>
<th>Main Issues</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nabilatuk Declaration¹ and Moruititi Declaration²</td>
<td>Matheniko, Pian, Bokora, Pokot¹ and Jie, Dodoth²</td>
<td>UPDF and Napak, Moroto, Amudat and Nakapiripirit Districts (Karamoja)</td>
<td>• Deterrence, sanctions • Compensation on livestock-related thefts and violence</td>
<td>2013¹ 2014²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lodwar Peace Conference</td>
<td>Turkana Toposa</td>
<td>Turkana County Eastern Equatoria State (South Sudan)</td>
<td>• Stopping cattle raids, killings • Promoting livestock markets • Dams, water pans</td>
<td>Nov 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyoro Resource Sharing</td>
<td>Dodoth Turkana</td>
<td>Kaabong District Turkan County</td>
<td>• Shared water and grazing • Ban on arms</td>
<td>Mar 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lodwar Intergovernmental Meeting</td>
<td>Turkana, Matheniko, Tepeth, Pokot</td>
<td>Turkana County Moroto District</td>
<td>• Border security • Tracking thievery • Sharing resources • Govts build water pans, health, education</td>
<td>May 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arba Minch Border Security Intergovernmental Resolutions</td>
<td>Turkana Dassenech Nyangatom</td>
<td>Turkana County South Omo Zone</td>
<td>• Cessation of theft and killings at Kenya–Ethiopia border • Interclan dialogue</td>
<td>Oct 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Pokot and Amudat Agreement Intergovernmental Resolutions</td>
<td>Pokot, Matheniko, Tepeth, Turkana, Sabiny</td>
<td>West Pokot County Amudat District</td>
<td>• Border security • Resource sharing, • Cross-border trade • Mapping water sources</td>
<td>Nov 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitale Resolutions</td>
<td>Turkana, Dodoth, Matheniko, Toposa, Nyangatom, Dassenech</td>
<td>Reps of Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, Ethiopia</td>
<td>• Women’s role, participation in peacemaking • Access to water and pasture • Economic opportunities</td>
<td>Nov 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kobebe Resource Sharing and Nakonyen Resource Sharing</td>
<td>Jie, Matheniko, Tepeth, Bokora, Turkana, Pokot</td>
<td>Moroto District Turkana County</td>
<td>• Joint dry season water and grazing • Ban on arms • Nabilatuk/Moruititi rules</td>
<td>May 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kampala Agreement</td>
<td>Turkana, Pokot, Karamojong communities</td>
<td>Ministry of Karamoja Affairs, Turkana County, West Pokot County</td>
<td>• Turkana and Pokot grazing in Uganda • Ban on arms • Nabilatuk/Moruititi rules • Joint framework for water and roads</td>
<td>Jan 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkana and Toposa Leaders Lokichoggio Resolution</td>
<td>Turkana Toposa</td>
<td>Turkana County Kapoeta State (South Sudan)</td>
<td>• Cross-border peace • Arms and rebels • Joint task force • Basic services, roads, water</td>
<td>Feb 2018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cumulatively, the agreements reflect an evolving conflict management network that government officials and community leaders consistently described as having helped to reduce conflict—especially large-scale raids—and saved lives in these countries. The Uganda-CEWERU assessed, for example, that the enforcement, compensation and social justice provisions of the Nabilatuk Declaration had reduced violent clashes in cattle raids, increased the number of
cases brought to court and opened up areas of water and pasture that previously had been abandoned due to insecurity. PEACE III has played an important role in giving impetus to these nascent cross-border institutional arrangements.

Nevertheless, there are many forces at play that make the gains in peacemaking in the Karamoja Cluster still fragile. The areas along the border with South Sudan remain unstable and more prone to conflict. National and local political dynamics, the continued presence of small arms and interclan suspicions and misunderstandings have destabilized the Loyoro resource sharing agreement. The partial unraveling and need for updating and repair of these accords is an intrinsic part of the larger peacebuilding process (see “An Unstable Peace in Loyoro” below).

As Table 7 indicates, the main issues addressed by these formal agreements were typically related to conflict reduction, border security, cattle theft, disarmament and sharing natural resources. However, it is notable that many of the agreements also encompassed issues and provisions that went well beyond the immediate agenda of peace and natural resource management, including water pans and dams, the establishment of markets and trading, women’s rights, wildlife protection, education, human and animal health and the sharing of cross-border schools and hospitals. Similarly, in several agreements, the Turkana County government—whose inhabitants have the greatest need and which has relatively more financial resources available—committed to the construction of water pans and dams. The inclusion of these more diverse issue areas and commitments, which varied from location to location, were an implicit recognition that sustaining the initial achievements in peacebuilding in the Karamoja Cluster will require other measures to increase the resilience of these cross-border communities.

A similar dynamic is present in Qadaduma, Ethiopia, an area the review team was unable to visit due to time constraints. In that location, PEACE III supported the construction of a water pan, a “peace dividend” that was created to provide increased water resources for the Garre and Ajuran, two groups that had been in conflict across the Kenya-Ethiopia border. The water pan is now supporting over 1,200 households and a process of joint management has led to peaceful relations between the Garre and Ajuran. At the same time, in an environment free of conflict, PEACE III staff referred to a number of “unintended important achievements” resulting from the water pan. In a kind of incremental, organic evolution from peacebuilding toward greater resilience, new transportation and tea-making businesses have sprung up, the number of traders has increased and there is increased access to government-supported health care and education. These examples of moving beyond peacebuilding point toward increased opportunities to “thicken” relations between communities, creating more intertwined relationships that increasingly address livelihoods and broader resilience issues.
Loyoro subcounty in Kaabong District in Karamoja is a good example of both the achievements and the challenges of PEACE III's cross-border work at the frontier between Uganda and Kenya. For many years, there has been conflict between the Dodoth pastoralists of Uganda and Turkana pastoralists from Kenya, who cross into Karamoja to access more plentiful dry-season grazing and water resources. With the assistance of PEACE III, a resource-sharing agreement was reached between the Dodoth and Turkana in March 2016. According to the agreement, the Turkana should not enter Uganda with illegal guns, Turkana kraal leaders should notify both governments and communities of their entry and exit, the Turkana should be allowed to graze and draw water from the Loyoro River in Uganda and all communities and government institutions should be committed to strengthen collaboration in promoting peace. With the peaceful conditions created by this new agreement, the two communities benefited from trading at a shared marketplace, and the Turkana were able to access health clinics and veterinary services in Uganda.

This agreement held until August 2017, when the Turkana who were grazing in Loyoro returned to Kenya for the presidential elections. After the elections, in September, cattle raiding by the Turkana unexpectedly resumed. Community members and government officials in Loyoro said the number of armed Turkana raiders ranged from “100–200” to “just small groups,” but the Dodoth of Loyoro were increasingly resentful (“they only come when they are crying for water”) and many were too fearful to even cultivate their lands. By mid-November, when conflict with a group of around 100 Turkana raiders led to the death of another local resident, PEACE III’s local partner reported “the incident has crested loss of trust among the Dodoth and Turkana.” In February 2018, four more people were killed, including three UPDF soldiers.

Explanations varied as to why the Turkana had turned back to violent raiding. Some said the Turkana were angry at the statements of a Ugandan district candidate who had campaigned on keeping the Turkana out of the area. The UPDF, meanwhile, was conducting a mini-disarmament of people in Kaabong who had re-acquired arms illicitly from South Sudan or Kenya. To ensure no other guns entered the area, the UPDF took strict measures to keep the Turkana from crossing into Kaabong, blocking access to water points and further stirring resentments. At the same time, some Dodoth entered Turkana and raided livestock in return (Kasasira 2018). For several months, attempts at starting a renewed peace dialogue failed to come to fruition. The border area remained insecure.

Amid this new instability, the local peace committee in Loyoro asked for outside help from the Dodoth Agro-pastoralist Development Organization (DADO), PEACE III’s local partner. Kraal leaders from Kaabong met as a group and agreed to continue to seek peaceful cross-border relations. With the involvement of PEACE III, a meeting was scheduled to bring together the kraal leaders and elders from both sides of the border, along with the respective government officials from both Turkana and Kaabong. Local observers were optimistic that arrangements could be made for the peaceful sharing of resources when the Turkana wish to return to Kaabong during the next dry season. But the recent experience in Loyoro demonstrated how the confluence of pre-existing problems in Uganda and Kenya—in this case, tense electoral cycles, illicit arms, disarmament and contrasting perceptions of changes in the rules and behavior on both sides—can destabilize what is still a fragile peace along the border between Karamoja and Turkana.
CLIMATE CHANGE KNOWLEDGE IN THE KARAMOJA CLUSTER

During the course of field interviews, the review team frequently asked respondents about their perceptions and understanding of climate trends, impacts and adaptive responses. Many people commented on the erratic and unpredictable changes in seasonality from year to year, with some noting frequently late or failed rains in the March-to-May season and increased or late rains in September to November (or later). For example, in Turkana in 2017, the long rains failed, unusually heavy rains fell in July and the short rains arrived later and heavier than usual. In some areas, water is no longer found in formerly reliable locations. The chairman of the Chiefs’ Forum observed that rainfall is spottier and more fragmented than in the past.

“The rain now is different and sometimes only goes a half kilometer. It used to rain from Lodwar to Uganda, then the wind would blow and it would come down even to Marsabit. You go now and see the rain is here but not there.”
— Chiefs’ Forum Chairman

As reflected by the PEACE III resource sharing agreements, the main adaptive response to climate change by pastoralists has been to intensify their search for water and pasture. Government officials and community leaders described a wide array of other climate adaptation measures that are underway, including small-scale irrigation, new boreholes, soil and water conservation, bans on tree cutting for charcoal, hay growing, cereal banking, energy-efficient stoves and tree planting.³ Some people in Karamoja use WhatsApp to exchange information and ideas on alternative crops and seeds, while others complain that the local agricultural research institute does not provide outreach and new information. Climate adaptation did not appear to be widely practiced, however, an impression in line with a recent survey sponsored by the World Food Program C-ADAPT project, which found that 85 percent of respondents in Moroto and 86 percent of respondents in Kaabong “have not made changes to protect themselves…from the impacts of climate change” (Chaplin et al. 2017).

Overall, the review team found that local communities well understand their immediate vulnerabilities to climate change (drought, lack of water and pasture, crop loss, pests, animal diseases, etc.). But their broader knowledge of the trajectory and implications of climate trends and their vision of the climate future is limited. With the exception of those in leadership positions, people at the community level with whom the review team spoke in Turkana and Karamoja relied almost exclusively on traditional knowledge to describe their understanding of and response to climate change. Traditional cultural practices such as reading goat intestines or observing signs from nature, such as the movement of birds and animals or the flowering of plants, are deeply embedded. While the NDMA gives informed seasonal forecasts in Turkana and the Uganda Disaster Risk Information Centre issues regional bulletins, the assimilation of this information by local populations appears to be low. Moreover, many interviewees expressed skepticism about these sources of information.

³ Responses from interviewees about charcoal bans and small-scale tree planting seemed to conflate climate change mitigation and climate change adaptation, or did not differentiate at all between the two categories.
Much remains to be done to explain the difference between scientific and traditional approaches to both seasonal forecasting and overall climate change. This is a considerable pedagogical and cultural challenge because, despite the fact that climate science has a stronger evidentiary basis, it still has significant uncertainty in seasonal forecasting—which is likely to undermine its credibility, especially in vulnerable communities who suffer high costs when hit by severe climate impacts.

What is needed is a broader and deeper understanding of the overall climate change challenge that leads to a vision of the medium- to long-term climate future for Turkana and Karamoja—as well as an appreciation of the need for peace to address that challenge. This would help make climate change a more powerful “forcing issue” for the cooperation required to respond to climate change threats. Hence, there is a still-unrealized opportunity to do much more with PEACE III partners, local officials and communities to strengthen climate change knowledge, improve climate change adaptation and explore supplementary and alternative livelihoods more intensively.
VI. LESSONS

AN EFFECTIVE MODEL FOR CONFLICT REDUCTION AND COLLABORATION

The initial lesson to be drawn from this Mid-Cycle Portfolio Review is that PEACE III’s model of encouraging and strengthening horizontal and vertical linkages among local, national and regional institutions, partner organizations and communities has been largely effective in helping to reduce and mitigate conflict, especially large-scale or escalatory violence in the Karamoja Cluster. Where PEACE III’s relationships are dense and have continuity, all stakeholders reported that conflict is at very low levels. Within the limits of a challenging environment, the PEACE III model works and is grounded in a growing body of knowledge about conflict dynamics and peacebuilding in cross-border ASAL regions.

PEACE III and its partners have been successful in establishing good working relationships and vertical linkages with the national governments (e.g., the NSC and NDMA in Kenya and the Office of the Prime Minister in Uganda), CEWERUs and IGAD. PEACE III’s relationship with IGAD has given it the necessary standing to engage in important negotiations and policy discussions.

PEACE III’s efforts have provided important support for an emerging and growing network of peace committees, women’s groups, youth groups and traditional leaders across pastoralist and agropastoralist communities in the borderlands of Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and South Sudan. Conflict dynamics in the region remain unstable and unpredictable, and peace agreements remain vulnerable to political events, the circulation of illicit arms, unequal access to natural resources and climate shocks. But the broader pattern is one of increasing collaboration and the gradual transformation of these conflict-prone areas.

Both the Chiefs’ Forum and Women’s Forum appear to be effective core institutions for PEACE III’s work, although their contributions remain contingent on the provision of reliable baseline support. The Women’s Forum has noteworthy additional potential for several reasons: 1) it has empowered women’s voices in what has become a significant cultural shift in a short time; 2) it has greater grassroots reach and impact on youth, thereby producing a more democratizing and transformative effect; and 3) the natural evolution of the agenda of the Women’s Forum from its core focus on peacebuilding and natural resources to include areas such as income-generation and gender-based violence has the potential to help build community resilience.

REMAINING GAPS

The breakdown of peace in Loyoro in September 2017 raises the critical issue of continuity of support for local peace and conflict efforts. The Loyoro subcounty official responsible for security said that PEACE III (or its partner, DADO, in this case) was slow to respond to the violence resulting from Turkana raids, the breakdown of Turkana–Dodoth relations and the
unraveling of the Loyoro resource sharing agreement. This was apparently because DADO had a funding bottleneck, and the organization only became engaged several months later.

Underlying the Loyoro example, however, is the larger issue of the gap between the prerogatives of the national government in relation to issues of security and conflict and the resources available to government officials at the local level to address outbreaks of conflict as they occur. The instruments used to address local and cross-border conflict are primarily the various security forces—police, police reservists, the Kenya Defence Force, UPDF, and Kenya’s Rapid Deployment Unit and Rural Border Patrol Unit. While peace committees have been growing in strength and number in Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya, both national and local governments have leaned heavily on PEACE III and other external donors for guidance and resources to address conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

For example, although Turkana County has a Department of Peace and Conflict on the drawing board, it says it has yet to assess its institutional capacity and its “needs, personnel and office space” (Turkana County Government and Mercy Corps 2018). Such institutional developments are farther behind or yet to be planned in Uganda and Ethiopia. In the interim, PEACE III faces the difficult task of “filling the gaps” to promote early warning and response, peacemaking and peacebuilding, while simultaneously reducing government dependency. Ironically, central governments are currently outsourcing to PEACE III and other donor programs some of the most effective activities related to cross-border conflict management, while claiming sovereign control of the domain of national security. Yet, governments are obliged by law to fulfill their responsibilities to protect their communities, and community members are entitled to claim their rights for protection as citizens.

Nevertheless, the review team found that PEACE III is making steady progress in nudging national and local governments toward recognizing the need for new institutional arrangements to respond quickly to conflict and provide mechanisms for conflict resolution. The network of peace committees, peace agreements and natural resource sharing agreements to which PEACE III has contributed, directly or indirectly, has helped to increase pro-peace public attitudes and institutionalize new forms of dispute resolution. The trend of progressively embedding these agreements into the expectations, routines and standard operating procedures of government officials, traditional leaders and community members is crucial to maintaining peace. But those efforts require ongoing support through the continuing work of PEACE III over the near-to-medium term as well as new policy frameworks, dedicated budget lines and increased resources from host-country governments.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND CONFLICT IN KARAMOJA

From 2005 to 2013, Karamoja experienced high levels of conflict and recurrent episodes of severe drought. It appeared to be a prime example of the negative synergies between climate change and conflict. Yet, the nature of the conflict was complex, involving a long history of the marginalization of Karamoja’s pastoralists, a huge surge in the number of guns in circulation, cycles of revenge among competing clans and violence caused by and in response to the
Ugandan government’s forced disarmament program. In recent years, despite the continuation of recent climate trends, conflict has decreased.

The most commonly heard explanation for this reduction in violence is that the UPDF’s persistence in enforcing the disarmament program finally produced dividends. Once the number of small arms was reduced to low levels, the mobilization of large-scale raids became increasingly difficult. Meanwhile, the UPDF maintained (and still maintains) a robust physical presence in the region, which all interviewees agree has contributed to a much more stable security environment.

Nevertheless, the Uganda-CEWERU’s draft review of the Nabilatuk Declaration states that Nabilatuk 2013 was “a post-disarmament intervention specific to addressing the rampant raids, associated killings... that were almost a daily occurrence.” Further, the UPDF itself brought together community members in the process that resulted in the Nabilatuk Declaration. According to the Uganda-CEWERU, it was Nabilatuk that produced a “drastic reduction of rustling” (CEWERU-Uganda and Mercy Corps 2017). It appears that conflict in Karamoja declined out of the combined effects of disarmament and Nabilatuk—the latter reflecting a new institutional arrangement that accommodated both the traditional and formal systems of conflict management and social justice. While climate stresses persisted, these measures were able to reverse the high levels of violence that had prevailed over the previous decade.

BUILDING ON COLLABORATIVE CAPACITY: ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT AND RESILIENCE

Beyond their direct contributions to conflict prevention and peacebuilding, the institutional relationships, networks, peace committees and human and social capital created or strengthened by PEACE III represent valuable assets that can be leveraged for further program activities. These new collaborative relationships have been partially institutionalized in the recent series of peace agreements and natural resource agreements. More generally, through their constituent groups in civil society and government, especially through the work of the peace committees, these cooperative linkages have circulated new norms and practices for the management of natural resources and conflict. There are two noteworthy characteristics of these collaborative arrangements.

First, because of the nature of the problems that they address—cross-border conflict, natural resource scarcity and climate change—the scale of the relationships is both spatially larger and more complex than those that preceded them. Given the inclusiveness and diversity of these relationships (e.g., women, reformed warriors/youth, chiefs, local and national government officials, NGOs, etc.), these nascent institutional practices address the shortfalls in legitimacy and effectiveness that are some of the fundamental reasons why the PEACE III country governments have been unable to respond more effectively to the challenges of climate change.

Second, the review team’s interviews and meetings made clear that peace committees, local government, women’s groups and communities are actively interested in expanding their joint sphere of activities. This is reflected in the many “non-peace-and-conflict” issues that appear in
nearly every peace agreement and natural resource sharing agreement. This “thickening” of the original peace and conflict agenda is a recognition that peace is necessary but not sufficient to ensure stability and sustainability in these cross-border communities. In essence, this constitutes a set of structures for collaborative learning and decision-making that can help build an agenda for resilience that is arrived at inductively, rather than prescriptively.

These “non-peace-and-conflict” issues include:

1) Income-generation, livelihood enhancement, and alternative livelihoods
2) Market development and capacity building in finance and business
3) Water infrastructure development (pans, dams, small-scale irrigation)
4) Increased representation of women
5) Better access to health and education for children
6) Improved agricultural techniques
7) Better rangeland management

PEACE III’s still-evolving institutional platforms represent an opportunity for program integration with other USAID activities related to livelihoods, environment, climate change, natural resource management, extractives and other aspects of a broader resilience agenda. It should be noted that this is qualitatively different from adopting conflict-sensitive approaches to specific project activities in these issue areas or specific project add-ons and adaptations to changing forms of conflict during the life of a project (e.g., USAID 2017). In this case, peace committees and other related institutions are already in place, predicated on the maintenance of peace as a prerequisite for successful development activities, with their existence already reflecting a negotiated consensus among the full range of stakeholders and the active support of local and national governments. Other models, such as the Northern Rangeland Trust (NRT) in Kenya, may be useful reference points in thinking about how best to take advantage of PEACE III’s relationships and collaborative networks. However, the distinctive characteristics of livelihoods and land use, as well as considerations of scale, in these cross-border pastoralist regions have led to more complex challenges, interests, incentives and institutional arrangements that need to be taken into account.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

During the remainder of the PEACE III cooperative agreement through 2019:

1) USAID should strongly support PEACE III activities, with an emphasis on institutionalizing the peace architecture of peace committees, peace agreements and natural resource agreements. PEACE III should review and provide a concise status report and recommended next steps by the relevant peace actors for each of these agreements before the end of the current award cycle.

2) PEACE III should emphasize regularizing and providing continuity to the Women’s Forum and Chiefs’ Forum in order to fully embed them as established local institutions. The program should also facilitate opportunities for increased intercommunity exchanges for members of the Women’s Forum.

3) PEACE III should enhance climate knowledge in its target communities through workshops and curricula that incorporate discussion of both traditional knowledge and current climate science, with a focus on medium- to long-term climate trends and their implications for the future of project areas. The Women’s Forum and youth councils should be considered primary outreach mechanisms to prioritize accessibility and assimilation of climate knowledge while reinforcing the message that responding to climate challenges requires peace and cooperation. Clarifying the climate change threat will help to catalyze peacebuilding and cooperative responses, such as community-based climate risk and vulnerability analysis, which in turn strengthen the foundation for climate change adaptation.

4) USAID should actively encourage the Kenyan and Ugandan governments to provide budget lines and dedicated resources for local governments to address conflict prevention and peacebuilding. This will help to close the gap currently being filled by PEACE III, promote self-reliance and make PEACE III’s achievements more likely to be sustainable over the longer term.

5) USAID should support PEACE III and Mercy Corps in actively advocating for the finalization and adoption of Turkana County’s “Community Safety Policy” and Uganda’s “National Peace Policy” as formulated by the Office of the Prime Minister.

6) PEACE III should continue to work closely with the Peace Directorate of Turkana County and encourage government counterparts to make Turkana County a model and example in realizing the peacebuilding commitments—including water pans and dams—contained within its peace and natural resource sharing agreements.

7) USAID should encourage the Governments of Kenya and Uganda to fulfill their publicly expressed intentions and officially join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.
With oil production beginning in Turkana County and mining conflicts already plaguing some areas of Karamoja, both governments need to monitor activities in the extractives sector to prevent additional conflict in border areas.

To ensure that PEACE III’s achievements are sustained and extended:

8) USAID should support PEACE III program activities for an additional award cycle after 2019 in recognition of its achievements to date and its critical role going forward in extending and deepening relationships to reduce conflict and advance peacebuilding in the border areas of Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. Bilateral programs do not address cross-border, community-level issues.

9) USAID should recognize and take advantage of the unique “accumulated assets” produced by PEACE III in the form of new institutional relationships and cross-border peace and conflict networks to explore opportunities for further program integration.

10) The “non-peace-and-conflict” issues enumerated in the PEACE III-supported peace and natural resource sharing agreements provide a demand-driven list of possible intervention areas, especially with respect to livelihoods/markets, natural resource management and opportunities for women and youth. A practical starting point for follow-up would be to focus greater attention on program integration possibilities with the Partnership for Resilience and Economic Growth (PREG), not limited to bilateral efforts in Kenya. Other possibilities include Food for Peace, Global Food Security Strategy (GFSS) efforts under Feed the Future and consideration of recent USAID activities like Growth Health and Governance (GHG) in Uganda.

11) USAID should consider leveraging the consensus-based institutional platforms of PEACE III and pivot to a follow-on activity that explicitly uses the peace architecture as a collaborative governance platform to support livelihoods and resilience work. Instead of jointly developing conflict and resilience programming side by side, as has been done in other resilience-related activities, view the peace architecture developed by PEACE III and local governments as an existing governance framework by which to develop resilience-related programming. By “thickening” the relationships between actors, giving the relationships value beyond peacebuilding alone, and fostering adaptive and participatory governance, peace is likely to be more sustainable and more development gains are likely. The new activity should focus on:

- Strengthening the peace architecture as a consensus-based governance platform
- Hosting a series of visioning activities among various stakeholders to develop a common vision of what is possible for resilience and livelihood work
- Facilitating mixed group study tours to increase participants’ knowledge of what is possible
• Coordinating with other parts of the Mission and empowering participants to take ownership of livelihood interventions
• Providing seed resources/pilots either directly though the new program or through collaboration with other Mission activities or development partners (ideally both) to show host governments how these mechanisms can be used for feedback and decision-making on development investments
• Continuing to encourage host-government ownership and support for the peace committees and related parts of the peace architecture
• Focusing on an explicit collaborating, learning and adapting (CLA) approach for the follow-on agreement and work plans, to be able to adapt to changing circumstances and opportunities
• Exploring management options within the Mission related to the new mechanisms to encourage greater cross-office buy-in and promote deeper integration


IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) (2017). *Resilience progress report: Review of the implementation of the IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI) since 2011*. Djibouti: IGAD.


## ANNEX: LIST OF PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS CONSULTED

### KENYA

### INTERNATIONAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation/Office</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAID/Kenya and USAID/East Africa (Nairobi)</td>
<td>Tina Dooley-Jones</td>
<td>Acting Mission Director</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Patrick Wilson</td>
<td>Deputy Mission Director</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Stephen Brager</td>
<td>Director, Democracy, Governance and Conflict Office (DGC)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Amy Hamelin</td>
<td>Deputy Chief, DGC Office</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Munawwar Alam</td>
<td>Senior Devolution Advisor, DGC Office</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Rosalind Wanyagi</td>
<td>Project Management Assistant, DGC Office</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Juniper Neill</td>
<td>Director, Environment Office (ENV)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brad Arsenault</td>
<td>Deputy Chief, ENV Office</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Chihenyo Kangara</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>International Institutions (Nairobi)</strong></td>
<td>Camlius Omogo</td>
<td>Director, Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dr. Gideon Galu</td>
<td>Regional Scientist for the Greater Horn of Africa</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dr. Robinson Mugo</td>
<td>Chief of Party, SERVIR (NASA-USAID)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Abebe Tadege</td>
<td>Climate Change Officer</td>
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<td>IGAD Climate Prediction and Application Centre (ICPAC)</td>
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</table>

### USAID/Kenya and USAID/East Africa (Nairobi)

- Tina Dooley-Jones, Acting Mission Director
- Patrick Wilson, Deputy Mission Director
- Stephen Brager, Director, Democracy, Governance and Conflict Office (DGC)
- Amy Hamelin, Deputy Chief, DGC Office
- Munawwar Alam, Senior Devolution Advisor, DGC Office
- Rosalind Wanyagi, Project Management Assistant, DGC Office
- Juniper Neill, Director, Environment Office (ENV)
- Brad Arsenault, Deputy Chief, ENV Office
- Chihenyo Kangara

### International Institutions (Nairobi)

- Camlius Omogo, Director, Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN)
- Dr. Gideon Galu, Regional Scientist for the Greater Horn of Africa
- Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET)
- Dr. Robinson Mugo, Chief of Party, SERVIR (NASA-USAID)
- Abebe Tadege, Climate Change Officer, IGAD Climate Prediction and Application Centre (ICPAC)
Government of Kenya

National Government Institutions
Selina Wanjiri
Director, National Steering Committee for Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (NSC)

James Oduor
CEO, National Drought Management Authority (NDMA)

Turkana County
Peter Lotesiro
Deputy Governor, Turkana County

Peter Eripete
Secretary

Col (Rtd) Lojore Edward
Peace Director

Captain (Rtd) Augustine Lokwang
Security Advisor

Charles Lokioto
County Executive Committee
Public Service and Disaster Management

Josephat Lotwel
Drought Response Officer, Turkana County
National Drought Management Authority

Nongovernmental Organizations

PEACE III Project
Sarah Gibbons
Chief of Party

PEACE III staff members in Nairobi and Lodwar

Sylvester Abara
Program Director
Karamoja Cluster

PEACE III Partners in Lodwar
Amfry Amoni
SAPCONE, Executive Director

SAPCONE staff members

Sam Kimeli
APaD Executive Director

APaD staff members

Community Representatives

Chiefs’ Forum
Mark Amojong
Chair, Chiefs’ Forum in Loima
Members of Women’s Forum from Loima
Sylvia Akori
Chairperson
Paulina Areng
Member of Low Level Women

Members of Women’s Forum from Lokichogio
Lucy Erika
Chairperson
Mary Najie
Member of Low Level Women

UGANDA

INTERNATIONAL

USAID/Uganda (Kampala)
Mark Meassick
Mission Director
Jo Lesser-Oltheten
Deputy Mission Director
Cyndee Pelt
Acting Director, Office of Democracy, Human Rights, & Governance (DRG)
Xavier Ejoyi
Conflict Management Specialist, DRG Office
Anthony Medeiros
Democracy Officer, DRG Office
Morris Nsamba
Project Management Specialist,

Harriet Busingye Muwanga
Program Management Specialist, DRG Office
Lyvia Kakonge
Conflict and Reintegration Advisor, DRG Office
Mark Wilson
Deputy Director, DRG Office

Rebecca Nimusiima
Administrative Assistant, DRG Office
Angela Kirabo
Administrative Assistant, DRG Office
Shawna Hirsch
Environment and Natural Resources Unit Leader, Office of Economic Growth

Laura Gonzales
Regional Legal Advisor

Government of Uganda

National Government Institutions
Rose Bwenvu
Assistant Commissioner, Disaster Management
Chairperson, National Platform for Peace Building
Office of the Prime Minister

Kevinah Nabutuwa
Coordinator, IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI)
Office of the Prime Minister

Peter Amodoi
Program Officer, Ministry of Karamoja Affairs
Office of the Prime Minister

Nickson Olwa
Assistant Commissioner of Police
Deputy Head, Conflict Early Warning and Response Unit (CEWERO)
Ministry of Internal Affairs

Moroto District Local Government
Andrew Keem Napaja  
District Chairman, Local Council V

Martin Gwokto  
Chief Administrative Officer

Aruk Maruk Richard  
Regional Police Commander

Hellen Pulkol  
Deputy Resident District Commissioner

**Rupa Subcounty Local Government**  
Godfrey Lotuk  
Subcounty Chief, Local Council III

Dan Apollo Loyomo  
Chairperson

Members of Peace Committee and Natural Resource Committee

**Loyoro Subcounty Local Government**  
Paul Loyollo  
Chairperson, Local Council III

Maurice Lokwang  
Security Officer

Philip Lochomin  
Speaker

Elisabeth Lopera  
Councilor for Women

Alibine Longole  
Chairperson, Local Council I

**Nongovernmental Organizations**

Mark Guti  
Moroto Office Director  
Mercy Corps

**Matheniko Development Forum (MADEFO)**  
Lucy Akello  
Program Coordinator

MADEFO staff members

**Dodoth Agro-pastoralist Development Organization DADO**  
Simon Peter Lomoe  
Executive Director

DADO staff members

**Community Representatives**

**Moroto Women’s Forum**  
Hellen Pulkol  
Chairperson

Dinah Lorika
Member of Low Level Women
Teddy Awilli
Member of Low Level Women
Rose Adero
Member of Low Level Women

Kaabong Women’s Forum
Regina Imuret
Chairperson
Lydia Akello
Member of Low Level Women
Lilly Naberi
Member of Low Level Women
Paska Acayo
Member of Low Level Women

Customary Institution Leaders (elders) at Loyoro Grazing Ground
Jino Lootan
Andrew Komol
Mariko Keno
Catherine Apus
Kizito Lokeris

Members of Kaabong Peace Ambassadors
Peter Achia
Chairperson
Simon Kamar
Vice Chairperson
Alex Lemukol
Secretary

Members of Kaabong Peace Ambassadors

Customary Institution Leaders (elders) at Napeikodo Kaabong West Subcounty
Meri Peter
Joseph Lokwang
John Lomoge
Martine Lelee
Apeyo Loduk

Members of the Natural Resource Sharing Committee at Loyoro Grazing Ground
Paul Akol Lomoe
Chairperson
Gabriel Lokong
Vice Chairperson
Samuel Loduk
Secretary
Joseph Lochoro
Treasurer
Rose Mudong
Mobiliser