Advanced Review

Panacea or paradox? Cross-sector partnerships, climate change, and development

Tim Forsyth*

Cross-sector partnerships between representatives of state, private business, and civil society are widely proposed as means to involve non-state actors in public policy. Yet, critics have argued partnerships contain paradoxes that prevent effective regulation or social inclusion. This paper reviews these debates and applies them to climate change policy in developing countries, and especially technology transfer and forest governance. The paper argues that debate about partnerships needs to move from rhetoric to identifying institutional designs that maximize contractual obligations and enhance local deliberation. But enhancing deliberation also implies looking at how partnerships reflect, rather than create, wider norms and advocacy coalitions, and by creating standardized means of collaboration such as free and prior informed consent. Rethinking partnerships in these ways not only accelerates climate change mitigation but also builds local adaptive capacity. *WIREs Clim Change* 2010 1 683–696

INTRODUCTION

This paper analyzes the role of intersectoral or cross-sector partnerships (CSPs) between members of the state, industry, and civil society in international climate change policy. In recent years, it has almost become *de rigueur* to say that climate change policy requires the active participation of both state and non-state actors. But the theoretical apparatus to harness and involve non-state actors is still poorly developed. This paper seeks to help overcome this shortfall by reviewing debates about partnerships and make suggestions for advancing their use in climate change policy, especially in developing countries.

The paper's chief argument is that CSPs can help reduce investors' costs and increase local participation and benefits. But there is a need to move beyond rhetorical uses of the word 'partnership'—which often give the impression of inclusive debate—to seeing partnerships as institutions that maximize both contractual obligations and local deliberation. Partnerships do not simply emerge from offering businesses incentives for investing in climate-friendly activities. Rather, they have to be built, and this paper suggests ways that actors—including states and funders—can attempt to facilitate partnerships through actions such as reducing costs, and institutionalizing forms of consent seeking and shared understandings of policy.

The paper begins by reviewing arguments for and against CSPs in public policy, and then applies these debates to climate change policy. It then illustrates them in relation to climate technology transfer and forest governance, and makes suggestions for how to make CSPs more effective.

CSPs: A PANACEA?

In their narrowest sense, CSPs are collaborations between actors from the different sectors of state, business, and society in order to achieve some aspect of public policy. They are sometimes also called bi- or tri-sector partnerships depending on whether two or three of these sectors participate.[1,2]

It is now widely agreed that CSPs have undergone a transition in their style and form since the 1990s. Some of the earliest applications of CSPs included classic forms of public–private partnerships, where governments would issue contracts to private companies to deliver public services and infrastructure that traditionally would have been provided by

*Correspondence to: t.j.forsyth@lse.ac.uk

Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, WC2A 2AE UK

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the state alone.[3,4] But since the late 1990s, CSPs have increasingly included new and more deliberative forms of governance based upon collaboration and consultation of non-state actors and the state.[5,6] Indeed, one Indonesian NGO (cited by the Asia Foundation[7], p. 59), stated: 'by creating partnerships, we also are trying to encourage greater equality and to promote values such as social justice'.

Analysts of public policy have proposed that CSPs can advance governance by addressing three 'policy deficits'.[8–10] The 'regulatory deficit' can be filled by allowing partnerships to provide new norms of acceptable behavior by non-state actors in arenas where states have historically lacked capacity. Second, CSPs can address the 'implementation deficit' if they can encourage actors to carry out policy objectives. And thirdly, partnerships help overcome the 'participation deficit' by inviting less powerful stakeholders, such as local citizens, to deliberate over, and shape, public policy.[11–14]

Accordingly, CSPs have become something of a panacea for some analysts—often those proposing neo-liberal, or New Public Management approaches to public policy—because they attempt to empower individuals and businesses within public policy, while also diminishing the reliance on states.[15] Indeed, CSPs form part of a growing trend toward a more deliberative and devolved form of governance using concepts such as 'public policy partnerships',[16] the 'mutual state',[17] or 'network' or 'hybrid' governance.[18] These approaches, in principle, aim to harness civil society more effectively within public policy by increasing public debate, and passing greater responsibility for certain public services to the local level. Proponents claim doing this will increase the speed and accountability of local public service provision, and decrease costs by reducing the need for a centralized state.

CSPs have already become popular within formal debates about international development. Section 8 of the United Nations' (UN) Millennium Development Goals, for example, have called for a 'new partnership for development' involving various collaborations of business and development. The UN's Global Compact was a more focused attempt to forge new partnerships between large businesses and NGOs in international development. And the World Summit for Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg in 2002 called for 'Type II' partnerships between actors such as governments, international organizations, companies, NGOs, and scientific organizations as a way to accelerate development. Furthermore, some bilateral donors have developed 'partnerships' as a forum for formulating and implementing development objectives.

OR PARADOX?

Despite these advantages, CSPs have also attracted critics for three apparent paradoxes.[9,10]

First, can partnerships produce effective regulation without the presence of effective states, or similar authoritative rule-makers? This criticism was pointed at the UN's Type II partnerships,[19,20] where it was alleged that large transnational corporations should be the *target* of regulation, rather than the agent of regulation. Moreover, states do not operate outside of the political and economic influences that influence partnerships, but instead are affected by these factors too. In effect, this criticism questions the ability of CSPs to address the regulation deficit.

Second, can CSPs successfully implement policy when there are strong political divides between sectors? Is it possible, for example, to reduce investment costs and increase local deliberation at the same time? This proposal seems to undermine the logic of how and why businesses seek collaboration. Accordingly, this paradox weakens the ability of CSPs to address the implementation deficit.

And third, can partnerships exist only by reducing public deliberation? Much interaction between business and civil society might be closer to conflict rather than cooperation. Reaching agreement, therefore, might imply reducing the range of frames or concerns under discussion, and focusing instead on limited areas of consensus. Indeed, some analysts of ecological modernization (or the integration of economic progress with environmental protection) have proposed that many apparently successful examples have succeeded only by redefining shared conceptions of sustainable development, rather than addressing all public worries.[21] This concern therefore questions the ability of CSPs to address the participation deficit.

Consequently, there are many reasons to question whether CSPs can indeed address public policy objectives or lead to meaningful inclusion of weaker parties such as citizens. One study of partnerships in the UK suggested that CSPs dating from the 1990s tended to use local communities as token participants rather than built long-term local deliberative capacity.[22] Evidence from Canada suggested that two CSPs involving natural resources did not overcome competition between collaborators, and failed to empower (rather than simply consult) citizens.[23] And a further study of partnerships encouraged by the Scottish Environment Protection Agency argued that partnerships still exhibited (or required) a technocratic direction from public servants that reflected an underlying lack of motivation to democratize policy objectives.[24]

Accordingly, critics have suggested that the very word 'partnerships' tends to give the impression of inclusion but often tends to reflect short-term interests of parties forging collaboration, rather than longer-term building of decentralized policy or deliberation. Biermann et al.[9,10] (p. 256) noted: 'considering the amount of time and finding invested in each partnership, it seems not surprising that partners themselves tend to be the primary beneficiaries of their partnerships'. And Andonova and Levy[20] (p. 23) concluded 'partnerships are mainly ''supply-driven'' (by what powerful actors have to offer)'. Clearly, partnerships are not yet delivering their potential benefits. What can be done?

FROM RHETORIC TO INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN

This paper argues that four steps can help transform CSPs from vaguely defined acts of 'partnering' toward mechanisms that can address—or at least lesson—the three deficits of regulation, implementation, and inclusion. These four steps can help move the debate about CSPs from rhetorical and ill-defined references to 'partnerships' and 'consultation' to more focused acts of collaboration that can actually allow different sectors to work together to deliver public services or goods.

Diversity of Institutional Arrangements

First, there is a need to see CSPs as institutional arrangements between different actors, with different objectives and methods. Consequently, institutions will vary according to the factors that drive collaborators toward agreement, and partnerships will have varied objectives, complexity, and methods.

Table 1 illustrates some of the more common forms of partnerships that exist today. These forms range from the very contractual (such as classic public–private partnerships between states and investors such as Build Operate and Transfer agreements) to the very discursive and conflictual (such as public consultations or disagreements between investors and NGOs). CSPs that are best able to deliver public services involve contractual obligations as well as building local capacity to deliberate and choose policy objectives in an inclusive way. Most successful forms of CSPs, therefore, are located within the central part of this table, and especially in the 'complementary' and 'shared' forms of collaboration, in which different CSPs can cooperate both to provide public services, and increase local deliberation at the same time. Advocacy coalitions, or policy networks based on consultation and advice, therefore might be forms of CSPs. But these more discursive and advisory networks do not typically involve contracts to provide public services, and hence might not be considered the most complete examples of CSPs in principle.

Assurance Mechanisms

Second, in accordance with neo-institutional theory, successful CSPs require strong 'assurance mechanisms' to ensure that different actors remain within an institution despite pre-existing differences in outlook and objectives.[25–29] Assurance mechanisms are practices that keep different sectors within a partnership. These mechanisms might include formal practices such as contracts and laws, or less formal mechanisms such as incentives paid by individual companies or NGOs to facilitate collaboration. There might also be certain non-financial incentives for remaining in partnership, such as good public relations (or avoiding negative media reporting). Assurance mechanisms might therefore be context specific rather than universally predictable.

Transaction Costs

Third, neo-institutional theory also points to the role of minimizing transaction costs in order to keep partnerships alive. Transaction costs are the barriers to successful collaboration, including financial costs, time, or inconvenience arising from collaboration. Low transaction costs therefore make CSPs more likely, especially where they coincide with strong assurance mechanisms, Weber[27] for example, refers to the both transaction cost and assurance mechanisms as ways to understand how partnerships succeed or fail (Table 2).

Deliberative Capacity

And fourthly, successful institutions also require parties to negotiate and acknowledge different perspectives about the objectives and methods of the partnership. In this sense, CSPs are not simply instrumental means of implementing pre-defined public policy objectives, but also sites where norms about environment or acceptable social behavior are negotiated and replicated.[30] The ability for CSPs to allow different parties to feel included and to reach mutual understanding might be called deliberative capacity (because it allows different positions to be deliberated upon). Successful deliberation might therefore depend on the willingness of parties to cooperate; the historic trust of parties for each other; and the compatibility of different perceptions of the underlying problem to

TABLE 1 | Simplified Classification of CSPs

	Partnerships Defined More in Contractual Terms			Partnerships Defined More in Deliberative Terms	
Type of Partnership	Substitutive	Complementary	Shared	Consultative	Conflictual
Typical actors	Classic 'public–private partnership'. Usually state and private investor	Parties undertake complementary economic roles, sometimes under contract to each other. E.g., community groups and private	Parties undertake overlapping roles. Can include all sectors	One party consults another for advice or permission without contracts. E.g., business and community groups	Parties engage in conflict or activism to influence each other or the state. Usually NGOs and businesses
Example	State contracts private investor to build plants. Ownership transferred to state after some years	Investor supplies electricity-generating technology, citizens may collect or segregate waste supply	Investor and citizens may both seek to benefit from waste recycling, although perhaps with different objectives	Investor has meetings with citizens to build trust and gain information	Not a classic partnership but can create agreements. E.g., NGOs influencing business practice through newspapers
Typical assurance mechanisms	Clearly defined contract, such as build–operate–transfer	Contracts between parties, assumption that parties gain from different roles	Contracts between parties, assumption that collaboration helps parties	Desire to avoid conflict, or damage to company reputation	Fear of criticism or reputational damage, loss of trust
Typical deliberative forums	Negotiations with the state, public tendering process	Negotiations between companies and communities, often helped by state	Negotiations between companies and communities, often helped by state	Meetings with community leaders, incorporation into public relations, etc.	Occasional public and private meetings, advertising campaigns in local press, etc.
Likely conceptual outcomes for public policy[1]	Privatized public service provision	Network governance, mutual state	Network governance, mutual state	Advocacy coalitions	Discourse coalitions
Typical costs, or threats, to partnership	Failure of either party to satisfy contract	Collaboration may be seen as less important than individual roles of parties	Different objectives of collaborators may undermine shared activities	Consultation seen as 'greenwash' or fail to build sufficient trust	If no responses to each party's position are made, and parties withdraw

Source: Expanded from Forsyth[54].
[1]These conceptual outcomes are likely to co-exist with others. The most typical outcomes are listed here for each style of partnership.

TABLE 2 | Conditions Influencing the Emergence and Maintenance of Collaboration

		Transactions Costs of Alternative Decisions		
		High and Applicable to All Stakeholders	High for Most Stakeholders but Not All	Low
The Assurance Mechanism	None	No collaboration	No collaboration	No collaboration
	Partial	Collaboration possible, but not sustainable	Highly unlikely	No collaboration
	Full	Sustained collaboration	Collaboration possible, but not sustainable	No collaboration

Source: Weber,[27] (p. 21).

be addressed. In turn, deliberative capacity might also reflect the ability of parties to cooperate and communicate successfully; including their knowledge of legal matters or media.

Building deliberative capacity, however, poses important questions. There has been a tendency, for example, to see deliberation as necessarily 'local' because 'inclusion' is usually used to discuss the role of local stakeholders in partnerships. Yet it is now clear that many frames and objectives for public policy cannot be restricted spatially to a locality, and that partnerships often reflect, rather than build, wider norms and advocacy coalitions.[31,32] Local citizens, for example, might be advised by national or international NGOs. Similarly, partnerships might form the expression for local concerns that are—at first glance—not immediately connected to the partnership. The transaction costs and potential for reaching shared visions of the purpose of partnerships might also vary greatly, and be especially difficult when partnerships involve large differences between parties such as between multinational investors and marginalized village groups in developing countries.

The potential to build locally deliberative partnerships has already been discussed within environmental debates known as 'cooperative environmental governance',[33] 'civic environmentalism',[34] community-driven regulation,[35] and 'pro-poor public–private partnerships'.[36] These approaches have identified ways that investors might be influenced by local citizens, or how environmental policy can be diversified in favor of local concerns.

But, it is not clear if these forms of environmental deliberation can also be called CSPs if they only advise on policy objectives and do not also contain some contractual delivery of environmental goods and services. It is further not clear if these concepts can be applied easily under conditions of poverty or rapid industrialization. Meadowcroft[37], for example, listed six benefits of Cooperative Environmental Governance including a more structured framework for pluralist inputs into environmental policymaking; a mechanism for building consensus; flexibility between contexts and participants; more stable policy outcomes; social learning about scientific advice; and learning about collaboration. These positive outcomes, might not be achieved where poverty or other barriers prevent public debate; or where environmental norms and activism are shaped by international advocacy groups or middle classes rather than weaker voices in civil society. Moreover, some environmentalists have suggested that climate change policy is too urgent to seek full local participation in policymaking because so many local voices lack awareness of problems (also see Refs 38,39).

Despite this concern, some activists have argued that states and international NGOs should—if possible—help build deliberative capacity by advancing rights for public expression. In advanced societies, public rights for dissent are relatively well established through activities such as writing to newspapers, citizen advice bureaus, and national laws that protect rights of consultation.[40] In many developing world contexts, these rights and accepted practices might not be established. Some activists, therefore, have proposed formalizing rights through uniform practices such as Free and Prior Informed Consent (FPIC), which requires the state or investor to present, explain, and seek agreement to new investments and projects from local stakeholders.[41] FPIC can be seen to be both a technical means of deliberation as well as a means of building trust within new partnerships by allowing citizens to consider evidence. It has a different and more specific meaning to 'consultation' alone, because FPIC implies that people agree to a proposal.[42] It might not be possible to get the agreement of individual states to procedures such as FPIC, because states are also influenced by political and economic pressures, but activist groups such as the Forest People's Programme have requested that international funders such as the World Bank adopt this practice.

These steps help transform CSPs from rhetorical acts of discussion toward more practical means of harnessing non-state actors in public policy. But can they be applied to climate change policy?

CSPs AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY

CSPs within climate change policy have been proposed for three main reasons. First, it is now clear that most international investment—especially including environmentally sound technology (EST)—is now conducted by the private sector, and accordingly the climate change impacts of this investment need to be regulated or harnessed. Second, local citizens and civil society groups need to be included in climate change policy in order to be aware of why measures are necessary, and to ensure that proposed policies are relevant for local groups, and hence more likely to succeed. And thirdly, there are limits to how far states—as political actors—can enact climate change policy at the sub-state level when so much economic activity is carried out by citizens and private-sector companies.

To date, however, most inter-state negotiations about climate change policy have not prioritized how to undertake CSPs or other institutional means of collaborating with non-state actors. Rather, the

flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol [of Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation, and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)] have focused on providing incentives for climate-friendly investment, such as through carbon credits, without assessing how to allow parties to make investment more successful through collaboration.

Some elements of CSPs, nonetheless, have emerged in climate change policy. Many aspects of climate change policy overtly referred to 'partnerships', although not necessarily in a contractual sense. For example, the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate[a] (APP) was agreed in 2005 between the countries of Australia, India, Japan, China, South Korea, and the USA (Canada joined in 2007).[43] This partnership was essentially between states, but involved the intention to collaborate with industrial partners by seeking ways to enhance international technology transfer for climate change mitigation (especially concerning coal) through incentives and frameworks for private investors. Critics, however, have suggested the APP was designed primarily to take attention away from the Kyoto Protocol, and that the scheme lacks teeth because it has no formal targets for greenhouse gas reductions. In this sense, the APP might arguably be another rhetorical use of the word 'partnership'. Indeed, according to US Senator John McCain, the APP was 'nothing more than a nice little public relations ploy'.[44]

Various other frameworks also refer to 'partnerships'. For example, the World Bank's Forest Carbon Partnership Fund of 2007 was established to help encourage private investment in forest management (see below). The 'Methane to Markets Partnership'[b] provides information and assistance to investors seeking to capture methane from land uses such as waste dumps and coalmines. The Millennium Development Goals have a specific China Climate Change Partnership Framework that advises on implementing climate change policy in China. ICLEI (Local Governments for Sustainability)[c] is an international association of local governments offering technical assistance and information at the local level. The International Climate Change Partnership[d] (ICCP) includes companies and trade associations from diverse industries. And there are numerous single, local-level partnerships, such as the London Climate Change Partnership,[e] which is part of the London Mayoral office to disseminate information about climate change (see also Refs 31,38,39 for more discussions of international advocacy and capacity building at the local level for climate change policy).

These kinds of partnerships, however, have tended to use rhetorical or awareness-building forms of collaboration, rather than the closer institutional arrangements based on contacts between different parties. These, more contractual, forms of CSP are most developed where private businesses seek to undertake climate-friendly investments involving local citizens or civil society organizations as willing partners. There are two arenas of climate change policy that might offer the most opportunity for adopting this kind of more collaboration, yet contractual, form of CSP.

The first arena is in implementing climate-friendly investment in developing countries, especially through the CDM. The CDM was created under the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 to encourage climate-friendly investment in non-Annex I countries (or developing countries). Unlike other mechanisms (such as Joint Implementation within Annex I countries), the CDM requires investment to contribute to 'sustainable development' in general, rather than greenhouse gas mitigation alone. This clause is now known as the CDM's 'development dividend', and is an important opportunity for local deliberation to influence the nature of investment (Ref 45, p. 14; see also Ref 46).

The determination of the CDM's 'development dividend' to date, however, has not always been achieved through local deliberation, but through national policies set by each country's Designated National Authority for climate change investment, and the CDM's own Executive Board, which has the ability to reject projects if they are considered insufficiently developmental.[f] Some critics have claimed this evaluation process both adds to investors' costs and reduces the flexibility for identifying what are sufficiently developmental projects. CSPs, therefore, might make investment easier for investors, and increase local deliberation about the development dividend.

The second arena is in the growing debate about adaptation to climate change. Adaptation involves learning to live with the impacts of climate change as well as trying to mitigate (or prevent) it. Yet, some critics have suggested that formal approaches to adaptation under the climate change convention deny opportunities for integrating adaptation with mitigation[47] The Marrakesh Accords of 2001 set up a new Adaptation Fund by extracting 2% of carbon credit profit from CDM investments, rather than insisting. But critics suggest that this decision adds to investors' costs without specifying how CDM projects can build adaption by activities such as offering livelihoods to vulnerable people. One possible means of integrating adaptation more closely with long-term development is Community-Based Adaptation (CBA) to climate change, which allows community members to shape adaptation, and integrate development

objectives with climate change policy.[48] Again, this arena seems another ideal application for CSPs.

This article now focus specifically on two different issues' areas where CSPs can play a role in climate governance according to the criteria identified before. These two themes are industrial technology transfer (often in connection with the CDM) and forest governance [as potentially linked to Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD)]. These examples are not proposed to be exhaustive summaries of the potential of CSPs in climate change policy, but they have been selected to indicate two very different arenas where private investors and local citizens can form CSPs for environmental policy.

Climate Technology Transfer

Transferring ESTs from richer to poorer countries has been recognized as a priority for climate change policy for a long time. But there has been little overt discussion of how to build CSPs for this purpose. Chapter 34 of Agenda 21, for example, stated that technology transfer should proceed '. . .on favorable terms, including on concessional and preferential terms'. But this statement (also echoed in Article 4 of the UNFCCC) did not address the commercial realities that any technology transfer needs to address commercial concerns of investors. Long-term technology transfer also requires compatibility with local needs, as well as investment in maintenance and cost-recovery mechanisms (see Refs 49–51).

The CDM, in principle, was a key step toward enhancing private investment in international technology transfer because it offered incentives for companies to mitigate climate change in developing countries, usually through investments in technologies, and by creating a local development dividend. But the CDM has been criticized for failing to achieve either sufficient technology transfer or the development dividend. Critics have suggested that too much investment has gone into 'sinks' projects (concerning the sequestration potential of land use and afforestation/reforestation), which contribute little to industrialization (although the role of these projects was restricted under the Marrakesh Accords)[52,53] (p. 4).

Moreover, critics say the CDM is too costly and complex. The Adaptation Fund is seen by some investors to reduce overall profits, and the decision-making process of the CDM Executive Board is considered time consuming, adding to transaction costs.[45] Indeed, some investors now prefer to use the so-called Voluntary Carbon Units (VCUs) as an additional means of reducing emissions alongside the CDM, but which currently do not count toward emissions reduction targets.[54] Indeed, in some cases such as in Sub-Saharan Africa, the overall difficulties of achieving financially attractive projects that can generate positive cash flows during loan lifetimes has been so difficult that the main impetus for CDM investment has been for generating good public relations, rather than profits based on carbon credits. One climate adviser noted, 'unfortunately, the CDM in Africa is largely about selling stories for corporate social responsibility rather than profits on climate change credits'.[g]

But are these trends permanent? Or can a more focused approach to CSPs reduce investors' costs and enhance local deliberation about how investment contributes to development?

Some researches by the author[30,49,55,56] offer insights into how CSPs can be used to enhance climate technology transfer. This research analyzed case studies of CSPs relating to waste-to-energy investments for climate change policy in India, the Philippines, and Thailand. These examples were selected because they were live examples of different actors building CSPs to implement climate change policy, and achieve policy beyond the past activities of the state. In particular, the research focused biomethanation (the capture of methane from organic waste), or the use of rice husks, both for electricity generation. These methods might use municipal waste from cities, but they do not include the direct incineration of waste.

Transaction Costs

The main transaction costs of CSPs involved securing regular supplies of organic waste, and in achieving understanding among diverse partners. For example, one major investor in the Philippines (Enron) had attempted to build a single 40-MW energy plant using rice husks as fuel in the northern island of Luzon. This was a relatively ambitious size for a plant, and Enron had contracted with some 150 rice farmers to buy their entire husk supply. Unfortunately, the early plans about costs and contracts were undermined when the rice farmers began to realize that Enron had no alternative supply of husks, and consequently raised their prices, Under these conditions, the financiers withdrew their support.

Also in the Philippines, a smaller US investor (PhilBio) tried to build a biomethanation plant in the wealthy suburb of Ayala Alabang near Manila. In principle, this was a classic complementary CSP because the company supplied electricity from its technology, and a local NGO was happy to supply the waste (which was causing problems of pollution). The company tried to provide livelihoods by hiring local people to sort waste into different streams of organic, inorganic, and recyclable wastes such as glass and

paper. Unfortunately, this project also failed. First, the company found that the waste stream was not as valuable to them as they had planned because the waste pickers removed the most valuable recyclable elements from the waste stream covertly. And secondly, local landowners raised the rents charged to the investor because they believed an international company might be able to pay more. The plans for positive collaboration therefore fell away when the chance of short-term profits appeared to local actors.

Assurance Mechanisms

Assurance mechanisms were a way to reduce these kinds of problems. In Thailand, one power company (AT Biopower) chose a different strategy to Enron by building six, smaller, 16-MW rice-husk power plants (rather than a single large plant). The company also contracted with just 20–30 rice millers per plant (rather than 150), and used just 10–15% of each miller's husk production. Contracts also included fines if millers did not supply their contracted amount, and bonuses if they achieved their target. These contractual arrangements meant that the assurance mechanisms were stronger, leading to a greater willingness of local collaborators to remain in the partnership.

The problems with biomethanation were also addressed to some extent by the experiences of the same US company in the far southern Philippine city of General Santos in Mindanao, and by an investor in the Indian city of Lucknow in Uttar Pradesh. In both locations, local governments have reputations for including poorer people in economic development. The investors employed waste pickers to sort waste. But unlike above, investors did not plan on making money from recycling waste, as they knew this was unlikely to produce value. In Lucknow, the investor (an Asian consortium) also worked closely with the Chennai-based NGO, Exnora, which specializes in community waste management and which trains people of low caste to collect (and recycle) waste from middle-class households. In an interview, a representative of the company said 'we don't want to upset the existing social system. Our main income comes from power, fertilizer and carbon credits. . . . we are not . . .depriving people of livelihoods'.

Deliberative Capacity

In all cases, CSPs were surprisingly limited as arenas for citizens to shape projects. In Thailand, the Thai investor's first attempt to establish a power plant in Suphan Buri province was resisted by local people because they believed (falsely) it was linked to profiteering by a local corrupt politician. Opponents of the plant spread false rumors that the electricity cables would prevent rainfall, or sterilize people who walked underneath them. The investor responded by withdrawing from this site and conducting future investments more carefully.

Also, in the Philippines and Thailand, plans for biomethanation plants met unexpected resistance from the local branches of the international NGO, Greenpeace. Representatives of the NGO in the Philippines had won a campaign to ban incineration of municipal waste in 2000. In the years following this success, the NGO tried to resist all forms of waste-to-energy on the grounds that it legitimized the creation of waste. Moreover, at that time, some local workers for Greenpeace misassociated biomethanation technologies with incineration, and feared that any discussion of biomethanation would undermine the ban on incineration. Indeed, on one occasion, the researcher himself was accused of working for a foreign technology company. And when asked about biomethanation, another Greenpeace worker said 'I think they tried to ban it in Europe'. (The researcher checked these statements with Greenpeace in Europe, and was told that these statements did not match the intentions of Greenpeace's HQ.)

Another common concern in the Philippines was that biomethanation would mean removing local people's livelihoods by taking the ownership of waste from waste pickers and transferring it to wealthy foreign companies. In one case (in Baguio, northern Luzon), a local NGO had represented the waste pickers in discussions with the company. But the company found that the NGO wanted to maintain the status quo, which involved keeping waste pickers working on municipal waste dumps, rather than as employees at a biomethanation plant. The company claimed that—in this case—the NGO did not help represent the waste pickers' interests.

Lessons

There are various apparent lessons for building CSPs. First, it is clear that CSPs can be constructed with the assistance of strong assurance mechanisms, which can keep collaborators in partnerships, and reduce transaction costs. Some mechanisms were largely common sense: for example, rewarding rice-husk millers to honor contracts, and fining them for undersupply. Some others were lessons from experience, such as the realization that it was not wise to plan to use the entire waste stream for biomethanation.

But it is also clear that most collaborations between private investors and local citizens in these examples were beset with misunderstandings, and opportunities for parties to act competitively rather than collaboratively. This finding was also noted

in developed countries by Jupp[22] and Mitchell,[23], discussed above.

Furthermore, the deliberative aspects of CSPs were apparently more complex than expected. Deliberation within CSPs was not confined to the locality or actual participants involved in partnerships. Rather, deliberations were mostly based on frames introduced by relatively more powerful NGOs (often outside localities), and along lines that identified with general norms (such as concerning a waste-free society, or the resentment of foreign investment) rather than site-specific concerns. Indeed, in the research for these case studies, the researcher found the only actors regularly referring to climate change were the investors. Local NGOs and citizens were not usually concerned, nor aware, of the potential risks of climate change, or the potential role of the investment in mitigating climate change.

The role of the state was also limited. In some cases, the presence of an overseeing and pro-poor local government was important in making large investments take place. But it was also difficult for states to influence underlying worries about new technologies, or for the manner in which non-state actors approached partnerships. These findings suggest that it is difficult for states to 'design' CSPs as part of environmental policy, rather than seek to assist partners where they are willing.

Consequently, the CSPs discussed here can be seen as examples of complementary or shared styles of partnerships described in Table 1 because they allowed contracts to be formed between different sectors. But progress toward social learning about environment, or in reaching a shared conception of the problem, was relatively poorly advanced at the time of research.

CSPs and Forest Governance

Research about CSPs concerning forests and climate change is relatively new and often conducted by critical NGOs. This section, however, reviews some of the literature to make comments on the applicability of CSPs in this emerging field of policy.

The Copenhagen Accord of 2009 confirmed that REDD will become part of climate change policy, and that the form of policy will be REDD+ (or the avoidance of deforestation, as well as reforestation and afforestation). Avoided deforestation has been called a 'highly cost-effective option' because it benefits climate change and forest policies simultaneously[57] (p. 537). Yet, against this, some critics have claimed that the sequestration benefits of many forest schemes are overstated.[58] Moreover, development-oriented critics claim REDD+ does not acknowledge sufficiently the rights and needs of forest-dependent communities.[41,59] Some potential problems include the inability of financial mechanisms to offer on-the-ground development options to marginalized social groups; or for afforestation/reforestation to remove land that would previously have gone to agriculture. Another concern is that framing forests as an important solution to climate change might also support forest conservation models that lead to evictions or the inappropriate portrayal of marginal people (such as those who used to practice shifting cultivation) as drivers of deforestation.[60]

The Stern Review[57] (p. 541) states: 'clarity over boundaries and ownership [with avoided deforestation], and the allocation of property rights regarded as just by local communities, will enhance the effectiveness of property rights in practice and strengthen the institutions required to support and enforce them'. But it is not clear how these steps will be achieved.

Most discussion at present is about REDD, which will reward countries with large forest areas for reducing deforestation rates.[61] The concept has been led by the Coalition of Rainforest Nations (comprising 33 countries) and especially Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea. This trend has been supported in 2006–2007 when the World Bank led discussions for a 'Global Forest Alliance' and 'Forest Carbon Partnership Facility' in collaboration with conservation NGOs such as the Nature Conservancy, Conservation International, World Wide Fund (WWF), and private-sector investors. One popular example of a REDD project-in-the-making is the Juma reserve in the Brazilian state of Amazonas (otherwise known as the Amazonas Sustainable Foundation or Fundação Amazonas Sustentável), which includes various private backers to prevent the deforestation of around 366,151 ha of tropical forests and release of 210,885,604 tons of CO_2 that are predicted by 2050.[h] The project will achieve this through environmental monitoring, creating sustainable businesses, community development, and paying individuals as well as communities in forest zones to avoid deforestation (payment for environmental services).

These terms clearly indicate a form of CSP. But how do existing studies show whether CSPs operate successfully in the governance of forests and climate?

Transaction Costs

The immediate problem for defining the transaction costs of REDD+ projects is that costs vary according to the objectives of projects. Evidence to date suggests that transaction costs are very high if there

is an earnest attempt to include forest-dependent communities. For example, Granda[62] assessed a Dutch-sponsored monoculture tree plantation in Ecuador, and concluded there were immense transaction costs in implementing a meaningful level of participation within the CSP. Despite agreeing contracts, local land users were never informed by the carbon forestry company about payments they would receive per hectare; they did not know the purpose of carbon credits; they did not know about penalty clauses, and consequently were now in debt in order to pay such penalties. Villagers also felt aggrieved they had to pay all unforeseen costs of forest plantations, such as failed seedlings or fire damage.

The implications of this particularly critical case study are that it was very different to achieve full compliance and awareness building of these forest-dependent people. But was this situation caused by low levels of awareness to begin with, or the lack of regulation to ensure full training and commitment by investors?

A further report by Greenpeace[63] in the Democratic Republic of Congo argued that the World Bank's strategies there increased, rather than avoided deforestation, by using logging as a form of economic development—and that logging titles have frequently been allocated without acknowledging local land rights. Indeed, the report claimed payments of just salt and beer have been made to community leaders in return for logging rights. In another study of the World Bank in Guyana, Griffiths[59] (p. 11) argued, 'the national REDD concept submitted to the [Forest Carbon Partnership Fund]... contains misleading and inaccurate information on land tenure, governance and deforestation', and that in Peru, the Bank's technical advisors explicitly refused to acknowledge forest peoples as key rights holders in REDD+.

Clearly, in cases like this, the nature of transaction costs depends on how different stakeholders see project objectives. According to these critical reports, the World Bank and investors did not want to undertake the costs of achieving full participation from local people. But these NGOs also argue that projects will ultimately fail—in terms of climate change policy and in terms of ethics—if this participation is not sought. In these cases, currently, the style of partnership is more akin to the conflictual form (Table 1), and there is not yet a complementary or shared vision of the public policy objective.

Assurance Mechanisms

Again, the recommendations for ensuring different outcomes vary between different stakeholders and their representatives. Critical NGOs such as the Forest People's Programme[59] (pp. 29, 30) propose a variety of steps to ensure better inclusion of local communities and private investors. Secure land tenure and community rights within forest resources feature strongly. There should be better negotiating capacity of community representatives; transparent procedures for grievances and benefit distribution; and even mutual agreement on both 'forest' and 'degradation'.

As discussed above, the concept of FPIC has been urged by various analysts.[42,64,65] Indeed, Griffiths[59,66] has argued that the World Bank approach to forest-related climate investment has used the term 'consultation' to imply a higher level of participation than actually achieved, and that FPIC should be the driving principle for REDD projects. On a more specific level, Wilson[65] (p. 31) outlines the activities by one investor (Veracel) for ensuring social participation in Brazil. These activities include a social networks program (to engage communities with collaborations); a social inventory (to map communities); social articulation and mobilization (to allow business employees to work with communities); and dialogues with local governments and neighboring landowners. Veracel's main work is in eucalyptus plantations, but it also engages in environmental restoration in degraded land.

Deliberative Capacity

Deliberation about REDD and forest-related climate investment is clearly more divided than concerning climate technology transfer. But, similar to technology transfer, many norms and values for governing forests come from powerful NGOs and actors outside of localities. On one hand, Griffiths[59] (p. 11) complains that many potential REDD projects have been designed by large environmental conservation NGOs such as the WWF for Nature and Conservation International, who might not champion livelihoods for forest communities. Yet, on the other hand, the voice of critical NGOs—such as Griffiths' own Forest People's Programme, or the Uruguay-based World Rainforest Movement—are clearly motivated by norms that place forest communities' livelihoods above other forms of conservation focusing on wilderness or carbon sequestration.

The CSPs investigated, in their current forms, were criticized because they did not encourage deliberation about forest conservation or climate change policy among the forest-dependent people. But importantly, some of the proposed assurance mechanisms for improving REDD projects also imply increasing deliberation. For example, FPIC implies that the concepts and purposes of any forest project should be

discussed and understood by local communities before they agree to it. Or, Veracel's program of sending employers to work with communities and engaging in dialog is another form of deliberation that also aims to reduce transaction costs and build assurance mechanisms.

Deliberative capacity about CSPs for forests and climate, therefore, is currently relatively low because of the large differences in how forests and forest projects are seen; and because of the wide difference in power and influence between stakeholders such as national states; international financial organizations and investors; international NGOs (within which there are many differences); and forest-dependent communities.

Lessons

Partnerships involving different sectors for forest-related climate investment are clearly less well developed than in climate technology transfer. Part of this reflects the fact that this field of investment and collaboration is newer than in technology. Yet, it also reflects the wider disparities between stakeholders such as international NGOs, investors and forest communities, and the tendency of each to prioritize different aspects of forest use as the motivations for policy. These differences are a main reason underlying the high transaction costs in trying to achieve a genuinely participatory and inclusive CSP.

So far, evidence suggests that the assurance mechanisms to address these concerns also imply building deliberative capacity. The proposals for more transparent negotiations or grievance procedures also imply greater space and time for discussing the purpose of projects. A consistent message from critical NGOs is that REDD+ projects should not be based on a simple form of 'partnership' based on consultation, but instead on FPIC, which includes an inherent level of deliberation.[42]

Yet, will this deliberation lead toward the agreement of different stakeholders on similar definitions of forest, appropriate forest use, and climate change policy? It is likely that such arrangements might occur in time for some CSPs. Hence, in Meadowcroft's terms[37] (p. 22), the CSPs considered here for integrating forest governance with climate change policy have not (yet) caused a pluralist or agreement-oriented input into environmental policy. Partnerships are still largely consultative (and controversially so) or conflictual (Table 1). At present, it seems the different normative values about forest projects, and the difficulties of achieving understanding among all parties, might undermine CSPs that seek to achieve contractual obligations and increased deliberation.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper started by asking if CSPs are a panacea or paradox in international climate change policy. In response, the paper concludes that CSPs offer immense potential. This conclusion in part reflects the likelihood that—in a very urgent sense—there might be no alternative to CSPs because climate change policy needs the full participation of non-state actors, and a greater amount of deliberation about how climate change affects local populations. But in order to achieve successful CSPs, important steps need to be taken.

First, it is necessary to apply the concept of 'partnership' in ways that refer to the contractual delivery of environmental goods and services rather than as rhetoric to refer to different sectors simply consulting each other. In semantic terms, there is no harm in referring to policy networks or advocacy coalitions as 'partnerships' because they involve forms of shared discussion and capacity building. But evidence has suggested that these kinds of partnerships might be motivated more out of public relations, brand management, or general advocacy rather than create the circumstances where private investors can address their needs relating to costs, and local citizens and civil society organizations can participate and deliberate with investors about policy. There is a need to differentiate between largely rhetorical uses of the word 'partnership', and instead focus on attempts to actually deliver public policy objectives in contractual and deliberative ways.

Second, there is a need to see CSPs as institutions, which can be designed and supported as spaces where contracting and deliberation on policy objectives can take place. In this sense, successful CSPs will have assurance mechanisms in order to maintain interest from different sectors, and which might also reduce transaction costs of collaboration. These design principles borrow from neo-institutional theory about bringing together actors with different agendas,[26–28] or from notions of network governance about the shared delivery of public services.[18] Moreover, institutions can become deliberative and inclusionary political spaces that can help achieved assurance mechanisms by allowing participants to seek common or complementary objectives.[40]

And third, there is a greater role of the state or funders to facilitate spaces where investors and local citizens can come together to negotiate CSPs. So far, mainstream climate change negotiations have focused on providing incentives for investors by offering credits for reducing greenhouse gas concentrations. These approaches seem to assume that CSPs (or other means of implementing climate change policies)

will emerge spontaneously to supply these incentives. Instead, states or funders—where possible—can help facilitate long-term and successful CSPs by providing adequate deliberative forums and opportunities for agreement. One opportunity is to make Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) a standard procedure as effectively an assurance mechanism and a form of deliberation that can build trust and awareness of policy objectives between local citizens and investors.

But there are also some concerns about building CSPs. First, states and funders are also influenced by political and economic restrictions in the same way as many non-state actors. It is sometimes infeasible for states to act as neutral facilitators of partnerships or to assume that rational design practices can work in practice. Indeed, it is clear that NGOs or other civil society organizations believe it necessary to pressurize some states and funders to facilitate successful CSPs. For example, the World Bank in some cases effectively performs the role of a state by setting rules and offering finance to local partnerships. But the World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Fund has been criticized for seeking a vision of forest management that does not include the views or rights of forest people.[59,63]

And second, the ability to make successful CSPs is much more difficult when actors have important differences in terms of power, or when deliberation includes many incompatible ideas. It is also difficult to build local deliberative institutions when ideas about appropriate policy can originate from international advocacy coalitions or when CSPs become the foci for wider debates about climate change and development that inhibit collaboration between different sectors. For example, in the examples relating to technology transfer and forest governance, CSPs were frequently undermined by clashes between national or international actors concerning the overall purpose of technology or forest policy. Clearly, these disagreements will not recede, but it is important to note that partnerships—whether successful or not—will always reflect and enforce normative visions from both localities and from larger spatial scales.

These concerns make it difficult to design and install CSPs without reference to the political influences in which each sector operates. One implication might be to focus on partnership processes rather than seeking to replicate standardized partnerships designs.[67] But these worries do not imply that CSPs should not be attempted. CSPs can accelerate climate change mitigation by overcoming the regulation, implementation, and inclusion deficits of state-led climate change policy. More locally, however, they can increase adaptive capacity by allowing citizens to participate in new economic activities, become more aware of risks, and hence provide livelihoods or risk aversion strategies for vulnerable groups. Building deliberative, and commercially attractive, CSPs therefore might not be a panacea, but—potentially—offer flexible and multifaceted ways to mitigate and adapt to climate change simultaneously.

NOTES

[a] http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/english/default.aspx
[b] http://www.methanetomarkets.org/
[c] http://www.iclei.org/
[d] http://www.iccp.net
[e] http://www.london.gov.uk/lccp/
[f] For example, climate change investment within Eastern Europe (under the mechanism known as Joint Implementation) might include flaring methane gas from waste dumps because burning methane converts reduces greenhouse gas concentrations by converting it into carbon dioxide (which is 25 times less warming). The CDM would usually require disallow flaring, and instead ask for the gas to be used for an additional developmental purpose such as electricity generation or heating[45] (p. 21).
[g] Natasha Calderwood, The Carbon Neutral Company, *pers. comm.* 2008.
[h] http://www.fas-amazonas.org/arquivos/juma_executive_summary.pdf

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